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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The experimental method: a historical primer
“It is a vulgar fallacy to suppose that scientific inquiry cannot be fundamental if
it threatens to become useful, or if it arises in response to problems posed by the
everyday world. The real world, in fact, is perhaps the most fertile of all sources of
good research questions calling for basic scientific inquiry” (Simon, 1979, p.494).
The history of modern economic thought is often stated to date back to the
year 1776 in which Adam Smith released his most famous work An Inquiry
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Specifically, the publication
of Smith’s book is seen as the start of classical economics, a field that has
subsequently been further developed by most notably Thomas Maltus and
David Ricardo. The advent of neo-classical theory in the late nineteenth
century through the works of among others Carl Menger and Léon Walras
led to a paradigm shift away from an aggregate decision making framework
used in classical theory towards a marginal decision making framework.
However, with the stronger focus on marginal decision making also came
the need to model individual behavior in a more formal manner. Perhaps the
most important assumption within neo-classical economics used to model
this behavior is the assumption of perfect (unbounded) rationality. For an
individual to be rational in the neo-classical sense, he is assumed to be able
to perfectly align his (transitive) preferences with all of his possibilities in
order to optimize his own well being under the constraints faced. Specifi-
cally, the process of rational decision making proceeds by first (1) listing all
possible options, (2) studying every option’s consequences and, finally, (3)
choosing the option that maximizes well-being.1
Although the assumption of perfect rationality has provided economics
with an extremely powerful tool to model decision making in a formal way,
the assumption has not remained uncriticized. The first major opposition
1By modeling individuals as fully rational decision makers, neo-classical economics was
able to “liberate economic analysis from its social and historical boundaries [..]” in order to allow for
the further formalization of the discipline as a whole (Zouboulakis, 2014, p.33). In line with
the greater emphasis on formal models, the neo-classical definition of rational choice, also
called ’rational choice theory’, is thus very much an optimization driven model of choice.
Moreover, this optimization could be made explicit with the introduction of utility theory
which, under some (mild) additional assumptions, can be shown to directly flow from ratio-
nal choice theory.
1
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1
against the assumption was levied by Herbert Simon (Simon, 1955). While
’strikingly simple’ and convenient from a theoretical standpoint, he deemed
perfect rationality and the optimization behavior related to it as unrealistic
and unrelated to actual human behavior. He argued this was especially true
for decisions involving uncertainty and imperfect competition. Instead, Si-
mon argued human behavior to be only boundedly rational and more aptly
described by ’satisficing’ rather then optimizing, meaning individuals would
search for an alternative that satisfied some aspiration level instead of resort-
ing to a computationally intensive optimizing procedure based on marginal
analysis (Simon, 1955, 1979).2 By introducing the concept of bounded ratio-
nality “Simon sought to criticize neoclassical economists for their lack of interest in
the formal foundations of rationality” (Klaes et al., 2005, p.38).3
A seminal paper responsible for the further development of the concept
of bounded rationality is Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in which an alterna-
tive for the omnipresent expected utility (EUT) theory was offered. In their
study Kahneman and Tversky show that subjects’ actual behavior in choice
problems violates EUT because it showcases (1) probability weighting, (2)
reference dependence, (3) loss aversion and (4) diminishing sensitivity (Bar-
beris, 2013). In order to facilitate the observed violations of EUT, Kahneman
and Tverksy developed cumulative prospect theory (CPT) which, together
with Kahneman and Tversky’s earlier work on heuristics and biases first
published in Science (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), paved the way for a
more behavioral stance toward economic decision making that borrowed
2It can be argued that although bounded rationality is now a far more well known con-
cept, Simon’s later beliefs regarding human decision making are more closely aligned with
the concept of ’procedural rationality’. Whereas bounded rationality mainly serves as a cri-
tique on the neo-classical framework and has low specificity in that it does not specify how a
decision process works under limited cognitive means, procedural decision making provides
a more detailed explanation of this process (Barros, 2010).
3Simon’s approach based on bounded instead of perfect rationality in turn received criti-
cism from other prominent economists. Benjamin Friedman for instance argued that realism
is not a prime necessity as long as a theory “yields predictions that are good enough for the pur-
pose in hand”, implying one should not focus on the realism of the assumptions of a theory
but rather on its implications (Friedman, 1979, p.41). John Muth took another stance by
instead arguing that “dynamic economic models do not assume enough rationality”. Specifically,
he argued that expectations “are essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economic
theory”, coining the term ’rational expectations’ (Muth, 1961, p.316). In a sense, his argument
followed along the lines of that of Friedman as both argued that there could be deviations
from rationality, but—when these deviations were uncorrelated—the predictions of models
assuming rationality would still hold. See Sent (2005) for further critiques levied against
Simon’s notion of bounded rationality.
2
heavily from psychology.4
This relatively new line of economic thought, coined ’behavioral eco-
nomics’, has been defined as a “movement [that] emphasizes micro-level data on
decision making, including experimental evidence, validation of modeling assump-
tions, interchanges between psychology and economics, and skepticism regarding
perfect rationality” (Laibson and Zeckhauser, 1998, p.19).5 As such behavioral
economics thus in part builds upon Herbert Simon’s observation regarding
the practical impossibility of the concept of perfect rationality and his subse-
quent introduction of the concept of bounded rationality. Doing away with
the assumption that individuals make choices on a rational basis, the field
has greatly expanded from the seventies onward and its insights have been
applied to a large range of economic topics.
Meanwhile, in parallel to economics as a whole, the concept of bounded
rationality gained more traction in finance as many observed market phe-
nomena could not be explained when assuming fully rational behavior.6 As
a result, behavioral theories have especially been impactful within finance,
leading to the creation of ’behavioral finance’ as a separate research program.
Notable financial topics to which behavioral insights have been applied are
among others the equity premium puzzle and the volatility puzzle at the
aggregate market level as well as under-diversification and the disposition
effect at the individual level (Barberis et al., 2001; Grinblatt and Han, 2005;
French and Poterba, 1991). Finally, at the company level, behavioral insights
have been used the explain among others dividend policy and capital struc-
ture decisions (Deshmukh et al., 2013; Ucˇkar, 2012).
With the advent of the concept of bounded rationality and the increasing
importance of behavioral economics and finance, also came an increasing
reliance on the use of economic experiments. Specifically, although behav-
ioral economics and finance have relied on a range of different methods to
develop and test theories, experiments have been instrumental in their early
4The work on (cumulative) prospect theory earned Daniel Kahneman a Nobel price and
the theory itself is “widely viewed as the best available description of how people evaluate risk in
experimental settings” (Barberis, 2013, p.173).
5The paper of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) marked the beginning of ’new behavioral
economics’, which, in contrast to the ’old behavioral economics’ literature before it, “situated
itself squarely within the mainstream” (Sent, 2004, p.742). This was accomplished by taking
the concept of rationality as the benchmark in studying departures from it, instead of—as
old behavioral economics had done—creating a new benchmark based on the concept of
bounded rationality (Sent, 2004).
6One of the first of such observations was made by Robert Shiller who argued that the
observed volatility of stock prices was higher than what could be expected were the efficient
market hypothesis to hold (Shiller, 1980).
3
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economics’, which, in contrast to the ’old behavioral economics’ literature before it, “situated
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development by providing the researcher with a method perfectly suited to
study individual behavior in a controlled setting. For instance, seminal pa-
pers such as prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the work
on preference reversals by Grether and Plott (1979) made heavy use of ex-
periments to further their claims (Guala, 2010).
Besides the advent of the behavioral research program, the increasing
importance of experimental economics was aided by two additional factors.
Firstly, the start of the field was characterized by the successful collaboration
of some prominent (experimental) economists that resulted in the seminar
on ’The Design of Experiments in Decision Processes’ that was organized
in 1952 in Santa Monica by a University of Michigan research group. The
seminar was of great help in spreading the experimental method among
economists previously not familiar with the field. Also, the seminar can be
deemed to have been instrumental (either directly or indirectly) in the work
of among others Reinhard Selten, Sidney Siegel, Jacob Marschak and Vernon
Smith (Smith, 1992). Through their work and that of others, experimental
economics gained further importance during the eighties and nineties which
culminated in the rewarding of the 2002 Nobel price in economics to Vernon
Smith (shared with Daniel Kahneman) "for having established laboratory exper-
iments as a tool in empirical economic analysis, especially in the study of alternative
market mechanisms" (Sveriges Riksbank, 2002).
Notwithstanding the work of the above authors, a second and arguably
more important reason for the remarkable success of experimental eco-
nomics is the fact that it offered economics as a whole some strong method-
ological benefits over existing methods. Bloomfield and Anderson (2010) list
four of these benefits: Firstly, by keeping all settings between two treatments
similar apart from the treatment variable, one can avoid omitted variable
bias. Secondly, experiments allow for the random assignment to treatment
groups thereby avoiding self selection issues. Thirdly, by using experimental
methods one can study (or control for) the influence of otherwise unobserv-
able independent variables. And, finally, the use of an experiment allows
one to study an otherwise unobservable dependent variable. Specifically,
regarding the latter two mentioned benefits; the use of experimental task
allows for the direct measurement of individual characteristics such as risk
aversion (Holt and Laury, 2002; Crosetto and Filippin, 2013), loss aversion
(Gächter et al., 2007) and competitiveness (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007)
that without the use if experiments are hard to directly use as either depen-
dent or independent variables.
Another factor besides the above mentioned benefits that has been im-
4
portant for the ongoing success of the field are the strict experimental pro-
tocols that are being used. For instance, deceiving subjects is not allowed7,
subjects are usually paid using performance based monetary incentives in
order to reduce noise from hypothetical decision making and, finally, exper-
imental materials such as instructions, data sets and experimental software
are freely shared to allow for easy replication of the study at hand (Smith,
1976; Camerer et al., 2011, 2016). This latter feature is also prominently
stated in the submission guidelines of journals such as Experimental Eco-
nomics and the Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. It is
without doubt that these guidelines are in part responsible for the relatively
high replication rate found in the study by Camerer et al. (2016). Specifically,
they were able to replicate 11 out of the chosen 18 studies published in ei-
ther the American Economic Review or the Quarterly Journal of Economics
during 2011-2014, implying a replication rate of 61.1% which is somewhat
higher than the rate found in a similar project using psychological studies
(see Open Science Collaboration, 2015). Moreover, Camerer et al. (2016) con-
clude that “lab experiments are at least as robust, and perhaps more robust, than
other kinds of empirical economics” (Camerer et al., 2016, p. 3).
1.2 Contributions
In this thesis four papers will be presented that find themselves at the cross-
roads of behavioral- and experimental finance thereby combing a research
area with a research method that have greatly complemented each other over
the last few decades. Specifically, this thesis will look at the influence of in-
dividual characteristics on both individual market behavior and aggregate
market outcomes in markets, with a strong—though not exclusive—focus
on behavioral models. In all four chapters a two-staged experimental de-
sign will be used. In the first stage of our experiments we measure subjects’
scores regarding a behavioral trait in an experimental task. In the second
stage of the experiments these scores are then used to create markets that
differ from each other only in terms of the average scores regarding this
trait. The difference in average scores between the markets serves as the
main treatment effect.
The use of ex-ante market composition in order to test for the formulated
7This is especially important given the finding by Ortmann and Hertwig (2002) that “the
direct experience of deception has the potential to change experimental performance. In other words,
the very use of deception can impair, and even destroy, the experimental control it is meant to achieve”
(Ortmann and Hertwig, 2002, p. 124).
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hypotheses is one of my prime contributions to the existing (experimental)
literature. Although there exist some papers making use of ex-ante market
composition (see for instance Ang and Schwarz, 1985; Dufwenberg et al.,
2005; Eckel and Füllbrunn, 2015), the use of this method seems limited given
its potential benefits. Namely, the use of this method allows for a direct in-
quiry into the relevance of individual characteristics with regards to both
individual behavior and aggregate market outcomes while keeping all other
variables stable between markets. The combination of the ex-ante (instead
of ex-post) identification of subject characteristics coupled with the possi-
bility to control for market characteristics such as trader information and
fundamental value paths greatly aid the internal validity of our method.
A further contribution of this thesis is the development and/or valida-
tion of experimental tasks used to measure the individual characteristics on
the basis of which our experimental markets are subsequently composed.
Firstly, the newly developed experimental tasks that are introduced to mea-
sure a certain individual characteristic can be used as a tool in future re-
search related to this characteristic. Secondly, by organizing markets or
groups based on both existing and novel tasks implemented in the second
stage of our experiments I also contribute to the validation of these tasks in
a dynamic market setting.
1.2.1 Chapter 2
Although asset bubbles have been observed in experiments as early as Smith
et al. (1988) and have been attributed to among others the information on
future dividends (Sutter et al., 2012), gender (Eckel and Füllbrunn, 2015), a
lack of short selling opportunities (Haruvy and Noussair, 2006) and trader
sophistication (Hefti et al., 2016), the exact role of (rational) speculation on
bubble formation has long remained unclear even though theoretically it has
been shown to play an important role.8 De Long et al. (1990a) for instance,
argue that—contrary to the neoclassical argument (see for instance Fried-
man, 1953)—destabilizing speculation is not per se automatically eliminated
when rational speculators follow trend chasing strategies, thereby exacerbat-
ing price bubbles. As price bubbles are not arbitraged away, this prediction
is in stark contrast with the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970). Pro-
vided this theoretical importance and lack of experimental evidence, Chap-
ter 2 tries to shed more light on the role of speculation on bubble formation
8See Palan (2013) and Powell and Shestakova (2016) for a full overview of the experimen-
tal literature on asset markets and bubble formation.
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in experimental asset markets.
In the first stage of the experiment a novel task to measure specula-
tive tendencies, the ’Speculation Elicitation Task’, or SET for short, is used.
The SET is based on the bubble game introduced in Moinas and Pouget
(2013) and revolves around a sequential market of three traders who are
offered to buy an asset with a commonly known zero fundamental value,
which—when bought—has to be offered to the next player in the sequence.
The asset’s value provides probabilistic information on a subject’s place in
the sequence; the higher the price, the further in line a subject is and the
higher the probability of not being able to resell the asset (thereby losing the
endowment as opposed to making a profit). When third in line, a trader
cannot resell and should thus never buy, meaning that backward induction
should prevent a fully rational trader from buying the asset and, by exten-
sion, a bubble from forming. In the SET subjects are offered to buy the
asset at a range of prices; the higher the offered price at which a subject is
willing to buy, the higher their SET-score and the stronger their speculative
tendency.
In both Moinas and Pouget’s Bubble Game as well in our SET, subjects
have a strong tendency to buy the asset. However, this tendency decreases
with increases in the offered price. This behavior can be explained by the
Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) model of Rogers et al. (2009) which
argues that, due to less than perfect payoff responsiveness, players will with
some probability make mistakes, i.e. buy when they are sure to be last in
the sequence. Because of the mistakes believed to be made by other traders,
buying the asset in either the Bubble Game or the SET might satisfy an
individual rationality constraint (IRC). Moreover, the mistake believed to be
made by the last player in line, leads to a trickle down effects that causes the
believed probability of reselling to increase with a decrease in the offered
price. These dynamics in turn explain the observed buying behavior in the
Bubble Game and the SET. We argue that the behavior captured by the QRE
in the SET might also explain speculative behavior in actual asset markets.
This implies that those subjects who are keen on speculating in the SET, i.e.
those traders who buy at higher and thus riskier offered prices in the SET,
are also those traders prone to speculate in asset markets.
To test this assertion we run three asset markets per session similar to
those used in Smith et al. (1988) in the second part of the experiment. We
compose each of the three asset markets in such a way as to create increas-
ing average SET-scores—and thus speculative tendencies—from the first to
the third asset market. We observe a strong treatment effect with signifi-
7
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cantly higher bubble formation in the markets with strong speculative ten-
dencies—as measured by the market average SET-score—than in those mar-
kets composed of traders with low speculative tendencies. To test whether
a third variable unrelated to speculative tendencies drives behavior in the
SET, we also consider a non-speculative market setting (Lei et al., 2001). In
contrast to the speculative market setting we find no impact of SET-scores
on market performance and bubble formation in this setting.
1.2.2 Chapter 3
As discussed above, cumulative prospect theory by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) can be deemed one of the most influential behavioral theories because
it provides a realistic alternative for utility theory when it comes to the
description of human choice behavior in experimental settings. Moreover,
although other explanations exist, prospect theory, combined with mental
accounting, also provides one of the most prominent explanations for the
disposition effect; the tendency to sell stocks with capital gains too soon and
hold on to stocks with capital losses for too long (Shefrin and Statman, 1985).
As the underreaction caused by the disposition effect theoretically leads to
price momentum and thus price predictability over longer periods of time,
the disposition bias itself contradicts the efficient market hypothesis (Fama,
1970). Moreover, as momentum patterns and price predictability are indeed
observed in asset markets (see for instance Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999;
Schiereck et al., 1999), the very act of selling winners too soon and holding
losers too long, is at odds with the rational expectations paradigm.
In the third chapter of this thesis, the effect of the disposition bias on
price underreaction following the disclosure of information regarding the
future dividend to a subgroup of insiders is studied. Although the effect
of the disposition effect on price underreaction following dividend infor-
mation has been studied before (see for instance Grinblatt and Han, 2005;
Weber and Welfens, 2009), this has so far always been under the assumption
of public information. We however argue that the dynamics under insider
information might be different from those under public information. More-
over, studying price dynamics under private information is relevant from
a more practical standpoint as insider information has been found to be a
common feature of real-life asset markets (Augustin et al., 2015).
In the first stage of our experiment we use a battery of sequential lot-
teries—each consisting of four rounds—to measure individual disposition
attitudes. The number of lotteries (rounds) played in either the sequential
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lottery with four consecutive losses or the sequential lottery with four con-
secutive wins were used to measure individual disposition biases in the loss
and gain domain respectively; the more (fewer) lotteries played in the losing
(winning) streak, the higher the subject’s disposition bias in the loss (gain)
domain. Making an explicit distinction between the disposition effect in
the loss and gain domain is motivated by the results of Weber and Welfens
(2009) who find significant asymmetries between individual disposition be-
havior in the two domains. Besides the application of a private instead of
a public signal, the explicit distinction between the gain and loss domain is
our study’s second main addition to the the current literature.
In the second stage of the experiment we compose asset markets simi-
lar to those used in Weber and Welfens (2009) with nine subjects, including
three insiders who receive either a positive or negative private signal regard-
ing the end of period dividend of the ambiguous asset they are trading. The
insiders were sampled from either the highest or lowest disposition subjects,
with disposition attitudes either measured in the gain domain (the lottery
with four consecutive wins) or the loss domain (the lottery with four con-
secutive losses), creating four distinct groups of insiders. Since each group
of insiders was administered either a positive or negative private signal re-
garding the ending dividend, we are able to create eight scenarios allowing
us study the full spectrum of disposition bias/price signal combinations.
Given the previously discussed asymmetries at the individual level between
disposition behavior in the gain and loss domain, we hypothesize that the
effect of insider disposition biases should have the strongest effect in those
scenarios in which these disposition attitudes are measured in a domain
corresponding to the price signal.
At the individual level we find high disposition insiders to be signifi-
cantly more (less) willing to hold the asset following a negative (positive)
price signal regarding the ending dividend than low disposition insiders.
This difference manifests itself in both quantity and price data. We more-
over find the responses following a negative and positive price shock to be
each other’s mirror image. However, as expected, these results only hold
when the price signal has the same sign as the domain in which the in-
sider disposition effects are measured. Finally, at the aggregate level we
find some minor evidence of a stronger price underreaction in markets with
high disposition insiders than those with low disposition insiders following
both a positive and negative price signal. We argue that the relatively weak
evidence for the latter finding might be due to price formation being the re-
sult of the interactions of both informed insiders and uninformed ’outsider’
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traders who might dampen the effect in terms of underreaction differences.
1.2.3 Chapter 4
The fourth chapter extends the approach and topic from the previous chap-
ters from the arena of financial asset markets to auction markets. Specifically,
we study the role of risk aversion on overbidding in first price sealed bid
(FPSB) auctions, with overbidding defined as making a bid that is above the
risk neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE). Overbidding has traditionally been
ascribed to risk aversion (Cox et al., 1982a); due to risk of losing by bid-
ding too low, risk averse individuals will tend to overcompensate and bid
above the RNNE. More recently, (experimental) evidence has discredited
this explanation and shifted attention to regret aversion as an alternative
behavioral explanation (Isaac and James, 2000; Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1989;
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2009).
We posit that the evidence against risk aversion as a possible explana-
tion might be flawed due to methodological reasons. For instance, the link
between risk aversion and overbidding is questioned in Isaac and James
(2000) who find no relationship between overbidding and subject risk atti-
tudes obtained from a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure. Also,
in Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2009) it is found that overbidding does
not decrease when bidding becomes less risky due to an experimental ma-
nipulation. However, in both papers subjects bid against computers instead
of other subjects (as in our experiment) which has been found to reduce
overbidding (Teubner et al., 2015). Also, both studies look at average over-
bidding over all value categories. However, subjects might not have been
bidding seriously in the very low private value segments.
We therefore aim to provide a further direct test of the influence of risk
aversion on overbidding in a two-staged experiment. We make use of the
Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET) by Crosetto and Filippin (2013) to mea-
sure individual risk attitudes. The BRET is easy to understand and to admin-
ister and moreover does not suffer some of the weakness of other frequently
used tasks. For instance, contrary to the Holt and Laury task, the BRET is
not affected by participants’ degree of loss aversion.
The elicited BRET-scores are used in the second stage of the experiment
to compose auction markets with increasing average risk aversion. Each auc-
tion market consists of four subjects who each receive a private value that
differs in each of the fifty auction rounds. In order to be able to explicitly test
for the influence of both risk- and regret aversion, we only provide informa-
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tion about the winning bid in the final twenty-five trading rounds meaning
that in the first twenty-five rounds a subject does not learn the winning bid
except when her or she wins the auction. This is done in order to be able
to study whether or not the effect or regret aversion has any influence on
bidding behavior above and beyond the possible effect of risk aversion.
In terms of overpricing, defined as the positive distance between the win-
ning bid and the RNNE bid based on the highest private value in a market,
we observe significantly higher values in the high risk averse markets than
in the low risk averse markets. Moreover, we observe a significant increase
in overpricing in all markets in the final twenty-five periods, pointing to
an additional effect of regret aversion beyond that of risk aversion on over-
pricing. At the individual level, we find significantly higher overbidding by
high risk averse individuals when compared to the bidding behavior of low
risk averse individuals. However, we do not find a significant effect of re-
gret aversion in the final twenty-five periods. Finally, we are able to exclude
learning about the level of risk aversion in the auction markets by our sub-
jects as a potential driver of our results. Our results thus suggest that risk
aversion should not be discarded as a possible explanation for overbidding
in FPSB auctions. We do however not claim that it is the only possible ex-
planation as we too find some evidence of regret aversion having an effect
on bidding behavior.
1.2.4 Chapter 5
Risk attitudes have played a central role in economic theory throughout his-
tory. For instance, the curvature of the utility function in expected utility the-
ory depends on risk attitudes. Furthermore, risk preferences play a central
role within both modern portfolio theory as well as the capital asset pricing
model; the higher the volatility of returns relative to the market portfolio,
the higher the risk premium (Markowitz, 1952). Besides asset prices at the
aggregate market level, risk attitudes have also been linked to among others
portfolio diversification with respect to risky and riskless assets.
Although there exist strong theoretical links between risk attitudes and
both individual market behavior as well as aggregate market outcomes,
there is little experimental evidence regarding this relationship. Moreover,
the experimental studies that do look into this relationship almost exclu-
sively focus on double auction markets while disregarding the call market
institution. However, there exist clear evidence of differences in terms of
both market activity and efficiency between the double auction and call mar-
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ket institutions (see for instance Friedman, 1953; Füllbrunn et al., 2014). One
potential cause for these differences might be the way information is pro-
vided in the two institutions. We argue that these differences in information
provision might interact with the relationship between risk attitudes and
individual market behavior and, consequently, aggregate market outcomes,
hence motivating our research into this relationship using call markets in-
stead of double auction markets in chapter 5.
As in Chapter 4, we measure risk attitudes using the BRET in the first
part of our experiment. These BRET-scores are then used in the second stage
of the experiment to compose three closed-book call markets per session
with increasing average risk aversion. Each call market ran for 12 periods,
with the value of the asset in each period relying on the outcome of a lot-
tery with two possible dividends. Although we kept the expected value of
the dividend similar throughout all periods, we did apply three different
dividend regimes by either changing the the volatility or skewness of the
dividend distribution as an additional robustness check.
Our results show that for our setting there is little to no relationship
between risk attitudes and both individual market behavior as well as ag-
gregate market outcomes in any of the dividend regimes. Only in terms
of market liquidity do we observe some evidence of a negative relationship
with average market risk aversion. We believe the lack of a relationship
between risk aversion and individual market behavior as well as aggregate
market outcomes to be caused by a combination of factors. Specifically, we
argue that our results might well be explained by a combination of factors
that are related to (1) our operationalization of risk and (2) inherent differ-
ences between the call market and double auction design.
Please note that the following chapters in this thesis include their own introduction
and conclusion and are as such self-contained. However, the different appendices
containing the experimental instructions and other supplementary material to these
chapters are found at the very end of this thesis (but before the biography and Dutch
summary). The reference list is presented after the final chapter.
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Chapter 2
Individual speculative behavior and
price bubbles in experimental asset
markets9
2.1 Introduction
Res tantum valet quantum vendi potest. (A thing is worth only what it can be
sold for.)
Price bubbles and crashes are prominent, recurring phenomena with fa-
mous examples reaching from the Dutch tulip mania (1634–1637) and the
South Sea Bubble (1720) to the Dot-com Bubble (1995-2000) and the burst-
ing of the U.S. housing bubble (2007-2008). Despite considerable literature
on price bubbles, empirical evidence on their underlying mechanisms and
drivers remains elusive. One of the alleged drivers that regularly captures
the attention of the media is speculation, often defined as a trading strat-
egy where investors seek capital gains by holding an asset above its fun-
damental value (a ‘bubble asset’), because they expect to sell it at an even
higher price to another investor, often referred to as ‘greater fool’ (Kindle-
berger and Aliber, 2005).10 A rich history of theoretical models in finance
shows that speculation can both be a rational strategy and fuel asset bubbles
where “investors can rationally expect an asset price to move in one direction in
the short run and in the opposite direction in the long run” (De Long et al., 1990b,
p.394). Empirically, however, it remains a challenge to identify and test for
the influence of speculators on bubble formation. Fundamental values are
generally not known in secondary data from financial markets, creating the
9This chapter is based on a joint paper with Utz Weitzel and Sascha Füllbrunn, Individual
speculative behavior and price bubbles in experimental asset markets. Current status: revise and
resubmit at Experimental Economics.
10Analogously, speculation also applies to shorting assets below fundamentals and to the
emergence of negative bubbles. For simplicity we focus on speculation in positive bubbles
and on going long. Note that this definition of speculation is less strict than ‘speculative
overpricing’, which refers to prices that exceed the most optimistic belief about the real value
of the asset and hence prices above the highest possible cash flow of an asset. The latter
is often used in rational bubble models with heterogeneous beliefs about the fundamental
value of an asset (e.g. Palfrey and Wang, 2012). In both of our experimental settings, however,
the (sum of) expected dividends of the asset is known at all points in time, so there is no
possibility for heterogeneous beliefs on cash flows or fundamental values.
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2joint-hypothesis problem (Fama, 1970, 1991) and a serious challenge to the
empirical identification of mispricing and hence speculation.
To tackle this joint-hypothesis problem, many studies analyze experi-
mental asset markets, which provide control over fundamental values and
thus allow to measure mispricing (e.g., Bloomfield and Anderson, 2010).
One approach to experimentally investigate the role of speculation in bub-
ble formation is by exclusion. In their seminal paper, Lei et al. (2001, LNP)
reconstruct the market environment of Smith et al. (1988, SSW), which is
well-known to produce bubbles, but remove the ability to speculate by lim-
iting the role of each agent to be either a buyer or a seller. Despite the
complete elimination of the possibility to resell at a higher price, LNP still
observe large price deviations from fundamental prices and bubbles. Al-
though LNP provide strong evidence, by falsification, that speculation is not
essential to the formation of bubbles, they “do not claim that speculation does
not occur in asset markets of this type [...]" (Lei et al., 2001, p.834). In fact, it
is still unclear, whether and, if yes, how much speculation adds to bubble
formation when trading is possible.
To answer this question, and in the wake of LNP, a number of studies
attempt to identify specific trading patterns from experimental trading data
(Haruvy and Noussair, 2006; Caginalp and Ilieva, 2008; Haruvy et al., 2014;
Baghestanian et al., 2015). The model of De Long et al. (1990b) is commonly
used to classify market participants into three types. Rational speculators
(RAs) look forward and trade on (correctly) expected future price move-
ments, while Momentum Traders (MMs) look back and chase recent trends
by extrapolation. Both RAs and MMs ignore any differences between prices
and fundamentals. In contrast, Fundamental Value Traders (FVs) only trade
on current prices and fundamentals.11 Based on this classification, differ-
ences in mispricing are attributed—across markets—to differences in the
distribution of traders’ types and—within markets—to the weight that dif-
ferent trading strategies have over time in a bubble-crash pattern.12
Yet, it remains a challenge to identify the contribution of speculative be-
havior to bubble formation. First, both RAs and MMs are very similar in
their observed trading behavior, because they only differ in their short-term,
11Here we refer to the terminology and adaptation by Haruvy et al. (2014). Specifically,
RAs anticipate the next period’s price and increase (decrease) holdings if the price move is
upward (downward). MMs buy (sell) when the last two prices show an upward (downward)
movement. FVs purchase (sell) when today’s market prices are below (above) the fundamen-
tal value of the asset.
12See, in particular, Haruvy and Noussair (2006); Haruvy et al. (2014); Baghestanian et al.
(2015).
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forward and backward looking time horizons. This similarity in observed
behavior makes it difficult to disentangle the two trader types empirically.
In fact, in a prototypical bubble-crash pattern, the behavioral difference be-
tween RA and MM can only be measured in the period at the peak of the
bubble and one period thereafter.13 If a speculator errs and exits the bub-
ble only one or two periods before (or after) the peak, her trading behavior
would be either indistinguishable or wrongly classified as MM. Most simu-
lation models in the above literature make sharp predictions based on RAs
with identical and accurate beliefs about future prices, which leaves little
room for error or for heterogeneity in the timing of a bubble exit. However,
market timing is a difficult task and uncertainty about the exit of others has
been shown to support bubbles even among speculators who are rational
and collectively both well-informed and well-financed (Abreu and Brunner-
meier, 2003). Hence, we cannot rule out that at least some MMs are RAs in
disguise and, ideally, would want to identify speculative behavior in the ab-
sence of momentum trading. Second, most trader classification experiments
administered the multi-period continuous double auction market environ-
ment of Smith et al. (1988), which comes with highly dynamic, endogenous,
and path dependent price formation processes. There exists ample evidence
for a multitude of effects related to market feedback and dynamics in SSW
markets, which potentially confound speculative behavior in bubbles and
thus complicate the ex-post separation of trading strategies that aim to out-
wit others (RA) from other rational (FV) and irrational (MM) approaches.14
This paper aims to provide evidence that individual speculative behavior
is one of the reasons why bubbles occur. For this, we first isolate speculative
13Assume, for example, a bubble market where prices start at the fundamental value in Pe-
riod 1, then increase continuously until Period 14, where they peak and then monotonously
decrease to the fundamental value at the end of trading in Period 20. We start to categorize
trading strategies in Period 3, because we require two past prices, pt−1and pt−2, to define the
demand for MMs. Following, e.g., Haruvy and Noussair (2006) and Haruvy et al. (2014) any
stock purchases in this period equally count toward MM and RA, because pt−1 − pt−2 > 0
and pt+1 − pt > 0. All other behavior is either FV or remains unclassified. This continues
until Period 14 where RAs for the first time show a different behavior than MMs: RAs start
selling their stock in (correct) anticipation of lower prices in Period 15 and in Period 16,
while MMs continue buying. However, after Period 16 both RAs and MMs sell into the crash
until Period 19, where classification ends because of missing expected prices (to define RAs)
in Period 20. Hence, given sufficient trading data, the classification of RAs versus MMs is
based on a behavioral difference of only 2 out of 17 periods.
14For example, LNP show that a lack of activity and boredom trades can play a role
in SSW bubbles. See Palan (2013) and Powell and Shestakova (2016) for comprehensive
overviews of studies that identify other factors, e.g., wealth changes, experience effects, and
misinterpretations of past dividend draws (e.g., gambler’s fallacy).
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2behavior in a much simpler setting ex ante, at the individual level and with-
out explicit market interaction in a novel Speculation Elicitation Task (SET).
The SET measures speculative behavior of individuals with a ’SET-score’;
the higher a subject’s SET-score, the higher a trader’s speculative behavior.
Importantly, the SET-score cannot be influenced by momentum strategies
based on past prices, because it is based on a one-shot game. Moreover,
as in the SET the subjects take individual decisions, the SET-score excludes
potentially confounding effects of market feedback and dynamics. In a sec-
ond step, we compose markets along the previously elicited SET-score in
order to analyze how markets with higher or lower average speculative be-
havior affect bubble formation in SSW markets. We observe much more
overpricing and larger bubbles in high SET-score markets than in low SET-
score markets. Finally, to exclude that non-speculative factors could have
produced the bubbles in the SSW, we administer the no-speculation envi-
ronment of LNP. We find no difference in overpricing comparing the high
SET-score to the low SET-score markets corroborating the notion that it is
indeed speculative behavior, as elicited by the SET, that (also) fuels bubbles
in the SSW. By linking speculation with bubble formation and overpricing,
this paper mainly contributes to the literature on experimental asset mar-
kets and on financial economics with respect to speculation effects. It also
has a methodological contribution by providing the SET as a simple and
quick-to-administer task for measuring speculative behavior.
The SET is based on the ’bubble game’ introduced by Moinas and Pouget
(2013). In the bubble game, three traders consecutively buy and sell an asset
to each other that is commonly known to have zero fundamental value. At
each point in the sequence, an incoming trader chooses between either (i)
accepting a buy offer at a given price and offering it to the next trader in line
at a higher price, or (ii) rejecting the buy offer, effectively leaving the current
owner stuck with a worthless asset. The last trader in the sequence cannot
sell the asset anymore. Thus, when buying the asset, traders speculate on
being able to sell it to a next trader at a higher price. Traders do not know
their position in the market sequence but the price at which they are offered
the asset serves as a signal on their position; the higher the offer price, the
higher the probability of being last in the sequence.
Under common rationality, backward induction shows that no trader
should buy the asset and hence a positive price—or bubble—should never
form. Moinas and Pouget (2013), however, find substantial trading in their
experiments and show that buying into the bubble game solves an individ-
ual rationality condition: the utility of buying is larger or equal to the utility
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of not buying, as long as the believed probability of someone next in line
buying is large enough. In fact, Moinas and Pouget (2013) find support
for a subjective Quantal Response Equilibrium model (QRE, McKelvey and
Palfrey, 1995; Rogers et al., 2009) where traders depart from the no-bubble
Nash equilibrium based on the assumption of a less than perfect payoff re-
sponsiveness of other traders. Hence, Moinas and Pouget (2013) claim that
“quantal responses [...] are important drivers of speculation” (abstract) and that
the bubble game provides “an experimental study of speculation” (title), where
traders buy bubble assets, because they believe that subsequent traders make
mistakes.15 This finding is in line with the noise trader theory by De Long
et al. (1990a), in which traders buy bubble assets expecting to resell them to
noise traders. This finding is also in line with the simulation models used
in the above mentioned experimental literature to identify speculative trad-
ing patterns. Importantly, this rationale translates to speculation in the SSW,
where “bubbles can occur when traders are uncertain that future prices will track
the fundamental value, because they doubt the rationality of the other traders, and
therefore speculate in the belief that there are opportunities for future capital gains”
(Lei et al., 2001, p.832).16 Hence, with regard to speculative rationale, there
exists a direct link between bubbles in the SSW and in the bubble game (also
see Moinas and Pouget (2013), e.g., on p.1515).17
With the SET we provide an experimental design that elicits the highest
price a traders is willing to buy for in the bubble game. The SET elicits buy
decisions for all possible prices and can therefore be seen as an extended,
price-list version of the original bubble game. In our experimental setting,
every subject goes through a list of all seven potential prices, starting at the
highest possible price, and decides whether to buy (and offer to sell for a
higher price) or not. At the highest price a subject is sure to be the last
in line and cannot resell. Moving down the list, the first price at which a
subject is willing to buy the asset determines the SET-score. This score can
15Moinas and Pouget (2013) also test other candidate models, notably the Analogy-Based
Expectation Equilibrium of Jehiel (2005) and the Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Camerer et al.
(2004). They find that particularly the latter model explains the observed behavior less well.
16A similar argument was offered by Plott (1991).
17In both settings, backward induction coupled with full information on the fundamental
value leads to a no-bubble Nash equilibrium with prices at the fundamental value. Specif-
ically, as in the SET, buying an asset above the fundamental value in the SSW should only
be considered when the assumed probability of reselling for a higher price in one of the
subsequent periods is high enough to satisfy a trader’s individual rationality condition. Ac-
cordingly, the thought process captured by the QRE can not only be applied to the bubble
game and the SET but also to speculative trading behavior in the SSW (and asset markets in
general).
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2be interpreted as a measure for speculative behavior: following QRE-logic,
the higher the buying price, the higher the assumed error rates of others
must be for a trader’s individual rationality condition to be satisfied, or, in
noise trader terms, the higher the SET-score, the more a trader is willing to
speculate on the existence of noise traders down the line.
To answer our main research question, we test whether the individual
propensity to speculate, as measured by the SET-score, impacts the forma-
tion of price bubbles in asset markets—in particular, in SSWmarkets. Specif-
ically, we split the subject population in SET-score tertiles and assign each
tertile to one of three independent but otherwise similar SSW markets.18 If
individual speculative behavior as captured by the SET-score fuels bubbles,
we expect systematically higher overpricing and bubbles in SSW markets
with high SET-scores than in markets with low SET-scores. Note that traders
are unaware of the fact that they are matched with others who have simi-
lar SET-scores. This does not affect our expectation, because for speculative
bubbles "it need not to be the case that irrational traders actually exist, but only
that their existence is believed to be possible” (Lei et al., 2001, p.834). Hence, in
markets with many speculators (high SET markets) we expect traders to feed
on each other as they receive price signals that confirm their assumption of
a high resale value, while in markets with few or no speculators (low SET
markets) such a positive feedback loop will be less likely.19
Turning to our results, we observe—in line with Moinas and Pouget
(2013)—speculative behavior in the SET with sufficiently heterogeneous SET-
score to compose distinctly different SSWmarkets. The results from the SSW
experiment show that markets with more speculative traders fuel asset mar-
ket bubbles. We find that price deviations from the fundamental value in
the high SET-score markets are statistically and economically significantly
higher than in low SET-score markets. To test whether our results are not
driven by other, non-speculative factors, we administer the no-speculation
environment of LNP. As expected, our treatment manipulation—the indi-
vidual speculative behavior—has no influence on bubble formation in LNP
markets. Hence, the SET does not elicit behavior that survives in the non-
speculative environment of LNP, such as risk-loving preferences or violation
of dominance (Moinas and Pouget, 2013), but it does seem to measure some
18By assigning subjects to markets based on their SET-score we follow earlier studies that
composed markets according to trader characteristics to study bubble formation, such as
prior market experience (Dufwenberg et al., 2005) or gender (Eckel and Füllbrunn, 2015).
19Also see, e.g., Stracca (2004) or Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) for a similar argumen-
tation.
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speculative rationale (in line with, e.g., the QRE) that adds to bubble forma-
tion in the SSW. Overall, our results corroborate the notion that speculation
is an important factor in bubble formation if market environments allow for
the realization of capital gains.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we discuss
the experimental design, we present the main results in Section 2.3, and
discuss and conclude in Section 2.4.
2.2 Experimental design
2.2.1 General setup and implementation
Each session consisted of three parts; in part one we elicited the SET-score,
in part two subjects participated in an asset market, and in part three we
elicited demographics, CRT (incentivized: Frederick, 2005), and risk atti-
tudes (incentivized: Holt and Laury, 2002; not incentivized: Bonin et al.,
2007).20 In Sessions S1-S4, subjects participated in the standard SSW asset
market environment while in Sessions S5-S7 we ran a robustness check in
which students participated in a no-speculation market environment in line
with LNP.
A total of 118 students participated in the first four sessions and an ad-
ditional 86 subjects participated in the three additional sessions making for
a total of 204 subjects over all seven sessions. Each session lasted about 1
hour and 45 minutes and the average earnings per subject were 22.33 euros.
All payments were made in cash and in private at the very end of the ex-
periment. All tasks were computerized using z-Tree Fischbacher (2007) and
subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Sessions S1-S4 were
conducted in the period from March to May 2014 and Sessions S5-S7 were
conducted from December to March 2015-2016. All sessions were run at
the NSM Decision Lab at the Radboud University (Nijmegen, The Nether-
lands).21
2.2.2 Speculation Elicitation Task (SET)
The SET is based on the bubble game introduced by Moinas and Pouget
(2013) and consists of a sequential market of three traders. Starting with a
20See Appendix A.1, A.2 and A.3 for detailed instructions.
21Table A.3 in Appendix A.5 provides descriptive statistics of the subjects in the experi-
ment.
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2one euro initial capital endowment, each trader can either accept or reject
to buy an asset with a fundamental value equal to zero for the price offered
(Figure 2.1). If a trader accepts to buy at a price P, she invests one euro initial
capital—the remaining amount is financed by an external financier—and
automatically offers the asset to the next trader in the sequence for a price
that is ten times higher, 10× P. The trader earns ten euro if the next trader
decides to buy and loses her investment if the next trader rejects to buy or if
no next trader exists. If a trader rejects to buy, she and all subsequent traders
keep their one euro initial capital.
Figure 2.1: Sequence of the SET
Notes: The first trader in line is offered to buy the asset at a randomly drawn price P1 ∈
{100, 101, 102, 103, 104}. When the first trader rejects, the game ends and all traders earn their
one euro initial capital. When the first trader accepts, the asset is offered to the second trader
in the sequence at a price P2 = 10× P1, i.e., P2 ∈ {101, 102, 103, 104, 105}. When the second
trader rejects, the game ends, the first trader earns zero, and the second and the third trader
earn the one euro initial capital. When the second trader accepts, the first trader sells the
asset and earns ten euros. The asset is then offered to the third trader in the sequence at a
price P3 = 10× P2, i.e., P3 ∈ {102, 103, 104, 105, 106}. When the third trader rejects, the game
ends, the second trader earns zero, and the third trader earns the one euro initial capital.
When the third trader accepts, the second trader sells the asset and earns ten euros. The
third trader buys the asset even though being last in the sequence and is unable to resell.
Thus, the third trader loses the one euro initial capital and earns zero.
For example, the first trader in line decides to buy the asset for P = 1, 000
paying the one euro initial capital. Then, she offers the asset to the second
trader in the sequence for P = (10× 1, 000 =)10, 000 who decides to buy
as well paying her one euro initial capital. As an immediate consequence,
the first trader earns ten euro. The second trader now offers the asset for
P = (10× 10× 1, 000 =)100, 000 to the third trader. The third trader however
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rejects the offer. Hence, the second trader holds a worthless asset and lost
her investment while the third trader keeps his initial capital. To summarize,
the payoffs are ten euro for the first trader, zero euro for the second trader
and one euro for the third trader.
Traders have no information about their position in the sequence, i.e.,
each trader has an equal chance of being either first, second or third in
the sequence. The price reveals information about a trader’s position in
the sequence though. The price offered to the trader in the first position
is randomly drawn from a set P1 ∈ {100, 101, 102, 103, 104} with a known
triangular distribution.22 The price offered to the second trader in the se-
quence is then P2 = P1 × 10, and the price offered to the third trader is
P3 = P2 × 10 = P1 × 100. Thus, for any price offered, Bayes’ rule provides
the probabilities of being first, second or third in the trading sequence. Note
that for an offer P = 106 the probability of being last is equal to one. Un-
der common rationality, backward induction rules out a Nash equilibrium
with positive prices (see Moinas and Pouget, 2013). Hence, independent
of whether the traders know their position in the sequence, neither trader
accepts an offer to buy. Note that buy decisions are made simultaneously
and independently in a one-shot setting. Hence, subjects have no further
information on the actions of other traders in their sequence.
To develop the SET design, we modified the bubble game of Moinas
and Pouget (2013) in two ways. First, instead of presenting the sub-
jects with one buy decision at a particular price, we elicited subjects’ buy
decisions for each price possible given the set of initial prices equal to
P1 ∈ {100, 101, 102, 103, 104}. This implies a set of offered prices equal to
P ∈ {100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106}. To elicit a buy decision at each price in
this set we asked each subject “Do you want to buy the asset at 1, 000, 000?”,
“Do you want to buy the asset at 100, 000?”,..., “Do you want to buy the asset at
1?”.23 Note that in order to facilitate backward induction we started with the
highest possible price for which a buy decision immediately leads to zero
payoff. The SET therefore provides a clear switching price PS for which a
subject rejects to buy at prices P > PS and accepts to buy at prices P ≤ PS.
Our SET-score is defined by the rank of the switching price PS as shown in
Table 2.1. A low SET-score reflects a low propensity to speculate while a
22For higher prices an external financial investor pays the difference. Earnings are divided
between the financial investor and the participant such that the participant always earns 10
euro. See Moinas and Pouget (2013) for details.
23See Appendix A.1 for the exact SET instructions and a screenshot of the task.
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2Table 2.1: The SET-score
Buy at or below price Never 100 101 102 103 104 105 106
Probability of being last (%) 0 0 0 23.08 28.57 46.15 57.14 100
SET-score 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Notes: The table shows the possible prices to buy for, the probability of being last given the
buy price and the SET-score based on the rank of prices.
high SET-score indicates a high propensity to speculate. 24
As a second change we tripled the opportunity costs for speculation, i.e.
the starting capital, to three euro. In pilot tests with the original payment
scheme we found that the distribution of SET-scores had a strong negative
skew toward higher values, indicating a generally high propensity to spec-
ulate. Subjects needed to presume only a small winning probability to let
the expected earnings from buying exceed one euro. With our calibration of
the starting capital to three euro, subjects have to presume a winning proba-
bility of at least 3/10, which provides more heterogeneity in SET-scores and
therefore allows us to better differentiate between speculative behavior for
the composition of SSW markets (see below).25
After subjects entered the lab, we first explained the basics of the SET by
reading the instructions for the one shot game aloud (see Appendix A.1.1),
followed by on-screen comprehension questions (see Appendix A.1.2). We
allowed several attempts to answer each question, but a subject could only
move on to the next question once the current question had been answered
correctly. Then the correct answers were publicly announced and thoroughly
explained. After having explained the basics of the SET, we provided the
procedural instructions on the subjects’ screen (see Appendix A.1.3). These
instructions made clear that the game had to be played not for one but for all
possible prices, and that one price would be randomly chosen to calculate
their earnings. We clearly indicated that these on-screen instructions were
the same for all participants. To get a consistent buy decision for the whole
24Finer SET-score scales can easily be created by increasing the cap on P1, but doing so is
a two-edged sword. On the one hand, more levels allow for a more elaborate scale as more
decisions are made and more heterogeneity in speculation becomes possible. On the other
hand, a design with many levels might include superfluous decisions and would take up too
much time.
25In fact, with opportunity costs of three euro the distribution of SET-scores shifted more
toward the center. The results from the pilot with one euro starting capital are available upon
request.
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list of prices, we clearly communicated that if subjects decide to buy at a
certain price PS, they are assumed to also buy for each price below PS. We
allowed subjects to check and revise their decisions before confirming their
final decision. The final payoff (paid out at the end of the experiment) for
a subject i was calculated as follows. First, one of the seven prices was
randomly drawn with equal probability to be the price the trader faced.
Second, subject i’s position was randomly drawn. Third, the remaining two
positions were filled with two randomly drawn subjects j and k from the
subjects in the room. Subject i’s payoff was calculated on the basis of all three
subjects’ decisions.26 Finally, after the SET task was administered we elicited
beliefs regarding the SET-scores of the other session participants using an
incentivized task (see Appendix A.1.4).
2.2.3 Asset markets (SSW and LNP)
To consider the effect of speculation on price bubbles, we make use of the as-
set market design introduced in SSW. We chose the SSW for several reasons.
Firstly, the market environment by LNP is based on the SSW. Secondly, the
SSW is known to produce price bubbles (Palan, 2013), which provides room
for speculation and hence scope for different market compositions to take
effect. Third, as explained in Section 2.1, the speculative rationale in the SET
and the SSW is similar (also see Moinas and Pouget, 2013), which allows
for inference on the role of speculation in bubbles. Fourth, the SSW has
a long tradition in experimental finance and remains the most commonly
employed market environment (Haruvy et al., 2014), which facilitates com-
parison to earlier studies and placement in the literature.
We compare markets composed of subjects with high speculative behav-
ior, i.e. subjects who scored high in the SET, to markets composed of subjects
with low speculative behavior, i.e. subjects who scored low in the SET. To
compose markets in each session, we ranked the elicited SET-scores, split
them in three groups and assigned them to three markets as follows. The
10 subjects with the highest SET-scores, representing those subjects within
the session population with the highest propensity to speculate, were as-
signed to one market, henceforth ’H-market’. The 10 subjects with the low-
est SET-scores, representing the subjects within the session population with
26Example: Suppose P = 1, 000 was drawn for subject i (suppose i chose to buy), and
suppose i is drawn to be number 2 in line. Then we look at the decision of subject j for
P = 100 (suppose j chose to buy) and of subject k for P = 10, 000 (suppose k chose not to
buy). Now the payoff for subject i is calculated according the decisions of all three (which is
zero as k rejected to buy and i purchased from j).
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2Table 2.1: The SET-score
Buy at or below price Never 100 101 102 103 104 105 106
Probability of being last (%) 0 0 0 23.08 28.57 46.15 57.14 100
SET-score 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Notes: The table shows the possible prices to buy for, the probability of being last given the
buy price and the SET-score based on the rank of prices.
high SET-score indicates a high propensity to speculate. 24
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After subjects entered the lab, we first explained the basics of the SET by
reading the instructions for the one shot game aloud (see Appendix A.1.1),
followed by on-screen comprehension questions (see Appendix A.1.2). We
allowed several attempts to answer each question, but a subject could only
move on to the next question once the current question had been answered
correctly. Then the correct answers were publicly announced and thoroughly
explained. After having explained the basics of the SET, we provided the
procedural instructions on the subjects’ screen (see Appendix A.1.3). These
instructions made clear that the game had to be played not for one but for all
possible prices, and that one price would be randomly chosen to calculate
their earnings. We clearly indicated that these on-screen instructions were
the same for all participants. To get a consistent buy decision for the whole
24Finer SET-score scales can easily be created by increasing the cap on P1, but doing so is
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hand, a design with many levels might include superfluous decisions and would take up too
much time.
25In fact, with opportunity costs of three euro the distribution of SET-scores shifted more
toward the center. The results from the pilot with one euro starting capital are available upon
request.
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list of prices, we clearly communicated that if subjects decide to buy at a
certain price PS, they are assumed to also buy for each price below PS. We
allowed subjects to check and revise their decisions before confirming their
final decision. The final payoff (paid out at the end of the experiment) for
a subject i was calculated as follows. First, one of the seven prices was
randomly drawn with equal probability to be the price the trader faced.
Second, subject i’s position was randomly drawn. Third, the remaining two
positions were filled with two randomly drawn subjects j and k from the
subjects in the room. Subject i’s payoff was calculated on the basis of all three
subjects’ decisions.26 Finally, after the SET task was administered we elicited
beliefs regarding the SET-scores of the other session participants using an
incentivized task (see Appendix A.1.4).
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2the lowest propensity to speculate, were assigned to another market, hence-
forth ’L-market’. The remaining subjects were assigned to a third market
with medium SET-scores, henceforth ’M-market’. Due to no-shows, the M-
markets of Sessions S1 and S7 contained 8 subjects while the M-markets of
Sessions S5 and S6 contained 9 subjects. Tied SET-scores were randomly
assigned to one of either markets. Subjects did not know how markets were
composed.27 Hence, we are able to compare the performance of three SSW
markets, differentiated by the population’s individual speculation behavior
into L, M and H-markets, leaving all other parameters constant.
As shown in Table A.4, the average SET-scores in S1-S4 for the L, M,
and H-markets are 2.4, 3.6, and 4.3 respectively while for S5-S7 the SET-
scores were 1.5, 3.1 and 4.2 respectively. Using Cuzick’s trend tests to test
for a trend in SET-scores from the L- (through the M-) to the H-markets,
we can reject the Null that no trend from L to H exists in each session in
favor of the alternative that SET-scores increases from L to H (p < 0.001).
Comparing only the L-markets to the H-markets, a Mann Whitney U test
confirms statistically significant differences in SET-scores for each individual
session as well (p < 0.001).
Before trading in the SSW market, subjects had a neutral trial period
of five minutes to get used to the trading platform.28 After the trial period
subjects entered the SSWmarket. Endowed with 2500 francs and two shares,
subjects were able to trade shares in 15 double-auction trading periods. Each
period lasted three minute, and francs and shares carried over from period
to period. At the end of every period, each share paid a dividend of 0, 8, 28,
or 60 francs with equal probability; note that in each of the three markets
in the same session the shares pay the same dividends. Since the expected
dividend equals 24 francs in every period, the fundamental value in period
t equals 24× (16–t), i.e. 360 francs in period 1, 336 francs in period 2, ... and
24 francs in period 15. After period 15, the shares remain worthless and the
francs were transferred to euros at a rate of one euro for 300 francs.
In Sessions S1-S4 (SSW) traders were able to buy AND sell shares (see
Appendix A.2.1). In Sessions S5-S7 (LNP) we prohibited speculation as
traders were either able to buy OR to sell shares in line with LNP NoSpec
treatments (see Appendix A.2.2). As instructions were almost similar to SSW,
27In line with previous studies, e.g. Cheung et al. (2014) and Levine et al. (2014), sub-
groups are composed without public knowledge on the determinants of selection. This en-
sures that our treatment variable, the degree of speculative behavior (average SET-score),
constitutes the only difference between markets without influencing the subjects’ beliefs.
28For instructions see Appendix A.2.
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bubbles can only be dedicated to expectations about the dividend draws but
not to speculation. To assign a trader his or her role as either buyer or seller
we ranked subjects within each market on their SET-score. Subjects with un-
even ranks were assigned the role of buyer while subjects with even ranks
were assigned the role of seller.29
In the LNP environment, we expect to see no differences between mar-
kets and hence the Null hypothesis (no speculation) is that prices do not sys-
tematically differ comparing H-, M-, and L-markets. In the original SSW en-
vironment, however, we expect support for the alternative hypothesis (spec-
ulation), which implies higher price bubbles in the H-market than in the
M-market and in the L-market.
2.3 Results
We present our results in the order of implementation of the tasks, starting
with the SET (Section 2.3.1), proceeding with the SSW markets in Sessions
S1-S4 (Section 2.3.2), and ending with the no-speculation LNP markets in
Sessions S5-S7 (Section 2.3.3).
2.3.1 The SET
As shown in Table 2.2, the SET-score distribution shows that five percent
of all participants chose not to buy at all while the remaining 95 percent of
participants did buy and thus speculated on the next trader in line buying
as well. Most subjects chose to buy at prices at or below 1,000 yielding an
average SET-score of 3.22 (SD 1.25). None of the subjects chose to buy at
the highest possible price P = 106 and only two subject chose to buy the
asset even for a price of 100,000. These results suggest that that subjects
understood the game quite well.
Table 2.2: SET-score distribution
SET-score 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Distribution 5% 4% 12% 30% 38% 9% 1% –
Notes: The Table provides the distribution of SET-scores for all 204 subjects.
29All L-markets and H-markets contained 5 buyers and 5 sellers while the M-markets of
Session S5 and S6 (with 9 traders each) contained 5 buyers and 4 sellers and the M-market
of Session S7 (with 8 traders) contained 4 buyers and 4 sellers.
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2To investigate whether individual measures explain speculative behav-
ior, we run an OLS regression with the SET-scores as dependent variable
and demographic variables together with CRT scores, risk attitudes and be-
liefs as independent variables. Specification (1) and (2) in Table 2.3 show
that none of the control variables is significant at any standard level of sig-
nificance.30 The subject’s belief on the buying behavior of her fellow par-
ticipants, however, is significantly and positively correlated with a subject’s
own SET-score. Hence, on average, and in accordance with the greater fool
theory, subjects who believe that others choose a higher PS also choose a
higher PS themselves.
We take a closer look at the subjects’ beliefs in Table A.1 and Table A.2
in Appendix A.4. When a subject believes the subsequent trader to buy at
P ≤ P′, then his buy price should be at most P′/10, i.e., a subjects SET-score
should be lower than the expected SET-score of others. Assuming expected
utility and risk neutrality, we observe that about 82% of all subjects are
within one step of this response.31 We furthermore find that 87% of subjects
obtain a positive expected buy premium. Finally, although Table A.2 shows
that the difference between the chosen and the best response SET-score in-
creases in the chosen SET-score, the actual difference in expected earnings
in the full SET between high and low SET-score individuals is actually very
small. This implies that high SET-score individuals do not necessarily make
worse decisions in terms of expected earnings.
30Due to technical difficulties with a computer at the end of Session 1, one subject was un-
able start the questionnaire. This student is therefore excluded from the regression analysis
presented in Section 2.3.1.
31Going from a price of 1 to a price of 10 counts as 1 step, going from a price 1 to a price
of 100 counts as 2 steps etc. Please see Appendix A.4 for more information on the calculation
of the optimal SET-score/buy prices.
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Table 2.3: SET-score regression
S1-S7
(1) (2)
Avg. believed SET 0.77∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07)
CRT -0.08
(0.06)
Holt Laury -0.03
(0.04)
General Risk 0.05
(0.03)
Age 0.04
(0.03)
Male -0.20
(0.13)
Foreign 0.11
(0.16)
Economics -0.25
(0.13)
Constant 0.30 -0.28
(0.22) (0.75)
Observations 203 203
R-squared 0.53 0.57
Notes: Regressions with the SET-score as the dependent variable. ’Avg. believed SET ’
is the average believed SET-score of others elicited at the end of part 1 of the experiment,
’Foreign’ is a dummy equal to 1 when a subject was born outside The Netherlands, ’Eco-
nomics’ is a dummy equal to 1 when a subject studies economics. Session dummies are
included in the regressions but not reported for sake of display. The reported results do
not change qualitatively when including the remaining risk questions from Bonin et al.
(2007). Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01,**p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1.
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22.3.2 Speculation and price bubbles in SSW markets
Figure 2.2 shows the difference between the median price path and the fun-
damental value for the L, M, and H-markets from the first four sessions.
The figure clearly shows that price bubbles are higher in H-markets than
in L-markets in almost all periods in all sessions; a result in line with our
alternative hypothesis from Section 2.2.3.
Figure 2.2: Median transaction price distance from the FV, S1-S4
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Notes: Distance between median transaction prices and the fundamental value (FV) for mar-
kets L, M, and H of Sessions S1-S4.
To measure the magnitude of price bubbles we follow the literature and
compute the bubble measures provided by Stöckl et al. (2010). As we are
more interested in overpricing and less in mispricing, we only consider the
relative deviation (RD) in this section and not the relative absolute deviation
(RAD)—which is almost similar in size and thus similar in test results (see
Table A.5 in Appendix A.5). The RD measures overpricing by taking the
average raw deviation form the fundamental value normalized by the mean
fundamental value, e.g., with a RD of 10 (– 10) percent, prices are on average
28
10 percent higher (lower) than the average fundamental value.32 Table 2.4
reports the RD (average SET-score in parentheses) by market and by session
together with the average RD over the first four sessions. In each session,
overpricing is lower in the L-market than in the H-market. To put the results
into perspective, overpricing on average is about 24 percent in the L-markets,
while in H-markets overpricing is on average around 77 percent, i.e., over-
pricing is more than three times higher in H-markets than in L-markets. We
moreover find a significant correlation of 0.6182 (p = 0.032) between the
average market SET-score and RD neglecting potential session effects.33
Table 2.4: Relative deviation (RD)
Session\Market L M H L=H
S1 9% (2.5) 40% (4.0) 40% (4.7) 0.006
S2 20% (2.5) 10% (3.0) 69% (4.2) 0.013
S3 49% (2.0) 79% (3.7) 92% (4.2) 0.002
S4 17% (2.5) 90% (3.8) 107% (4.2) 0.001
S1-S4 24% (2.4) 55% (3.6) 77% (4.3) 0.001
Notes: N=118. Relative deviation is measured as RD = 115 ∑
15
t=1
Pt−FVt
mean(FV) . Each separate
market consisted of ten subject (eight subjects in S1’s M-market). Average SET-scores are
provided in parentheses. The last column provides p-values obtained by running a Wilcoxon
signed rank test on the difference in RD values between the L- and H-market on a per period
basis.
To statistically compare the L and the H-markets, i.e. the markets with
the highest difference in terms of SET-scores, we use a test proposed by
Haruvy and Noussair (2006). We treat the difference between the average
price and the fundamental value in each period of each session as the rel-
evant unit of observation yielding 15 observations.34 We then evaluate the
32RD is defined as 1T ∑
T
t=1
Pt−FVt
mean FV with Pt being the mean period transaction price.
33To test whether CRT (among others Bosch-Rosa et al., 2015) or risk preferences (among
others Eckel and Füllbrunn, 2015) play a role in bubble formation we also look at correlations
between CRT and RD and General Risk and RD. We find small and insignificant correlations;
the correlation between RD and average market CRT equals -0.1577 (p = 0.624) and the
correlation between RD and the average market score on the general risk question equals
0.1055 (p = 0.744).
34As in Haruvy and Noussair (2006) we assumes that the difference between price and
fundamental value is independent over periods and results in giving equal weight to all
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2hypothesis that the difference in the L-markets is equal to the difference in
the H-markets using a Wilcoxon signed rank test.35 The p-values in the final
column of Table A.6 in the Appendix show that we can reject the Null that
the relative deviation in the L-market is equal to that in the H-market for
each comparison—each session and in aggregate—at the five percent level.
Hence, overpricing is significantly higher in the H-markets than in the L-
markets.
Although there exists a clear difference in prices between the L and the
H-markets, Table A.6 shows that a clear trend in RD scores from the L,
through the M, to the H-markets is only present in Sessions S3 and S4. A
reason for this might be that our market composition device relies on the
students’ heterogeneity with respect to SET-scores, i.e. when average SET-
score are close to each other as for example in market M and H in S1, market
L and M in S2, or market M and H in S3 and S4, the RD scores are quite
close to each other. We therefore use the combined data from Sessions S1-S4
to evaluate the Null that RDL = RDM = RDH against the alternative that
RDL < RDM < RDH using Cuzick’s trend test. We can reject the Null at a
significance level of one percent indicating a significant trend in overpricing
(see Table A.5 in the Appendix). Hence, overpricing is increasing in the
average propensity to speculate.36
Finally, during the first four sessions subjects were asked to make an
incentivized prediction of the average price for the coming period at the
start of that period.37 There is no statistical difference between the L, M
and H-markets in terms of (absolute) prediction errors over all 15 periods
taken together indicating that high SET-score individuals thus also predict
higher transaction prices. However, we do observe that traders from M and
H-markets failed to correctly predict the market crash towards the end of
periods in all sessions
35Thus, for each session we evaluated the Null that (PHt − FVt) − (PLt − FVt) = 0, and
across sessions we evaluated the Null that 14 ∑
4
i=1(P
H
t,i − FVt)− 14 ∑4i=1(PLt,i − FVt) = 0 with i
being the session ID.
36Table A.5 in Appendix A.5 shows that running similar tests with other bubble measures
used in the literature, i.e. measures that are related to the magnitude of the bubble, yields
similar results; the higher the market average propensity to speculate as measured by the
average SET-score of a market, the larger the magnitude of the price bubble in that market.
These results hold both in terms of a significant difference between the L and M-markets
(using a Wilcoxon signed rank test) as well as in terms of a significant trend from the L,
through the M, to the H-markets (using Cuzick’s trend test). We furthermore observe a
significantly higher turnover in the H-markets than in the L- markets.
37Figure A.4 in the Appendix shows the prediction errors for the L, M and H-markets
averaged over S1-S4.
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the experiment while in the first periods especially the H-market failed to
predict the high starting price.38 As subsequent prediction errors in those
cases were quickly reduced, it seems—as was also found in Haruvy et al.
(2007)—that participants’ predictions can best be modeled by an adaptive
learning model. This is confirmed by the results in Table A.7 in which we
report the results of two equations from Haruvy et al. (2007) that are used to
test the influence of adaptive learning as well as the usage of the fundamen-
tal value as an anchor for the formation of beliefs.39 We find that in the L, M
and H-markets the use of adaptive beliefs is more important than anchoring
on the fundamental value. However, the relative importance of anchoring
on the fundamental value decreases in the average market SET-score, i.e. an-
choring on the fundamental value seems more important in the L-markets
than in the H-markets.
2.3.3 No speculation treatment in LNP markets
Lei et al. (2001) made an interesting observation; they report that even in as-
set markets in which speculation is excluded by design—subjects in the role
of buyers can only buy and subjects in the role of sellers can only sell—price
bubbles do occur. Hence, speculative motives cannot drive bubbles in such
markets and, as a consequence, market compositions with respect to SET-
scores should have no effect. If we would find such an effect, however, the
SET-score would also measure something other than purely speculative be-
havior.
To test this, we run three additional sessions with the same protocol as
in the SSW sessions but with the only exception that traders were allowed
to either only buy or only sell assets, i.e. we implemented the LNP design.
Figure 2.3 shows the deviation of the median transaction price from the
fundamental value in the LNP sessions. We observe that in many periods
the subjects do not trade at all and moreover that none of the nine markets
shows a bubble pattern. Overall, we find no evidence that SET-scores affect
overpricing—in particular, we do not find the same relationship with respect
38Median predictions for the first period transaction price were 379.38, 421.25 and 373.125
for the L, M and H-markets respectively.
39To test the influence of adaptive learning, we model the price prediction for period t
made at the start of that same period in market m by subject i, denoted by Bi,m,t, as follows:
Bi,m,t = Ci+ β periodtrend. The variable ’periodtrend’ equals Pm,t−1+ Pm,t−1
Pm,t−1−Pm,t−2
Pm,t−2 where
Pm,t stands for the median transaction price in market m at time t. To test the influence of
anchoring on the fundamental value we use the following formula: Bi,m,t = Ci + γ FVt with
FVt being the time t fundamental value and Ci representing a constant.
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2to SET-scores as in our SSW setting. However, eyeballing the figures is the
only evidence we can provide; due to the low number of trades—with no
trades in 65 percent of periods––we are not able to provide reliable bubble
measures.40
Figure 2.3: Median transaction price distance from the FV, S5-S7
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Notes: Distance between median transaction prices and the fundamental value (FV) for mar-
kets L, M, and H of Sessions S5-S7.
Besides the lack of bubble formation in any of the LNP no-speculation
markets, we find some additional differences when comparing our results
to the original findings of LNP. Specifically, while LNP find that market dy-
namics in terms of the relationship between excess demand (total bids minus
total asks) and price changes in their no-speculation markets closely follow
that of the bubble markets from Smith et al. (1988), we find no such rela-
tionship.41 In other dimensions our results are close to the original findings.
In terms of trading volume, for example, the results from our sessions are
40Note that in Session 6 the deviations from fundamental value in periods 1, 2, 5, 9, 11
and 13 are caused by the same buyer/subject.
41Specifically, the results provided in the Appendix in Table A.8 indicate that there is no
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relatively close to those found in LNP. We find that in our LNP sessions on
average 86% of possible trades are executed whereas LNP find that between
80 and 90% of trades are executed. However, we see no trade in 65% of all
periods with little difference between the L, M and H-markets. We can only
speculate on why we observe differences between the results in terms of bub-
ble formation from our no-speculation markets and the LNP no-speculation
markets. Our parametrization is different to LNP with respect to the num-
ber of market participants (n=7/8 vs. n=9/10), the number of shares in the
market (80 vs. 20), the allocation of endowments (buyer only cash/seller
only shares vs. buyer and sellers having cash and shares), the number of
periods (12 vs. 15), and the dividend payments ({20,40} vs {0, 8, 28, 60}).
Especially, the fact that in our setting all traders were already endowed with
shares before the start of the market might have reduced the effect of LNP’s
‘active participation hypothesis’ thereby reducing the number of irrational
trades executed for the sake of trading. Another explanation might be the
fact that the SET was administered before our markets making backward
induction more salient.
2.4 Discussion and conclusion
Our result seem to indicate that indeed the speculative trading behavior
of market participants plays a role in the formation of price bubbles. Of
course, this is not to say that other factors might not play a role as well. We
readily acknowledge the existence of many determinants for bubbles, many
of which are unrelated to speculative behavior. Moreover, our definition of
speculative behavior, namely a trader’s SET-score, hinges on the assumption
that the speculative reasoning in the SET (along the lines of the QRE and
noise trader theory) also applies to trading in SSW markets. Although a full
investigation is beyond the scope of our paper (and might be addressed in
future work), many aspects of our results lend credibility to this assumption.
Firstly, as show in Table A.8, we see an increasing importance of mar-
ket pressure (defined as the number of bids minus the number of asks in
a period) on price changes moving from the L to the H-markets. In other
words, the higher one’s SET-score, the more likely one deems future capi-
tal gains, which translates to excess market pressure. As the QRE predicts,
high SET-score individuals assume higher error rates among fellow traders
influence of excess demand on price changes in our final three sessions. Rather, the results
closely mimic those from the L-markets in the first four sessions.
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2leading to higher expected capital gains; this finding is consistent with sim-
ilar arguments offered for speculation in the SSW environment by LNP and
Plott (1991). Moreover, this rationale directly translates to simulation models
used in the experimental literature to identify speculative trading patterns
in SSW markets (e.g. Baghestanian et al., 2015), which are based on noise
trader theory (De Long et al., 1990a).
The bubble game is based on the centipede game, where players are
able to extract higher rents from the experimenter through coordination.
Although this is not an equilibrium strategy one could argue that the SET
measures coordination rather than speculation. Specifically, when all par-
ticipants in the SET buy into the bubble at all prices, the expected average
pay-off is higher than not buying at all, namely 6.36 versus 3 euro in the
Nash equilibrium. However, if the SET measures a tendency to coordinate,
then this should have no effect on bubble formation in the SSW markets,
because in the latter traders trade against each other: if one traders wins,
another trader automatically loses; a feature that is not present in the SET.
Hence, as coordination cannot explain bubble formation in both the SET and
the SSW, we do not think that coordination drives our results.
Another alternative explanation for our results might be that the SET
captures a failure to backward induct rather than speculative trading strate-
gies. However, we do not think this is the case in our experiment. Firstly,
we have made backward induction salient in our test questions as well as
by starting the price list in the SET elicitation procedure at the highest pos-
sible price. Moreover, as the results in Section A.4 suggest, subjects seem to
make a conscious decision regarding their best possible action given their
beliefs about the SET-scores of others. Specifically, about 82 percent of sub-
jects buy at most one step away from their optimal buying price given their
beliefs about the SET-score of the other subjects in their session. Finally, not
a single subject bought the asset for the highest possible price—at which one
is sure to be last in the trading sequence—in the SET which clearly points
towards an understanding of the mechanics behind the game.
LNP found that price bubbles arise even when buying for resale is not
possible (their non-speculation treatment) meaning that these bubbles must
be driven by either risk-loving preferences or irrationality in the sense of a
violation of dominance (Moinas and Pouget, 2013). Following this result it
could be argued that our results, too, might be the result of irrationality that
is correlated with SET-scores. In our final three ’robustness check’ sessions
in line with LNP, however, we find no correlation between SET-scores and
bubble formation; surprisingly we find neither of the L, M or H-markets
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to produce a bubble. Overall, we can conclude that irrational behavior is
not likely to be the driving force behind our main result. We do not claim,
however, that the speculative behavior measured in the SET is the only driv-
ing force in SSW bubbles. It is well-known that many other factors might
well play a role as well (Palan, 2013). In that sense our conclusion does
not clash with that of LNP, who write: "We do not claim that speculation does
not occur in asset markets of this type, merely that speculation is not necessary to
cause departures from fundamental values”(Lei et al., 2001, p.842). Paraphrasing
LNP, we do not claim that speculation is necessary to cause departures from
fundamental values, merely that it does occur in asset markets of this type.
In this paper we test whether speculative behavior of traders fuel price
bubbles in experimental asset markets. To capture speculative behavior at
the individual level, we introduced a new measure—the SET-score derived
from the Speculation Elicitation Task—based on the bubble game of Moinas
and Pouget (2013). The SET can be easily implemented in the laboratory
(in about 15-20 minutes) and provides a simple and easy-to-interpret score.
We find that bubbles are higher in SSW markets composed of traders with
high speculative behavior than in markets composed of traders with low
speculative behavior given the possibility of speculation is not excluded by
design. Hence, we provide experimental evidence that speculative trading
behavior adds to the formation of asset market bubbles.
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Chapter 3
The disposition effect and underreac-
tion to private information42
3.1 Introduction
The disposition effect, as first coined in Shefrin and Statman (1985), is de-
fined as the tendency of investors to hold stocks with capital losses too long
and to sell stocks with capital gains too soon. Empirically, the disposition
effect has been observed in stock markets (Odean, 1999; Kaustia, 2004; Chen
et al., 2007; Chong, 2009; Hur et al., 2010; Talpsepp, 2011; Ormos and Joó,
2014), futures markets (Frino et al., 2004; Choe and Eom, 2009; Chou and
Wang, 2011; Cheng et al., 2013; Li and Yang, 2013) and mutual fund mar-
kets (Frazzini, 2006; Singal and Xu, 2011; Cici, 2012). Furthermore, Weber
and Camerer (1998), Weber et al. (2007) and Weber and Welfens (2009) have
found the bias to be present in experimental asset markets.
The most common explanation for the disposition effect is based on a
combination of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and mental
accounting (Thaler, 1985). Specifically, it is based on the ’S-shaped’ value
function from prospect theory that implies risk averse behavior following
gains and risk seeking behavior following losses relative to a reference point
(Grinblatt and Han, 2005). This behavior results in the tendency to sell the
asset following (paper) gains and to hold the asset following (paper) losses
causing price underreaction and subsequent return drifts equal in sign to the
price signal (Frazzini, 2006; Dacey and Zielonka, 2008). Other explanations
that have been offered for the disposition effect are realization utility (Shefrin
and Statman, 1985; Barberis and Xiong, 2009, 2012), regret/pride (Shefrin
and Statman, 1985; Fogel and Berry, 2006; Muermann and Volkman Wise,
2006; Bleichrodt et al., 2010; Lehenkari, 2012), self-control (Shefrin and Stat-
man, 1985; Mintoft et al., 2012), cognitive dissonance (Chang et al., 2016;
Grosshans et al., 2017), the belief in mean reversion (Odean, 1998; Jiao, 2017)
and informational differences between informed and uninformed investors
(Dorn and Strobl, 2011).
At the aggregate market level the disposition effect has been offered as
an explanation for empirical puzzles such as the positive correlation between
42This chapter is based on a joint paper with Jiangyan Li, Jianying Qiu and Utz Weitzel,
The disposition effect and underreaction to private information. Current status: in preparation.
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and Statman, 1985; Barberis and Xiong, 2009, 2012), regret/pride (Shefrin
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At the aggregate market level the disposition effect has been offered as
an explanation for empirical puzzles such as the positive correlation between
42This chapter is based on a joint paper with Jiangyan Li, Jianying Qiu and Utz Weitzel,
The disposition effect and underreaction to private information. Current status: in preparation.
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3returns and trading volumes (Odean, 1998), high trading volumes in run-ups
and low trading volumes during crashes (Weber and Camerer, 1998) and
the tendency of past winners to outperform past losers (Grinblatt and Han,
2005). In this paper we examine the role of the disposition effect with respect
to a fourth empirical puzzle: the widely documented underreaction (either
positive or negative) of stock prices to news (see for instance Jegadeesh and
Titman, 1993; Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999; Schiereck et al., 1999).
According to the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970) this type of
underreaction should not exist as it implies predictability of stock returns
which should be arbitraged away instantaneously. However, in a market in
which investors are affected by the disposition effect, the buying (selling)
pressure following a positive (negative) price signal will be relatively low.
When coupled with limited arbitrage possibilities due to capital constraints
and limited time horizons (Grinblatt and Han, 2005), the disposition effect
will prevent prices from immediately reaching their new equilibrium values
thereby causing price underreaction and subsequent price momentum.
Although the link between the disposition effect and price underreaction
following new price information has been shown in among others Grinblatt
and Han (2005), Frazzini (2006) and Weber and Welfens (2009), it is always
under the assumption of public information regarding price news. Instead,
we are interested in the role of the disposition effect in the process of market
underreaction following the arrival of private information to a small group
of insiders. The translation of private signals into market prices is perhaps
the corner stone of market efficiency and much effort has been devoted to
the design of market mechanism that could facilitate this process. Moreover,
as for instance shown in Augustin et al. (2015), the actual usage of insider
information in financial markets seems widespread.
Besides the practical relevance, distinguishing between private and pub-
lic information in markets affected by the disposition effect is also interesting
from a theoretical standpoint due to the possibly different dynamics follow-
ing the price signal. Specifically, contrary to the case of public information,
insider traders in our experiment have a distinct informational advantage
over the other non-insiders that they will try to exploit for as long as pos-
sible by spacing out their trades in order to prevent this information from
being picked up by other market participants (see for instance Buffa, 2013).
However, this trading behavior might also lead to a potential stronger un-
derreaction than under the case of public information as it takes longer for
the price signal to be translated into actual price changes. It is interesting
to see if and to what extent insider disposition attitudes play a role in these
38
dynamics.
To study the relationship between the disposition effect and price un-
derreaction under private information, we make use of an experimental ap-
proach as, contrary to empirical methods, it provides us with full control
over the average disposition level of our markets, the fundamental value
and the price signals provided to the insiders. We are therefore able to di-
rectly test for this relationship without the problem of having to disentangle
it from the other possible factors responsible for the selling of winners and
holding of losers such as the belief in mean reversion, portfolio rebalancing
and trading costs.
In the first part of our experiment we measure individual disposition
levels using a novel method involving an ambiguous sequential two-state
(either gain or loss) lottery with four rounds. In total six of these sequential
lotteries are administered with each sequential lottery being called a ’series’.
In each lottery series subjects are given the option before the start of each of
the four lotteries making up the series to either play or quit with earnings
accumulating through each series. We pre-determined the outcomes in such
a way to create both a series containing four consecutive losses, called ’Series
L’, and a series containing four consecutive gains, called ’Series G’, that
are used to measure each individual’s disposition level in the loss and gain
domain respectively. The longer one keeps playing in Series L, the higher
one’s disposition effect is in the loss domain and the sooner one stops in
Series G, the higher one’s disposition effect is in the gain domain.
In the second part of our experiment subjects trade an asset in a
computer-based double auction market that subjects know to consist of six
’outsiders’ who do not receive a private price signal regarding the end-of-
period dividend and three insiders who do. The final value of the asset
being traded equals this end-of period dividend that depends on the un-
known color of a pre-drawn ball from an ambiguous urn. Our treatment
effect is the type of insider present in a market. Specifically, we categorize
insiders by their disposition level (high/low) measured in part one of the
experiment and the domain in which this level was measured (gain/loss)
leading to four different types of insiders. After two minutes of trading, the
insiders receive a private signal that either a low or high pay-off ball has not
been drawn amounting to a positive and negative price signal respectively.
We run eight asset markets per session; one for every possible scenario (4
types of insiders × 2 types of price signals).
Our paper adds to the literature in two ways. Firstly, by focusing on
the relationship between the disposition effect and underreaction using pri-
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3vate instead of public news signals, we open up a potentially important and
practically relevant avenue within the disposition effect literature. Secondly,
as we make an explicit distinction between the disposition effect in the gain
and loss domains by means of our 4×2 design, we are able to study the
whole spectrum of different insider types/price signal combinations. With
the asymmetries in both individual disposition effect behavior and market
underreaction between the gain and loss domains found in Weber et al.
(2007) and Weber and Welfens (2009) respectively, we believe such an analy-
sis is warranted.
Our results show that high disposition insiders exhibit a greater (lower)
willingness to hold the asset following a negative (positive) signal than the
low disposition insiders as evidenced by both price and especially quantity
data. Finally, at the aggregate market level we observe some minor evidence
of a stronger price underreaction in markets with high disposition insid-
ers than those with low disposition insiders following both a positive and
negative price signal. As expected, both results only hold when individual
disposition biases are measured in the domain corresponding to the insider
price signal.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides an
overview of the related literature and presents our hypotheses. Section 3.3
includes the experimental design and procedures. In Section 3.4 our results
are presented and discussed. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Literature review and hypothesis development
Underreaction of stock prices to news has been widely documented. For
instance, using a sample of NYSE and AMEX stocks running from 1965
to 1989, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) report that—due to the serial corre-
lation in the firm-specific component of returns—significant profits can be
obtained by following a trading strategy based on buying past winners and
selling past losers. This results continues to hold when correcting for firm
size and systematic risk. They argue that these return dynamics could be
the result of underreaction to short term firm prospects and the subsequent
momentum that follows.
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), using a sample of NYSE, AMEX and
NASDAQ stocks running from 1963 to 1995, find that investment strategies
based on short-term (less than 12 months) industry momentum, i.e. buy-
ing stocks from past winning industries and selling stocks from past losing
industries, result in significant profits even after controlling for size, book-
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to-market equity, individual stock momentum and market micro-structure.
Like Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) contend
that their results might be due to short run underreaction of stock prices to
(industry) news.
Finally, Schiereck et al. (1999) also examine the profitability of momen-
tum trading strategies on a sample of stocks traded on the Frankfurt stock
exchange in the period from 1961 to 1991. They too find that these types
of strategies are highly profitable in the short run (<12 months) even when
corrected for firm size, systematic risk and macro-economic variables. More-
over, their results strongly support the underreaction hypothesis. Specifi-
cally, it is found that the more extreme the past price paths of a portfolio,
the higher the profit of following a momentum strategy will be.
Although the disposition effect is perhaps the most prominent expla-
nation for price underreaction to news, the literature offers multiple other
explanations for the phenomenon. For instance, Barberis et al. (1998) posit
that both under- and overreaction can be explained by a Bayesian represen-
tative investor who believes that dividend payouts are either in a trending
(positive correlation) state or a mean-reverting (negative correlation) state,
even though in reality they follow a random walk. Consecutive earnings an-
nouncements of the same sign increase the investor’s belief of being in the
trending state while two consecutive earnings announcement with an oppo-
site sign increase the investor’s belief of being in a mean-reverting state. The
pessimism when believed to be in the mean-reverting state leads to an un-
derreaction to (earnings) announcements while the optimism when believed
to be in the trending state leads to an overreaction.43
Like Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1997) also use investor sentiment
to explain under- and overreaction, albeit with different psychological con-
cepts. Their model features both informed investors subject to both overcon-
fidence and self-attribution as well as uninformed investors who are subject
to no biases. Due to their biases informed investors attach too much value
to both their private information and public information in accordance with
their private signal while they dismiss public information that is not in ac-
cordance with their private signal. These biases cause an underreaction to
public information and an overreaction to private information.
A different type of heterogeneous agents model is introduced by Hong
and Stein (1999) who explain underreaction using an infinite-horizon model
in which two types of boundedly rational investors populate the market. The
43Ludwig and Zimper (2013) extend Barberis et al. (1998) by more explicitly modeling the
behavioral underpinnings used in Barberis et al. (1998) by means of decision theory.
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3first type of investor, called ’newswatchers’, make price prediction based on
private information about the fundamental value without conditioning on
current and past prices while the ’momentum traders’ only use past prices
to predict future prices. Assuming gradual diffusion of private informa-
tion, prices slowly change when newswatchers start trading on their private
information leading to initial price underreaction followed by eventual over-
reaction when the momentum traders pick up on this price change.
A study that does explicitly look into the disposition effect as a possi-
ble explanation for price underreaction is Lin and Rassenti (2012). Using
experimental asset markets to set up a horse race between competing expla-
nations for underreaction, they find that neither the explanation offered by
Hong and Stein (1999) nor that by Daniel et al. (1997) matches their data.
Moreover, they also find that the disposition effect does not provide an ex-
planation for the underreaction observed in their markets. Specifically, in
contrast with the empirical study based on mutual fund data of Frazzini
(2006) it is found that in those cases where capital gains or losses have the
same sign as the news announcement, the observed underreaction and sub-
sequent drift are no more pronounced than when this is not the case even
though this would be expected from the disposition effect. Instead, perform-
ing a simulation with the parameters extracted from the experimental data
leads Lin and Rassenti (2012) to posit price inertia as the main explanation
for the under- and overreaction observed.
Contrary to Lin and Rassenti (2012) however, Grinblatt and Han (2005)
do find empirical proof for a model explaining underreaction by disposition
biases. Namely, the predictions from their model—that includes both in-
vestors affected by the disposition bias and investors free of biases—match
the relationship between unrealized gains and losses and price underre-
action following price news observed for NYSE and AMEX traded stocks.
Specifically, as expected from the disposition effect, positive (negative) news
if followed by positive (negative) return drifts.
In an experiment based on the model developed by Grinblatt and Han
(2005), Weber and Welfens (2009) create both high and low disposition mar-
kets in order to study the relationship between the markets’ average level
of disposition bias and underreaction following either a positive or negative
public price signal. The individual disposition levels are measured by means
of the aggregate observed buying and selling behavior following both gains
and losses (thereby making no distinction between the disposition effect in
the gain and loss domain). Underreaction is present in all markets following
a positive price signal but the underreaction is significantly higher in the
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high disposition markets. Following a negative price signal, underreaction
is only found for the high disposition markets with the underreaction being
significantly smaller than that following a positive price signal.
Given the above results it seems natural to expect high disposition insid-
ers in our experiment to be more (less) willing to hold the asset following a
negative (positive) price signal than the low disposition insiders. However,
as mentioned in the introduction and as posited by Buffa (2013), insiders
might prefer to not trade aggressively on their information as to make sure
they remain undetected, leading to a stronger price underreaction follow-
ing private than public information although this effect might be damp-
ened when—as in our experiment—it is common knowledge that insiders
are present (Schnitzlein, 2002).
Irrespective of the aggressiveness with which insiders use their informa-
tion and the difference in terms of underreaction compared to the public
information setting, there is no reason to believe there is no mediating role
of disposition attitudes on price underreaction following private informa-
tion. Although the effect of insider disposition levels on the willingness to
hold the asset following a price signal might not be equally strong as under
public information, we thus do still expect to see a difference in terms of
the willingness to hold the asset following the private price signal between
the two groups expressed in both quantities and prices of submitted and
accepted bids/asks. This leads us to formulate our first hypothesis related
to individual insider trading behavior following the price signal:
Hypothesis 1: High disposition insiders have a higher (lower) willing-
ness to hold the asset following a negative (positive) price signal than
low disposition insiders in terms of both the quantities and prices of
submitted and accepted bids and asks.
If Hypothesis 1 indeed holds this also implies that the selling (buying)
pressure following a negative (positive) signal is weaker in markets filled
with high disposition insiders than in markets with low disposition insid-
ers. These differences in post-signal behavior are expected to lead to a slower
diffusion of the private signal in markets with high disposition insiders com-
pared to markets with low disposition insiders. This leads us to the formu-
lation of our second hypothesis related to the market response following the
price signal provided to the insider traders:
Hypothesis 2: Markets with high disposition insiders exhibit stronger
price underreaction than low disposition insider markets following ei-
ther a positive or negative price signal.
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3However, we only expect the above hypotheses to hold when the individual
disposition levels are measured in the domain (gain/loss) that matches the
sign of the price signal (positive/negative). This follows from Weber et al.
(2007) who find that individual behavior in these two domains is unrelated
as evidenced by the lack of a systematic correlation between the proportions
of winners and losers realized following a positive and negative signal re-
spectively in both field data as well as the two experimental tasks used in
their study. This leads us to formulate our third and final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 hold only when the
insider disposition levels are measured in the domain corresponding
to the price signal.
3.3 Experimental design
3.3.1 General procedures
We ran six experimental sessions with 27 subject each (162 subjects in to-
tal) in the period from January to April of 2016 in the NSM Decision lab
located at the Radboud University (Nijmegen, The Netherlands). All ex-
periments were programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects
were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Each session lasted approxi-
mately 1 hour and 30 minutes with average earnings (paid out in cash at the
end of the experiment) of 17.01 euro per subject. Table B.1 in the appendix
provides descriptive statistics of the subjects in our sessions. The different
stages of the experiment are described in more detail below and depicted
schematically in Figure B.1 in the appendix.
3.3.2 Measuring individual disposition levels
In order to measure individual disposition levels we propose a new exper-
imental task that consists out of six sequential ambiguous lotteries, called
’series’, with four rounds each in which subjects can either win or lose 400
ECU in each round. The reason for using ambiguous instead of risky lot-
teries is to ensure our task more closely resembles actual markets in which
probabilities are unknown. The decision subjects had to make during each
lottery of each series was whether or not to play the lottery. As the payoff
from the lottery part of the experiment included a fixed initial endowment
of 1600 ECU and one of the six series was randomly chosen for pay-out,
subjects could at most lose their initial endowment. Table 3.1 shows the six
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Table 3.1: Lottery task
Series draw 1 draw 2 draw 3 draw 4
1 -400 400 400 400
2 400 400 -400 400
3 400 -400 400 400
4 -400 400 -400 400
5 (L) -400 -400 -400 -400
6 (G) 400 400 400 400
Notes: Lottery outcomes for each of the six possible series. Series 5 ( ’Series L’ ) is used to
measure disposition levels in the loss domain and Series 6 (’Series G’) is used to measure
disposition levels in the gain domain. The order of the series was randomized.
possible series that all subjects went through in a randomized fashion as
to minimize order effects. Instructions for the lottery task are provided in
Appendix B.2.1.
By predetermining the outcomes of the lotteries for each of the series we
were able to include both a series with four consecutive losses as well as a se-
ries with four consecutive gains, called ’Series L’ and ’Series G’ respectively
(Series 5 and 6 in Table 3.1). We count the number of lotteries played in
both Series L and Series G and posit that the later (earlier) a subject quits at
Series L (Series G) the higher her disposition level in the loss (gain) domain
is. This means that for both the disposition effect measured in the loss and
gain domain scores range from 0 to 5, with 0 indicating no lotteries played.
For sake of comparability we invert the scale for Series G meaning that a
score of 5 indicates the highest level of disposition effect in both the loss and
gain domain (holding a loser for as long as possible or selling a winner as
soon as possible respectively).
Our task shares some features with the ’housing task’ used in Weber
et al. (2007) to measure disposition attitudes. In the housing task subjects
are told that they inherited five houses which they need to sell over the
next five ’years’. Each house goes up or down in value with an amount of
30,000 euros per year and the probabilities of a price increase are the same
for all houses but decrease over time to below 50%. The disposition effect is
evident when a subject either sells a house too early and thereby does not
participate in a lottery with a positive expected payoff, or when a subject
holds a house for too long thereby participating in a lottery with a negative
expected payoff. However, unlike our task, the housing task does not make
an explicit distinction between the loss and gain domain.
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3However, we only expect the above hypotheses to hold when the individual
disposition levels are measured in the domain (gain/loss) that matches the
sign of the price signal (positive/negative). This follows from Weber et al.
(2007) who find that individual behavior in these two domains is unrelated
as evidenced by the lack of a systematic correlation between the proportions
of winners and losers realized following a positive and negative signal re-
spectively in both field data as well as the two experimental tasks used in
their study. This leads us to formulate our third and final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 hold only when the
insider disposition levels are measured in the domain corresponding
to the price signal.
3.3 Experimental design
3.3.1 General procedures
We ran six experimental sessions with 27 subject each (162 subjects in to-
tal) in the period from January to April of 2016 in the NSM Decision lab
located at the Radboud University (Nijmegen, The Netherlands). All ex-
periments were programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects
were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Each session lasted approxi-
mately 1 hour and 30 minutes with average earnings (paid out in cash at the
end of the experiment) of 17.01 euro per subject. Table B.1 in the appendix
provides descriptive statistics of the subjects in our sessions. The different
stages of the experiment are described in more detail below and depicted
schematically in Figure B.1 in the appendix.
3.3.2 Measuring individual disposition levels
In order to measure individual disposition levels we propose a new exper-
imental task that consists out of six sequential ambiguous lotteries, called
’series’, with four rounds each in which subjects can either win or lose 400
ECU in each round. The reason for using ambiguous instead of risky lot-
teries is to ensure our task more closely resembles actual markets in which
probabilities are unknown. The decision subjects had to make during each
lottery of each series was whether or not to play the lottery. As the payoff
from the lottery part of the experiment included a fixed initial endowment
of 1600 ECU and one of the six series was randomly chosen for pay-out,
subjects could at most lose their initial endowment. Table 3.1 shows the six
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3The second task used in Weber et al. (2007) to measure disposition atti-
tudes, namely the ’stock market task’, can make such a distinction. In the
stock market task subjects can trade six goods that all have equal but inde-
pendent probabilities of an increase or decrease in value. Weber et al. (2007)
apply an upward moving, downward moving and a neutral market regime
in which the value of the goods on average increases, decreases or stays put
respectively. Although the upward and downward regimes allow for the
measurement of the disposition effect in both the gain and loss domain, the
task relies on probability updating and as such does not share the simplicity
of our lottery task.
3.3.3 Market stage
The market stage of our experiment is based on the experimental asset mar-
ket used in Plott and Sunder (1982). In our four minute open-book contin-
uous double auction markets nine subjects can trade an asset whose value
equals a state-dependent ending dividend, see Section B.2.2 for instructions.
In line with the lottery task described in Section 3.3.2, the dividend is am-
biguous in order to more closely resemble actual asset markets.44 All sub-
jects receive 4000 ECU and 15 shares at the start of the market. The value of
the ending dividend is based on the color of a ball drawn from a bowl at the
beginning of the period but whose color is only announced at the very end
of that same period. The bowl consists out of 100 balls but the exact compo-
sition of the bowl is unknown. If a black ball is drawn the dividend equals 0
ECU, drawing a white ball results in a 100 ECU dividend, drawing a yellow
ball results in a 600 ECU dividend and drawing a purple ball results in a
700 ECU dividend. When we assume both ambiguity and risk neutrality
we arrive at a ’naive’ fundamental value of 350. Buy orders can only enter
the book when subjects have enough money to pay for the asset while sell
orders are possible only when a seller has enough risky assets to sell. That
is, short selling and leverage are not allowed. Historical transaction prices
are presented on the trading screen depicted in Figure B.3.
In order to be able to study the relationship between the disposition effect
and insider trading, three out of the nine traders in a market are appointed
as insiders who will receive the same private signal that excludes one po-
tential color of the drawn ball. The fact that insiders will be appointed as
44Corgnet et al. (2013) conclude that the absence of under- or overreaction to news is
robust to the introduction of ambiguity in the fundamental value of the asset (Corgnet et al.,
2013, p. 721). We therefore do not believe that using an ambiguous asset instead of a risky
asset might be driving any of our results.
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well as what kind of information they will receive is known to all traders at
the start of the market but none of the traders knows whether or not he or
she will be an insider. After two minutes of trading however, those subjects
appointed as insiders receive their private signal while the non-insiders sim-
ply see a screen notifying them that the insiders have received their signal.
The insiders all receive the same private signal notifying them that either
the white (100 ECU) or the yellow (600 ECU) ball was not drawn. Receiv-
ing a signal that the ball drawn is not white constitutes receiving a positive
signal as the naive expected value of the asset increased from 350 to 433.33.
Conversely, receiving a signal that the ball drawn is not yellow constitutes
a negative signal as the naive expected value drops from 350 to 266.66. Af-
ter the private signal is provided, trading continues for an additional two
minutes. The final dividend is determined by the computer with each of
the three remaining colors equally likely to be drawn (this was unknown to
the subjects). Note that the standard deviation of dividends (309.12) is equal
following a positive or negative signal while the skew only differs in sign
(0.65 and -0.65 following a positive and negative signal respectively).
During each session we ran three of the above described experimental as-
set markets in parallel (18 markets in total) with each market being repeated
eight times in order accommodate all combinations of our three different
treatment effects. Subjects were informed that one of the 8 repetitions was
randomly chosen for pay-out. In each of the eight ’periods’ we study one out
of the eight possible combinations of the following treatment effects: (1) the
domain in which the disposition effect is measured (gain/loss), (2) the dis-
position effect level of the insiders (high/low), and (3) the signal provided
to the insiders (positive/negative).
In the first four periods, called ’Block 1’, the disposition level of the in-
siders is measured in the gain domain (lottery Series G) while in the final
four periods, called ’Block 2’, the insider disposition levels are measured in
the loss domain (lottery Series L). Within each block of four periods, the
insiders in the first and third period were those subjects with the highest
individual disposition scores, while the insiders in the second and fourth
period of each block were those subjects with the lowest individual dispo-
sition scores (with ties broken randomly). Again, a high disposition score
in the gain domain implies a subject was one of the first to stop playing in
lottery Series G (selling a winner too soon), while a high disposition effect
in the loss domain implies a subject was one of the last to stop playing in
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she will be an insider. After two minutes of trading however, those subjects
appointed as insiders receive their private signal while the non-insiders sim-
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3lottery Series L (holding a loser too long).45
Finally, the price signal itself was positive in Periods 1, 4, 6 and 7 while it
was negative in the remaining periods. Those periods from the same block
with the same price signal but different insider disposition effect levels are
referred to as cohorts. Specifically, Period 1 and 4 are referred to as Cohort
1, Period 6 and 7 are referred to as Cohort 2, Period 5 and 8 are referred to as
Cohort 3 and, finally, Period 2 and 3 are referred to as Cohort 4. Following
Hypothesis 3, we expect to see a systematic difference in behavior between
high and low disposition insiders only for Cohort 1 and Cohort 3. Table 3.2
summarizes the eight combinations of the three treatment effects and the
cohort each combination belongs to.
Table 3.2: Treatment effects
Disp. measured in gain domain Disp. measured in loss domain
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
DP insiders High Low High Low High Low High Low
Signal Pos. Neg. Neg. Pos. Neg. Pos. Pos. Neg.
Cohort 1 4 4 1 3 2 2 3
Notes: Treatment effects by trading period.
3.3.4 Measuring ambiguity attitudes
As ambiguity is involved in both stages of our experiment discussed above,
we measure ambiguity attitudes in the final part of our experiment to as-
certain our results are not driven by these attitudes (see Section B.2.3 for
instructions). Specifically, subjects are first told that they are about to face a
choice list with eleven rows. In each row they are presented with a risky and
45Since each session consisted out of three markets with nine participants each including
three insiders, there were a total of nine insiders per session in each of the eight periods. In
Period 1 and 3 the insiders were those subjects with the highest nine disposition scores
measured in the gain domain, while in Period 2 and 4 the insiders were those subjects
with the lowest nine disposition scores in the gain domain. Furthermore, in Period 5 and
7 the insiders were those subjects with the highest nine disposition scores measured in the
loss domain, while in Period 6 and 8 the insiders were those subjects with the lowest nine
disposition scores measured in the loss domain. To evenly distribute the insiders and non-
insiders over all three markets in each session, Market 1, 2 and 3 were composed of subjets
whose rank equaled 1+ 3x, 2+ 3x and 3+ 3x respectivey, with x ranging from 0 to 8 in steps
of one. Please note that we made sure that those subjects that decided not to play any lottery
in the sequence relevant for measuring their disposition attitude were always classified as
a non-insider. This was done because in these cases the subjects could not be classified as
either high or low disposition individuals.
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an ambiguous urn: the composition of white and black balls in the ambigu-
ous urn remains constant over rows but is unknown while in the risky urn
the composition of white and black balls is known but changes from row
to row. Subjects are then asked to choose the color of the ball that, when
selected, will yield payment at the chosen ambiguous urn.
After having chosen the color for payment subjects move to a second
screen on which the actual choice table is provided (see Figure B.4) they are
told to make the actual choice between the ambiguous and risky urn at each
row. One of the eleven rows will be randomly selected for payment and a
ball will be drawn from the chosen urn. If that ball’s color matches the color
chosen by the subject, the subject will receive 800 ECU.
The probability at which a subject is indifferent between the risky and the
ambiguous lottery, called the ’matching probability’, is our measure of the
subject’s ambiguity attitude. The matching probability equals the average of
the probabilities of success at the risky urns at the two lines in which the
final risky (ambiguous) urn and first ambiguous (risky) urn are chosen in
case the chosen color for the ball was black (white). A matching probability
lower (higher) than 0.5 indicates ambiguity aversion (ambiguity seeking).
This method of measuring ambiguity attitudes is frequently used within the
literature (see for instance Lauriola and Levin, 2001; Dimmock et al., 2015;
Cavatorta and Schröder, 2016) and benefits from the fact that it can measure
ambiguity attitudes independent of risk attitudes (Dimmock et al., 2015).
Note that we exclude those subjects with multiple switching points or those
who picked either the risky or ambiguous urn in all instances (3% of cases)
from all below analyses involving individual ambiguity preferences.
3.4 Results
Below we firstly discuss the individual disposition scores as measured by
the lottery task from Section 3.4.1. We continue in Section 3.4.2 by present-
ing some general information on order volume and prices in our markets
both before and after the price signal where we make an explicit distinction
between those periods experiencing a positive price signal and those expe-
riencing a negative price signal. In Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 we look into the
relationship between insider disposition levels on the one hand and individ-
ual market behavior, market prices and underreaction on the other following
a positive and negative private price signal respectively.
Within Section 3.4.3 our primary focus will be Cohort 1 while in Sec-
tion 3.4.4 or primary focus will be Cohort 3 as in those two cohorts the
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3insider disposition levels are measured in a domain (gain/loss) matching
the price signal (positive/negative) which, as captured by the combination
of Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, is expected to result in systematic differences be-
tween the high and low disposition insider markets within these cohorts.
Although from a theoretical standpoint Cohort 2 and 4 are thus less interest-
ing and therefore discussed relatively briefly, they do serve as a robustness
check. Specifically, due to the mismatch between the domain of disposition
measurement and the sign of the price signals we should not observe sys-
tematic differences in market behavior between high and low disposition
insiders within these cohorts.
3.4.1 Individual disposition levels
Table 3.3 shows the frequency distribution of the individual disposition lev-
els measured in the lottery task. As can be seen, the disposition effects seems
much more pronounced in the loss than in the gain domain. Moreover, we
find a negative correlation of -0.178 (p = 0.024) between individuals’ dispo-
sition scores in the gain and loss domain driven by the large percentage of
subjects with a maximum disposition score in the loss domain. The lack of a
positive correlation as well as the fact that the disposition effect seems more
pronounced in the loss domain are both in line with the findings reported in
Weber et al. (2007). Furthermore, we find no significant correlation between
individual ambiguity attitudes (as measured by the task discussed in Section
3.3.4) and disposition effect levels in the gain domain (0.041, p = 0.607) nor
in the loss domain (0.072, p = 0.366).
Table 3.3: Disposition level distribution
Disposition score 1 2 3 4 5
Gain domain (%) 29.01 12.96 29.01 20.37 8.64
Loss domain (%) 8.02 3.09 10.49 8.64 69.75
Notes: Disposition score distribution (in percentages) grouped over the gain and loss domain.
The higher an individual’s disposition score in the gain (loss) domain, the sooner (later) she
stopped playing in lottery Series G (lottery Series L).
Table 3.4 provides the disposition levels of the high and low disposition
insiders within both the gain and loss domain. Most importantly, a Mann
Whitney U test strongly rejects the null of equal disposition levels between
high and low disposition insiders in both the gain and loss domain (p =
0.000 in both cases).
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Table 3.4: Insider disposition levels
High disp. insiders Low disp. insiders Mann U test
Gain domain 3.94 1.14 0.000
Loss domain 5.00 3.24 0.000
Notes: Disposition scores for high and lows disposition insiders measured in both the gain
and loss domain. The final column provides the p-values of a Mann Whitney U test for
differences in disposition scores between high and low disposition insiders in both the gain
and the loss domain.
3.4.2 General trading behavior
3.4.2.1 Order volume
Table B.2 in the appendix provides data on the number of bids and asks
placed per second per market in the different periods both before and after
the price signal with the post-signal data separated in insider and outsider
order placement. All figures, including those belonging to the post-signal
insiders and non-insiders (called ’outsiders’, also see below), are normalized
to reflect the average nine-person asset market used in our experiments.
We find that before the price signal on average 0.291 bids and 0.390 asks
are placed every second in our markets. This corresponds to one bid being
made every 3.41 seconds while an ask is made every 2.56 seconds and a new
order being entered in the order book every 1.46 seconds; figures close to
those found in Weber and Welfens (2009). With 0.282 bids per second the
amount of bids made does not significantly change (p = 0.168) after a posi-
tive signal whereas the amount of asks placed does significantly decrease to
0.309 asks per second (p = 0.000).46 Following a negative signal the amount
of bids per second significantly decreases to 0.216 (p = 0.000) while the
amount of asks significantly increases to 0.459 asks per second (p = 0.003).
Table B.3 provides data on the number of (normalized) accepted bids,
asks and executed trades per second. Before the price signal 0.083 bids are
46Note that in this and all following comparisons between a pre- and post-signal quantities
of submitted/accepted bids and asks as well as trades, the pre-signal quantity is always based
on the same periods as the post-signal quantity, e.g. when we compare pre- and post-signal
submitted bid quantities following a positive signal we compare the number of pre-signal
submitted bids from the positive signal periods (Period 1, 4, 6 and 7) with the number
of post-signal submitted bids from those same periods. In terms of order volume variables
(submitted/accepted bids and asks as well as trading volume), the amount of submitted asks
is the only variable for which we find a mildly significant (p = 0.028) difference between the
periods to experience a positive signal and those to experience a negative signal (0.378 vs.
0.405 submitted asks per second).
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Weber et al. (2007). Furthermore, we find no significant correlation between
individual ambiguity attitudes (as measured by the task discussed in Section
3.3.4) and disposition effect levels in the gain domain (0.041, p = 0.607) nor
in the loss domain (0.072, p = 0.366).
Table 3.3: Disposition level distribution
Disposition score 1 2 3 4 5
Gain domain (%) 29.01 12.96 29.01 20.37 8.64
Loss domain (%) 8.02 3.09 10.49 8.64 69.75
Notes: Disposition score distribution (in percentages) grouped over the gain and loss domain.
The higher an individual’s disposition score in the gain (loss) domain, the sooner (later) she
stopped playing in lottery Series G (lottery Series L).
Table 3.4 provides the disposition levels of the high and low disposition
insiders within both the gain and loss domain. Most importantly, a Mann
Whitney U test strongly rejects the null of equal disposition levels between
high and low disposition insiders in both the gain and loss domain (p =
0.000 in both cases).
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Table 3.4: Insider disposition levels
High disp. insiders Low disp. insiders Mann U test
Gain domain 3.94 1.14 0.000
Loss domain 5.00 3.24 0.000
Notes: Disposition scores for high and lows disposition insiders measured in both the gain
and loss domain. The final column provides the p-values of a Mann Whitney U test for
differences in disposition scores between high and low disposition insiders in both the gain
and the loss domain.
3.4.2 General trading behavior
3.4.2.1 Order volume
Table B.2 in the appendix provides data on the number of bids and asks
placed per second per market in the different periods both before and after
the price signal with the post-signal data separated in insider and outsider
order placement. All figures, including those belonging to the post-signal
insiders and non-insiders (called ’outsiders’, also see below), are normalized
to reflect the average nine-person asset market used in our experiments.
We find that before the price signal on average 0.291 bids and 0.390 asks
are placed every second in our markets. This corresponds to one bid being
made every 3.41 seconds while an ask is made every 2.56 seconds and a new
order being entered in the order book every 1.46 seconds; figures close to
those found in Weber and Welfens (2009). With 0.282 bids per second the
amount of bids made does not significantly change (p = 0.168) after a posi-
tive signal whereas the amount of asks placed does significantly decrease to
0.309 asks per second (p = 0.000).46 Following a negative signal the amount
of bids per second significantly decreases to 0.216 (p = 0.000) while the
amount of asks significantly increases to 0.459 asks per second (p = 0.003).
Table B.3 provides data on the number of (normalized) accepted bids,
asks and executed trades per second. Before the price signal 0.083 bids are
46Note that in this and all following comparisons between a pre- and post-signal quantities
of submitted/accepted bids and asks as well as trades, the pre-signal quantity is always based
on the same periods as the post-signal quantity, e.g. when we compare pre- and post-signal
submitted bid quantities following a positive signal we compare the number of pre-signal
submitted bids from the positive signal periods (Period 1, 4, 6 and 7) with the number
of post-signal submitted bids from those same periods. In terms of order volume variables
(submitted/accepted bids and asks as well as trading volume), the amount of submitted asks
is the only variable for which we find a mildly significant (p = 0.028) difference between the
periods to experience a positive signal and those to experience a negative signal (0.378 vs.
0.405 submitted asks per second).
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3accepted per second, 0.117 asks are accepted per second and 0.2 trades are
made each second. This corresponds to an average of one accepted bid
every 12.05 seconds, one accepted ask every 8.47 seconds and a trade being
executed every 5 seconds. Compared to a trading frequency of once every
7.98 seconds found in Weber and Welfens (2009), this number is relatively
high. Following a positive signal, the amount of accepted bids and asks
as well as the number of trades per second remain virtually unchanged at
0.081, 0.112 and 0.194 respectively. The same applies to a negative signal
after which every second on average 0.086 bids are accepted, 0.122 asks are
accepted and 0.207 trades are executed. None of the post-signal changes in
accepted bids, accepted asks and executed trades following either a positive
or a negative price signal are statistically significant.
As expected from their information differential, the total response fol-
lowing a price signal is far from evenly distributed between those traders
receiving a private signal and those who do not. This can be seen in Ta-
ble 3.5 in which we provide the differences between the amount of submit-
ted/accepted bids and asks per second by (post-signal) insider traders on the
one hand and pre-signal traders to become insiders (called ’pre-insiders’),
all pre-signal traders (called ’pre-all’ traders) and post-signal non-insider
traders (called ’outsider’ traders) on the other hand, averaged over all peri-
ods with either a positive or a negative price signal.47 We find insider order
placement to be in line with their inside information regarding the sign of
the price signal. Specifically, after a positive signal insiders place signifi-
cantly more bids and less asks than they did before the signal, but also more
than the pre-all traders and the (post-signal) outsider traders. Conversely,
insiders place significantly less bids and more asks than pre-insiders, pre-all
traders and outsider traders after a negative signal.
The same pattern can be seen when it comes to accepted bids and ac-
cepted asks. Following a positive price signal insiders accept significantly
less bids and significantly more asks than pre-insiders, pre-all traders and
the post-signal outsiders. Again, the converse applies following a nega-
tive price signal. Only the increase in the number of accepted bids when
compared between insiders and both pre-insiders and pre-all traders is not
significant. Insider order acceptance is thus too in line with the insider in-
formation advantage.
47Again, all figures have been normalized.
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Table 3.5: Insider trading behavior - volume
Pre-signal Post-signal
pre-insiders pre-all outsiders
# Bids 66.31*** 42.18*** 90.54***
Positive # Asks -39.48*** -45.66*** -42.98***
signal # Acc. bids -48.47*** -44.03*** -42.05***
# Acc. asks 27.98*** 31.12*** 87.80***
# Bids -46.00*** -47.74*** -36.55***
Negative # Asks 61.09*** 49.49*** 57.58***
signal # Acc. bids 6.15 2.48 8.57***
# Acc. asks -29.72*** -34.54*** -37.23***
Notes: Percentage difference between insiders and indicated groups in terms of the number
of submitted/accepted bids and asks. Wilcoxon test for significance: ***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p
<0.1.
Table B.6 provides the same data as Table 3.5 but on a per period basis.
As expected, in the large majority of periods the difference between insider
order placement and acceptance on the one hand and pre-insider, pre-all and
outsider trader order placement and acceptance on the other is in line with
the inside information obtained. Interestingly, these differences are larger (in
the expected direction) in Period 4 than in Period 1 as well as larger in Period
8 than in Period 5. This provides a first indication that the disposition effect
seems to have an effect on order placement and acceptance. We provide
further evidence on this feature in Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4.
3.4.2.2 Order/transaction prices and underreaction
Table B.4 shows the bid and ask prices per period both before and after the
price signal. The average pre-signal bid price and ask price equal 250.93
and 351.84 respectively implying a rather large bid-ask spread of over 100.
After a positive signal the bid price is significantly higher at 266.11 (p =
0.000) while the ask price increases significantly to 363.11 (p = 0.000).48 The
48Note that in this and all following comparisons between a pre- and post-signal prices of
submitted/accepted bids and asks as well as trades, the pre-signal prices are always based
on the same periods as the post-signal prices, e.g. when we compare pre- and post-signal
submitted bid prices following a positive signal we compare the prices of the pre-signal
submitted bids from the positive signal periods (Period 1, 4, 6 and 7) with the prices of
post-signal submitted bids from those same periods. In terms of price variables (prices of
submitted/accepted bids and asks as well as trading prices) we only find significant differ-
ences between the pre-signal prices of periods to experience a positive signal and those to
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<0.1.
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3bid-ask spread following a positive signal thus only decreases by around
3% indicating that market uncertainty has not reduced following a positive
signal. After a negative signal the average bid price decreases significantly to
224.40 (p = 0.000) and the average ask price decreases significantly to 314.38
(p = 0.000), implying a 10% decrease in the bid-asks spread. Although
bid and ask prices thus seem to indicate that the insider information is fed
through in the market, it does not lead to a strong reduction in market
uncertainty as measured by the bid-ask spread.
The first two main columns of Table B.5 provide data on transaction
prices grouped over accepted bids and asks per period which in turn are
split in pre- and post-signal figures. After a positive signal both prices of
accepted bids and accepted asks increase significantly from 264.37 to 283.65
and from 307.04 to 318.23 respectively (p = 0.000 in both cases). Following
a negative signal, the price of accepted bids and asks both decrease signifi-
cantly from 264.37 to 245.95 and from 307.04 to 268.71 respectively (p = 0.000
in both cases). This provides a first indication that price signals do not only
impact order volume and prices but also actual transaction prices.
Table 3.6: Insider trading behavior - prices
Pre-signal Post-signal
pre-insiders pre-all outsiders
# Bids 6.75* 9.97*** 4.78**
Positive # Asks 3.93 2.79 1.21**
signal # Acc. bids -0.67 -0.89*** -10.52**
# Acc. asks 3.23*** 3.96*** -0.19
# Bids -13.92*** -23.42*** -16.57***
Negative # Asks -13.40*** -13.25*** -5.20***
signal # Acc. bids -6.79 -4.41*** 7.47***
# Acc. asks -15.95*** -19.02*** -9.10
Notes: Percentage difference between insiders and indicated groups in terms of the prices
of submitted/accepted bids and asks. Wilcoxon test for significance: ***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p
<0.1.
As was the case with the order volume data, we do not expect price
changes following a price signal to be equal between insiders and outsiders.
In parallel with Table 3.5, Table 3.6 therefore provides a comparison of in-
experience a negative signal for submitted bids (247.79 vs. 254.07, p = 0.000) and submitted
asks (352.11 vs 353.96, p = 0.040)
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sider bid and ask prices as well as their accepted bid and ask prices with
those of pre-insider, pre-all and outsider traders, averaged over those pe-
riods experiencing either a negative or positive price signal. Although the
picture is not quite as clear as it was in Table 3.5, we still observe differences
in prices of submitted bids and asks and (to a lesser extend) accepted asks
to be in line with differences in information. The only real exception are the
accepted bids prices. However, Table B.7 shows that, in contrast with Period
1 and 5, Period 4 and 8 exhibit insider behavior consistent with the price sig-
nal for all price categories including accepted bids. Disposition levels thus
seem to interact not only with order volume but also with both submitted
and accepted bid and ask prices.
Finally, the final main column of Table B.5 provides information on the
transaction prices both before and after the price signals on a per period
basis. Before the signal the average transaction price equals 289.97 with no
significant difference (p = 0.153) between the average price in periods that
will experience a positive signal (288.43) and those that will experience a
negative signal (291.39). The pre-signal average transaction price implies
a total uncertainty premium of around 60 corresponding to a value for α
of around 0.59 in the α-MaxMin model, assuming a max and min prior that
place a 100% weight on the maximum and minimum dividends respectively.
This value is consistent with estimates found in Potamites and Zhang (2012)
and Dimmock et al. (2015) and moreover matches the results from our am-
biguity task in which we find a matching probability of on average 47.80%
indicating slight ambiguity aversion.
Figure 3.1 shows box plots as well as the mean of the post-signal transac-
tion price paths in those periods experiencing either a positive or a negative
price signal. After a positive signal the average transaction price increases
slightly but significantly by 5.73% (p = 0.000) while after a negative signal
the average transaction price decreases significantly by 10.39% (p = 0.011).
In order to gauge the distance from the fundamental value after the price
signal we do not take the previously discussed naive fundamental values as
a benchmark as these values do not correct for the uncertainty premium pre-
viously discussed. Instead we subtract this uncertainty premium from the
naive fundamental value to arrive at our benchmarks Bpos and Bneg which
are the price benchmarks in the periods with a positive and negative price
signal respectively as represented by the orange lines in Figure 3.1. The
uncertainty premium equals the difference between the naive fundamental
value and the median transaction price in the final thirty seconds before
the price signal which we take to be the equilibrium price. The uncertainty
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accepted bids prices. However, Table B.7 shows that, in contrast with Period
1 and 5, Period 4 and 8 exhibit insider behavior consistent with the price sig-
nal for all price categories including accepted bids. Disposition levels thus
seem to interact not only with order volume but also with both submitted
and accepted bid and ask prices.
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3premium was calculated separately for the two groups of periods either ex-
periencing a positive or negative signal but equaled 50 in both cases.
Figure 3.1: Price paths following a positive and negative price signal
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Notes: Box plots and means of transaction prices per trading block of 30 seconds grouped
over periods experiencing either a positive or a negative price signal.
Table 3.7 shows the post-signal price underreaction defined as the per-
centage difference between the average transaction price, Ti , in the ith post-
signal thirty second trading block and the respective benchmark. Specifi-
cally, following a positive signal underreaction in post-signal trading block i
is defined as (Bpos − Ti)/Bpos while following a negative signal it is defined
as (Ti − Bneg)/Bneg. As already observed from Figure 3.1, the underreaction
after a positive signal is stronger than the underreaction following a nega-
tive signal. Although in both instances the underreaction is significant in all
thirty second trading blocks, there is no price momentum toward the new
fundamental value following a positive signal while we do observe price mo-
mentum following a negative signal. Specifically, when, in line with Weber
and Welfens (2009), defining price momentum as the price underreaction
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in the first post-signal trading block minus that in the fourth post-signal
trading block, we find a momentum of 19.09% following a negative signal,
while we find a reverse momentum of -1.88% away from the post-signal
fundamental price following a positive price signal. Notwithstanding these
differences in momentum, the final column of 3.7 shows that seen over the
entire post-signal period there is no significant difference in underreaction
following either a positive or negative price signal.
Table 3.7: Underreaction
Post-signal trading block (30s. each)
1 2 3 4 ALL
(a) Positive signal 18.56*** 20.39*** 20.93*** 21.99*** 20.44***
(b) Negative signal 28.47*** 24.90*** 17.26*** 9.38*** 20.52***
Diff. (a) and (b) -9.91*** -4.51*** 3.67 12.61*** -0.08
Notes: Percentage difference between insiders and indicated groups in terms of the prices of
submitted/accepted bids and asks. Mann Whitney U test (first two rows) and Wilcoxon test
(final row) for significance: ***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1.
3.4.3 Insider behavior and underreaction after a positive signal
3.4.3.1 Cohort 1
Given Hypothesis 1, we expect to see a weaker increase in the willingness to
hold shares for the Cohort 1 high disposition insiders (Period 1) than for the
low disposition insiders (Period 4) following the positive price signal. One
way to obtain a proxy for this willingness is by subtracting the percentage
difference between insiders and pre-insiders in terms of the average num-
ber of submitted asks per second from the percentage difference between
insiders and pre-insiders in terms of the average number of submitted bids
per second (Table B.6 presents all these differences). This proxy, which we
dub Proxy 1V (with ’V’ standing for volume), increases with the change in
willingness to hold the asset following the price signal.49
For Cohort 1 in particular, this means we expect to see higher values
for Proxy 1V for low disposition insiders than high disposition insiders as
the former group is more likely to hold on to the asset following a positive
49Using all pre-signal traders as the benchmark (instead of using only those traders to
become an insider) leads to qualitatively similar results for Proxy 1V as well as for the other
three proxies to be introduced in this section (’2V’, ’1P’ and ’2P’).
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For Cohort 1 in particular, this means we expect to see higher values
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3Table 3.8: Volume - Cohort 1
Cohort 1 # Bids # Asks # Acc. bids # Acc. asks # Bought # Sold
0-30 -59.46 -5.26 200.00 21.73 -2.13 90.91
31-60 -62.64 122.58 66.67 -25.00 -31.75 180.00
61-90 -62.65 27.03 200.00 -48.48 -49.12 107.69
91-120 -71.05 109.52 -10.00 -21.88 -48.21 68.74
ALL -63.43*** 54.33*** 61.11 -21.77 -34.08*** 106.00***
Notes: Percentage difference between Cohort 1 high and low disposition insiders in terms of
volume. Wilcoxon test for significance (final row only): ***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1.
price signal. Our results indeed confirm this expectation; the change in
willingness to hold the asset flowing from changes in submitted bids and
asks following the signal equals 11.40 for the high disposition insiders while
it equals 129.47 for the low disposition insiders.
In similar fashion, a second proxy for the change in the willingness to
hold the asset following the price signal can be obtained by replacing the
submitted bid and ask volumes from Proxy 1V by the accepted bid and asks
volumes (again, see Table B.6). Using this second proxy, called Proxy 2V, the
results again match our expectations: we find Proxy 2V to equal 60.33 for
the high disposition insiders and 112.38 for the low disposition insiders. The
results regarding both Proxy 1V and 2V are thus in line with Hypothesis 1.
Table 3.8 provides the (post-signal) percentage differences between high
and low disposition insiders (high disposition minus low disposition) in
terms of the number submitted/accepted bids and asks as well as the num-
ber of times an insider was either a buyer or a seller.50 Positive (negative)
percentages imply more (less) active behavior by the high disposition insid-
ers. As expected from the above described differences in responses following
the price signal, high disposition insiders have a lower willingness to hold
the asset following a positive price signal than their low disposition counter-
parts as indicated by the on average significantly lower (higher) number of
submitted bids (submitted asks) and bought (sold) stocks. High disposition
50Note that we only test for a significant difference over the whole post-signal period and
not for the trading blocks of thirty seconds separately. This is due to the fact that the data
was at times too sparse to test for significance when using the thirty second blocks as the unit
of analysis. The same applies to all other tables in this subsection. Also, for all tables in this
subsection we always compare the high disposition period with the low disposition period
by taking the high disposition period as the base case meaning all table entries indicate the
how much lower or higher (in percentage terms) the high disposition figure is compared to
the low disposition figure.
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insiders also accept more bids and accept less asks than the low disposition
insiders, however both these differences are on average non-significant.
The difference between high and low disposition behavior in terms of
selling behavior becomes even more clear from Figure 3.2 which depicts the
post-signal change in share holdings for both groups. In line with Hypoth-
esis 1, high disposition insiders clearly have a lower post-signal willingness
to hold the asset as evidenced by the much larger increase in share holdings
for low than for high disposition insiders.
Figure 3.2: Change in post-signal shareholdings for Cohort 1 insiders
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Notes: Average post-signal share build-up for the high and low disposition insiders from
Cohort 1.
Analogous to Proxy 1V and 2V we construct Proxies 1P and 2P, with ’P’
standing for price, by using the percentage differences between insiders and
pre-insiders in terms of the price of submitted/accepted bids and asks found
in Table B.7. Specifically, adding the percentage difference between insiders
and pre-inisiders in terms of the average price of submitted (accepted) asks
to the percentage difference between insiders and pre-inisiders in terms of
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price signal. Our results indeed confirm this expectation; the change in
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percentages imply more (less) active behavior by the high disposition insid-
ers. As expected from the above described differences in responses following
the price signal, high disposition insiders have a lower willingness to hold
the asset following a positive price signal than their low disposition counter-
parts as indicated by the on average significantly lower (higher) number of
submitted bids (submitted asks) and bought (sold) stocks. High disposition
50Note that we only test for a significant difference over the whole post-signal period and
not for the trading blocks of thirty seconds separately. This is due to the fact that the data
was at times too sparse to test for significance when using the thirty second blocks as the unit
of analysis. The same applies to all other tables in this subsection. Also, for all tables in this
subsection we always compare the high disposition period with the low disposition period
by taking the high disposition period as the base case meaning all table entries indicate the
how much lower or higher (in percentage terms) the high disposition figure is compared to
the low disposition figure.
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insiders also accept more bids and accept less asks than the low disposition
insiders, however both these differences are on average non-significant.
The difference between high and low disposition behavior in terms of
selling behavior becomes even more clear from Figure 3.2 which depicts the
post-signal change in share holdings for both groups. In line with Hypoth-
esis 1, high disposition insiders clearly have a lower post-signal willingness
to hold the asset as evidenced by the much larger increase in share holdings
for low than for high disposition insiders.
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Analogous to Proxy 1V and 2V we construct Proxies 1P and 2P, with ’P’
standing for price, by using the percentage differences between insiders and
pre-insiders in terms of the price of submitted/accepted bids and asks found
in Table B.7. Specifically, adding the percentage difference between insiders
and pre-inisiders in terms of the average price of submitted (accepted) asks
to the percentage difference between insiders and pre-inisiders in terms of
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3the price of submitted (accepted) bids yields Proxy 1P (2P). The higher the
values of both 1P and 2P, the higher the increase in willingness to hold the
stock after the positive price signal.
Using Proxy 1P we find that, contrary to what would be expected from
the differences in disposition attitudes, the change in willingness equals
63.79 for the high disposition insiders and 21.88 for the low disposition insid-
ers. However, focusing on the difference between accepted ask and accepted
bid prices by means of Proxy 2P, the results do indeed point to a smaller
increase in the willingness to hold the asset by the low disposition insid-
ers; the change in willingness equals 4.30 for the high disposition insider
markets and 18.71 for the low disposition insider markets.
Table 3.9: Prices - Cohort 1
Cohort 1 Bid price Ask price Acc. bid price Acc. ask price Buy price Sell price
0-30 -5.90 -14.74 -38.61 8.12 8.37 -31.17
31-60 -7.27 -3.88 -32.85 7.09 4.84 -24.10
61-90 -11.39 -11.34 -3.97 0.87 2.42 -6.58
91-120 16.77 -18.94 -20.60 -9.75 -7.94 -25.82
ALL -6.12 -11.86*** -21.13** 3.29 3.57** -18.88**
Notes: Percentage difference between Cohort 1 high and low disposition insiders in terms of
prices. Wilcoxon test for significance (final row only): ***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1.
Table 3.9 shows the percentage differences between high and low dispo-
sition insiders in terms of their submitted bid and ask prices, their accepted
bid and ask prices and their buy and sell prices following the price signal.51
In line with Hypothesis 1, we find that high disposition insiders indeed sub-
mit bids and asks with on average lower prices than the low disposition
insiders do, with only the average post-signal difference in terms of sub-
mitted ask prices being significant. Unexpectedly though, high disposition
insiders on average tend to buy the asset at a slightly higher price than the
low disposition insiders as they accept asks for a higher (though not signifi-
cantly so) price than the low disposition insiders. However, as the negative
difference in accepted bids and sell prices are of a magnitude larger than
51Please note that as the uncertainty premium (see Section 3.4.2.2) can (and does) differ
between different periods in our experiment we cannot simply compare the raw price levels
between periods within a cohort. Instead, we correct for this by adding the uncertainty pre-
mium calculated for a particular period to the post-signal (bid-, ask- accepted bid-, accepted
ask-, buy- and sell-) prices of that particular period. Note that the uncertainty premium
differs for periods within Cohorts 1, 3 and 4. However, not correcting for differences in the
uncertainty premium does not qualitatively change our results.
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the positive difference in accepted asks and buy prices in general, the high
disposition traders’ lower willingness to hold the asset is still apparent from
the overall price dynamics.
Figure 3.3 presents the price paths and the respective price benchmarks
corrected for the period uncertainty premium equaling 50 for Period 1 and
70 for Period 4. We observe a significant increase in the average transaction
price following the price signal in the period with high disposition insiders
(Period 1) of 4.75% (p = 0.018) and a non-significant increase of 4.47% (p =
0.392) in the period with low disposition insiders (Period 4).
Figure 3.3: Price paths - Cohort 1
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Notes: Box plots and means of transaction prices per trading block of 30 seconds for both
Cohort 1 periods.
Following Hypothesis 2 as well as the results in Tables 3.8 and 3.9, we
expect more downward pressure on prices in Period 1 leading to stronger
underreaction when compared to that in Period 4 in which the insiders are
low disposition traders. However, the results in Table 3.10, which shows
the percentage amount of underreaction as compared to the period specific
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ALL -6.12 -11.86*** -21.13** 3.29 3.57** -18.88**
Notes: Percentage difference between Cohort 1 high and low disposition insiders in terms of
prices. Wilcoxon test for significance (final row only): ***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1.
Table 3.9 shows the percentage differences between high and low dispo-
sition insiders in terms of their submitted bid and ask prices, their accepted
bid and ask prices and their buy and sell prices following the price signal.51
In line with Hypothesis 1, we find that high disposition insiders indeed sub-
mit bids and asks with on average lower prices than the low disposition
insiders do, with only the average post-signal difference in terms of sub-
mitted ask prices being significant. Unexpectedly though, high disposition
insiders on average tend to buy the asset at a slightly higher price than the
low disposition insiders as they accept asks for a higher (though not signifi-
cantly so) price than the low disposition insiders. However, as the negative
difference in accepted bids and sell prices are of a magnitude larger than
51Please note that as the uncertainty premium (see Section 3.4.2.2) can (and does) differ
between different periods in our experiment we cannot simply compare the raw price levels
between periods within a cohort. Instead, we correct for this by adding the uncertainty pre-
mium calculated for a particular period to the post-signal (bid-, ask- accepted bid-, accepted
ask-, buy- and sell-) prices of that particular period. Note that the uncertainty premium
differs for periods within Cohorts 1, 3 and 4. However, not correcting for differences in the
uncertainty premium does not qualitatively change our results.
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the positive difference in accepted asks and buy prices in general, the high
disposition traders’ lower willingness to hold the asset is still apparent from
the overall price dynamics.
Figure 3.3 presents the price paths and the respective price benchmarks
corrected for the period uncertainty premium equaling 50 for Period 1 and
70 for Period 4. We observe a significant increase in the average transaction
price following the price signal in the period with high disposition insiders
(Period 1) of 4.75% (p = 0.018) and a non-significant increase of 4.47% (p =
0.392) in the period with low disposition insiders (Period 4).
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Notes: Box plots and means of transaction prices per trading block of 30 seconds for both
Cohort 1 periods.
Following Hypothesis 2 as well as the results in Tables 3.8 and 3.9, we
expect more downward pressure on prices in Period 1 leading to stronger
underreaction when compared to that in Period 4 in which the insiders are
low disposition traders. However, the results in Table 3.10, which shows
the percentage amount of underreaction as compared to the period specific
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3benchmark in both Period 1 and 4 as well as the difference in underreaction
between the two periods, only mildly support Hypothesis 2. Specifically, we
observe a significant underreaction in all separate trading blocks as well as
in the whole post-signal market phase for both periods. The underreaction
seems to decrease slightly with time in Period 4 whereas it actually increases
over time in Period 1 leading to a significantly lower underreaction in Period
4 compared to Period 1 in the final thirty second trading block.
Although the difference between the two periods in terms of underreac-
tion found in the final seconds of trading is in line with Hypothesis 2, the
underreaction in Period 4 is on average not significantly different from that
in Period 1 and seems relatively constant with no real sign of convergence
towards the benchmark. Specifically, in the low disposition insider period
we only observe some minor price momentum of 1.54% towards the post-
signal fundamental value while we actually observe a reverse momentum
of -14.03% away from the new (post-signal) fundamental value in the high
disposition insider period.
Table 3.10: Underreaction - Cohort 1
Post-signal trading block (30s. each)
1 2 3 4 ALL
(a) High disp. (Period 1) 15.90*** 16.65*** 20.76*** 29.93*** 20.27***
(b) Low disp. (Period 4) 16.53*** 17.71*** 19.50*** 14.99*** 17.79***
Diff. (a) and (b) -0.63 -1.06 1.26 14.94** 2.48
Notes: Transaction price underreaction in percentage terms relative to the benchmark price
following a positive price signal in Cohort 1. Mann Whitney U test (first two rows) and
Wilcoxon test (final row) for significance: ***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1.
3.4.3.2 Cohort 2
Following Hypothesis 3, we do not expect to see a systematic difference in
the willingness to hold the asset following the price signal between high
and low disposition insiders in Cohort 2. Applying Proxy 1V and 2V to this
cohort indeed confirms this expectation. Namely, while we do find a lower
change in willingness to hold the asset following the positive price signal for
the high disposition insiders (Period 7) than for the low disposition insiders
(Period 6) when applying Proxy 1V, the opposite is observed when applying
Proxy 2V. Specifically, we find 1V to equal 47.87 for the high disposition
insiders and 151.18 for the low disposition insiders while these figures equal
105.00 and 17.33 respectively for Proxy 2V. In contrast to Cohort 1 the latter
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proxy thus does not provide clear evidence of a higher positive change in
the willingness to hold shares by the low disposition insiders than the high
disposition insiders following a positive price signal.
Looking at the post-signal percentage difference between the high and
low disposition traders in terms of the different trading volume variables
found in Table B.8, we find that, similarly to Cohort 1, high disposition
insiders on average submit significantly less bids and significantly more asks
than the low disposition insiders. However, the average difference in post-
signal selling pressure between high and low disposition traders as proxied
by the difference in the number of submitted bids minus the difference in
the number of submitted asks between high and low disposition insiders is
nearly 60% higher in Cohort 1. A further difference with Cohort 1 is the fact
that in Cohort 2 the high disposition insiders accept significantly less bids
and sell significantly less than the low disposition traders. Moreover, unlike
Cohort 1, the high disposition insiders accept more bids and buy more than
the low disposition insiders, although in both cases the difference is not
significant. Finally, whereas Figure 3.2 showed a clear difference between
high and low disposition insiders in terms of post-signal changes in share
holdings, no such difference in visible in Figure B.7.
Moving to the change in willingness to hold the asset as extracted from
changes in the submitted bid and ask prices following the price signal by
means of Proxy 1P, we find the change in willingness to equal 4.61 for the
high disposition insiders and 16.13 for the low disposition insiders. Further-
more, we find 2P to equal 11.61 for the high disposition insiders and -5.49 for
the low disposition insiders. The differences between high and low disposi-
tion insiders in terms of Proxy 1P and 2P from Cohort 2 are thus opposite to
those found for Cohort 1.
We observe additional differences between Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 when
comparing Table 3.9 with Table B.9 which provides the post-signal percent-
age difference in terms of prices between the high and low disposition in-
siders of Cohort 2. Whereas for Cohort 1 the vast majority of differences
was negative and therefore in line with Hypothesis 1, all differences within
Cohort 2, with the exception of the difference in submitted bids, are positive.
Finally, moving from individual behavior to market dynamics, Figure B.5
shows the Cohort 2 price paths relative to the benchmark that was calculated
using an uncertainty premium equal to 50 in Period 6 and 49.5 in Period 7.
In the period with high disposition insiders (Period 7) the price following the
positive price signal increases significantly by 9.20% (p = 0.002) while in the
period with low disposition insiders (Period 6) we observe a smaller though
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3benchmark in both Period 1 and 4 as well as the difference in underreaction
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the willingness to hold shares by the low disposition insiders than the high
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found in Table B.8, we find that, similarly to Cohort 1, high disposition
insiders on average submit significantly less bids and significantly more asks
than the low disposition insiders. However, the average difference in post-
signal selling pressure between high and low disposition traders as proxied
by the difference in the number of submitted bids minus the difference in
the number of submitted asks between high and low disposition insiders is
nearly 60% higher in Cohort 1. A further difference with Cohort 1 is the fact
that in Cohort 2 the high disposition insiders accept significantly less bids
and sell significantly less than the low disposition traders. Moreover, unlike
Cohort 1, the high disposition insiders accept more bids and buy more than
the low disposition insiders, although in both cases the difference is not
significant. Finally, whereas Figure 3.2 showed a clear difference between
high and low disposition insiders in terms of post-signal changes in share
holdings, no such difference in visible in Figure B.7.
Moving to the change in willingness to hold the asset as extracted from
changes in the submitted bid and ask prices following the price signal by
means of Proxy 1P, we find the change in willingness to equal 4.61 for the
high disposition insiders and 16.13 for the low disposition insiders. Further-
more, we find 2P to equal 11.61 for the high disposition insiders and -5.49 for
the low disposition insiders. The differences between high and low disposi-
tion insiders in terms of Proxy 1P and 2P from Cohort 2 are thus opposite to
those found for Cohort 1.
We observe additional differences between Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 when
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age difference in terms of prices between the high and low disposition in-
siders of Cohort 2. Whereas for Cohort 1 the vast majority of differences
was negative and therefore in line with Hypothesis 1, all differences within
Cohort 2, with the exception of the difference in submitted bids, are positive.
Finally, moving from individual behavior to market dynamics, Figure B.5
shows the Cohort 2 price paths relative to the benchmark that was calculated
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period with low disposition insiders (Period 6) we observe a smaller though
63
3still significant increase in transaction prices equal to 4.59% (p = 0.007).
Table B.10 shows the underreaction (as previously defined) for the Co-
hort 2 periods as well as the difference in underreaction between the two
periods. Whereas the underreaction was on average higher for the high
disposition insiders in Cohort 1, the opposite is observed in Cohort 2; the
underreaction is, when seen over the entire post-signal period, significantly
higher for the low disposition insiders than for the high disposition insiders.
As was the case for Cohort 1, there is little to no momentum towards the
benchmark in either period with the difference between the mean transac-
tion price and the new fundamental value being significant for all separate
post-signal trading blocks of both Cohort 2 periods. Specifically, when again
defining post-signal price momentum as the difference between the price
underreaction in the first post-signal trading block and the last post-signal
trading block, we observe a negative momentum away from the new fun-
damental value equal to 2.01% for the high disposition insider markets and
a slight positive momentum equal to 0.42% for the low disposition insider
markets.
3.4.4 Insider behavior and underreaction after a negative signal
3.4.4.1 Cohort 3
As the periods forming Cohort 3 include insiders whose disposition levels
are measured in the domain (loss) matching the price signal (negative) we
can make a clear prediction on the willingness to hold shares following the
negative signal. Specifically, we expect the high disposition insiders from
Period 5 to be more willing to hold shares than their low disposition coun-
terparts from Period 8 after having received their insider information in the
form of a negative price signal.
Using Proxy 1V to assess the change in willingness to hold the asset
in terms of the number of submitted bids and asks confirms that the high
disposition insiders are more inclined to hold the asset following the price
signal. We find the value of Proxy 1V to be equal to -85.92 for the high
disposition and -102.34 for the low disposition insiders. Looking at changes
in the willingness to hold shares flowing from changes in the number of
accepted bids and asks as the by means of Proxy 2V yields similar results;
we find this proxy to equal -28.19 for the high disposition insiders and -
80.72 for the low disposition insiders. As expected from Hypothesis 1, both
proxies thus show a stronger negative change in the willingness to hold the
asset for the low disposition insiders than for the high disposition insiders.
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This thus implies that the high disposition insiders from Cohort 3 are more
keen on holding the stock following a negative price signal than the low
disposition insiders are.
Table 3.11 provides the post-signal percentage difference in terms of the
number of submitted and accepted bids and asks as well as the number
of bought and sold shares between high and low disposition insiders. Fol-
lowing Hypothesis 1, we expect the high disposition insiders to submit more
bids and less asks, accept less bids and more asks and to generally buy more
and sell less than the low disposition insiders. For the most part the final
row of Table 3.11 indeed confirms this hypothesis; except for the number
of submitted bids, all others differences have the correct sign and are, with
the exception of the number of submitted asks, significant. 52 Moreover,
Figure 3.4 is almost the exact inverse of Figure 3.2; high disposition insiders
clearly have a higher willingness to hold the asset following the negative
price signal than low disposition insiders.
Table 3.11: Volume - Cohort 3
Cohort 3 # Bids # Asks # Acc. bids # Acc. asks # Bought # Sold
0-30 30.30 25.38 -26.32 200.00 40.00 -23.21
31-60 -15.90 -8.93 -43.75 63.63 44.44 -30.99
61-90 11.11 -12.50 -9.52 120.00 36.36 -30.36
91-120 -25.58 -18.75 -24.00 83.33 29.16 -28.30
ALL -3.40 -1.17 -27.84* 94.29** 36.49** -28.39**
Notes: Percentage difference between Cohort 3 high and low disposition insiders in terms of
volume. Wilcoxon test for significance (final row only): ***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1.
Moving from insider behavior in terms of volume to prices, we can again
use Proxy 1P and Proxy 2P to assess the change in willingness to hold the
asset as expressed by the differences in changes of the prices of submitted
and accepted bids and asks respectively following the price signal. We find
the value of Proxy 1P to be equal to -31.90 for the high disposition and -
39.50 for the low disposition insiders. Furthermore, Proxy 2P equals -12.69
52We do observe rather big differences within the post signal period when we focus on
the different thirty second trading blocks found in Table 3.11. Especially the percentage
differences between the number of submitted bids and asks show a rather erratic pattern
throughout the four post-schock trading blocks. The pattern is more stable for the differences
in accepted bids and asks although the 200% difference in terms of accepted asks between
he high and low disposition insiders is a bit of an outlier. Incidentally, it moreover exactly
mirrors the 200% difference between the number accepted bids of high and low insiders
found in Cohort 1.
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3still significant increase in transaction prices equal to 4.59% (p = 0.007).
Table B.10 shows the underreaction (as previously defined) for the Co-
hort 2 periods as well as the difference in underreaction between the two
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underreaction is, when seen over the entire post-signal period, significantly
higher for the low disposition insiders than for the high disposition insiders.
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post-signal trading blocks of both Cohort 2 periods. Specifically, when again
defining post-signal price momentum as the difference between the price
underreaction in the first post-signal trading block and the last post-signal
trading block, we observe a negative momentum away from the new fun-
damental value equal to 2.01% for the high disposition insider markets and
a slight positive momentum equal to 0.42% for the low disposition insider
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3.4.4 Insider behavior and underreaction after a negative signal
3.4.4.1 Cohort 3
As the periods forming Cohort 3 include insiders whose disposition levels
are measured in the domain (loss) matching the price signal (negative) we
can make a clear prediction on the willingness to hold shares following the
negative signal. Specifically, we expect the high disposition insiders from
Period 5 to be more willing to hold shares than their low disposition coun-
terparts from Period 8 after having received their insider information in the
form of a negative price signal.
Using Proxy 1V to assess the change in willingness to hold the asset
in terms of the number of submitted bids and asks confirms that the high
disposition insiders are more inclined to hold the asset following the price
signal. We find the value of Proxy 1V to be equal to -85.92 for the high
disposition and -102.34 for the low disposition insiders. Looking at changes
in the willingness to hold shares flowing from changes in the number of
accepted bids and asks as the by means of Proxy 2V yields similar results;
we find this proxy to equal -28.19 for the high disposition insiders and -
80.72 for the low disposition insiders. As expected from Hypothesis 1, both
proxies thus show a stronger negative change in the willingness to hold the
asset for the low disposition insiders than for the high disposition insiders.
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This thus implies that the high disposition insiders from Cohort 3 are more
keen on holding the stock following a negative price signal than the low
disposition insiders are.
Table 3.11 provides the post-signal percentage difference in terms of the
number of submitted and accepted bids and asks as well as the number
of bought and sold shares between high and low disposition insiders. Fol-
lowing Hypothesis 1, we expect the high disposition insiders to submit more
bids and less asks, accept less bids and more asks and to generally buy more
and sell less than the low disposition insiders. For the most part the final
row of Table 3.11 indeed confirms this hypothesis; except for the number
of submitted bids, all others differences have the correct sign and are, with
the exception of the number of submitted asks, significant. 52 Moreover,
Figure 3.4 is almost the exact inverse of Figure 3.2; high disposition insiders
clearly have a higher willingness to hold the asset following the negative
price signal than low disposition insiders.
Table 3.11: Volume - Cohort 3
Cohort 3 # Bids # Asks # Acc. bids # Acc. asks # Bought # Sold
0-30 30.30 25.38 -26.32 200.00 40.00 -23.21
31-60 -15.90 -8.93 -43.75 63.63 44.44 -30.99
61-90 11.11 -12.50 -9.52 120.00 36.36 -30.36
91-120 -25.58 -18.75 -24.00 83.33 29.16 -28.30
ALL -3.40 -1.17 -27.84* 94.29** 36.49** -28.39**
Notes: Percentage difference between Cohort 3 high and low disposition insiders in terms of
volume. Wilcoxon test for significance (final row only): ***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1.
Moving from insider behavior in terms of volume to prices, we can again
use Proxy 1P and Proxy 2P to assess the change in willingness to hold the
asset as expressed by the differences in changes of the prices of submitted
and accepted bids and asks respectively following the price signal. We find
the value of Proxy 1P to be equal to -31.90 for the high disposition and -
39.50 for the low disposition insiders. Furthermore, Proxy 2P equals -12.69
52We do observe rather big differences within the post signal period when we focus on
the different thirty second trading blocks found in Table 3.11. Especially the percentage
differences between the number of submitted bids and asks show a rather erratic pattern
throughout the four post-schock trading blocks. The pattern is more stable for the differences
in accepted bids and asks although the 200% difference in terms of accepted asks between
he high and low disposition insiders is a bit of an outlier. Incidentally, it moreover exactly
mirrors the 200% difference between the number accepted bids of high and low insiders
found in Cohort 1.
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3for the high disposition insiders and -33.60 for the low disposition insiders.
We thus find that, as was the case with the the proxies based on the number
of submitted and accepted bids and asks, the willingness to hold the asset is
generally higher for the high disposition traders using the two proxies based
on the prices of submitted and, especially, accepted bids and asks.
Figure 3.4: Change in post-signal shareholdings for Cohort 3 insiders
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Notes: Average post-signal share build-up for the high and low disposition insiders from
Cohort 3.
The trend towards a higher willingness of the high disposition insiders
to hold to stock can also be observed in Table 3.12 which provides the per-
centage difference between high and low disposition insiders in terms of
(post-signal) prices of both submitted/accepted bids and asks as well as buy
and sell prices. The final row of Table 3.12 shows that seen over the entire
post-signal period all these differences are positive and, with the exception
of the price of submitted bids and accepted asks, significant at at least the
5%-level. Moreover, the trend of positive differences in terms of all these
price variables between the high and low disposition insiders seems rather
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stable not only when seen over the whole post-signal period but also for the
post-signal thirty second trading blocks individually. As was the case for
the variables related to trading volume, Hypothesis 1 thus also seems to be
supported when it comes to price related trading behavior in Cohort 3.
Table 3.12: Prices - Cohort 3
Cohort 3 Bid price Ask price Acc. bid price Acc. ask price Buy price Sell price
0-30 23.86 8.16 14.34 8.84 34.90 8.50
31-60 13.15 5.00 17.13 -12.89 -2.13 10.80
61-90 3.91 14.90 26.67 6.04 15.39 10.52
91-120 -9.26 14.04 23.58 8.34 5.19 16.48
ALL 10.04 10.91*** 20.35*** 1.14 10.12** 11.06***
Notes: Percentage difference between Cohort 3 high and low disposition insiders in terms of
prices. Wilcoxon test for significance (final row only): ***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1.
Figure 3.5 shows the price paths of Cohort 3 including the benchmark
prices (orange lines) that represent uncertainty premia equal to 70 for Period
5 (high disposition insiders) and 50 for Period 8 (low disposition insiders).
Although on average the 9.43% significant decrease (p = 0.000) in transac-
tion prices in the period with high disposition insiders is very similar to
the significant 11.19% decrease (p = 0.000) in the period with low disposi-
tion insiders, it is apparent from Figure 3.5 that there is a more pronounced
convergence towards the benchmark in the latter period. Namely, underre-
action seems to decrease in the period with low disposition insiders (Period
8) whereas it seems to stay rather stable in the period with high disposition
insiders (Period 5).
The differences in underreaction between the periods with high and low
disposition insiders visible in Figure 3.5 are indeed confirmed in Table 3.13.
Although the underreaction remains significant in all post-signal trading
blocks in both periods, the degree of underreaction is—in line with Hypoth-
esis 2—on average (seen over the whole post-signal period) significantly
smaller when the insiders are low disposition insiders compared to when
they are high disposition insiders. Moreover, these differences in underre-
action are significant for three out the four post-schock trading blocks and
seem to increase towards the end of the trading period.
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Notes: Box plots and means of transaction prices per trading block of 30 seconds for both
Cohort 3 periods.
In contrast to both Cohort 1 periods, we do observe convergence towards
the post-signal fundamental value for both Cohort 3 periods, albeit smaller
for the period with the high disposition insiders. Namely, we observe a
momentum equal to 16.11% for the high disposition insider markets and a
momentum equal to 19.27% for the low disposition insider markets.
Table 3.13: Underreaction - Cohort 3
Post-signal trading block (30s. each)
1 2 3 4 ALL
(a) High disp. (Period 5) 35.17*** 30.62*** 29.34*** 19.06*** 29.09***
(b) Low disp. (Period 8) 26.54*** 25.42*** 20.80*** 7.27* 21.09***
Diff. (a) and (b) 8.63* 5.20 8.54** 11.79* 8.00***
Notes: Transaction price underreaction in percentage terms relative to the benchmark price
following a negative price signal in Cohort 3. Mann Whitney U test (first two rows) and
Wilcoxon test (final row) for significance: ***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1.
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3.4.4.2 Cohort 4
Starting with the changes in the willingness to hold the asset following the
positive price signal based on the changes in the number of submitted bids
and asks following the price signal by means of Proxy 1V, we find the Co-
hort 4 results to be in line with the results from Cohort 3. Namely, we find
a stronger negative change in the willingness for the low disposition insid-
ers than for the high disposition insiders with 1V equaling -74.25 for the
high disposition insider period (Period 3) and -161.7 for the low disposition
insider period (Period 2). For Proxy 2V, however, we find that contrary to
Cohort 3 the willingness to hold the asset decreases more strongly in the
high disposition insider period. Specifically, Proxy 2V equals -24.82 for the
high disposition insider period and -6.10 for the low disposition insider pe-
riod.
Moving to post-signal differences, a comparison of Tables B.11and 3.11
shows that the post-signal difference between the high and low disposition
insiders in terms of their willingness to hold the asset in markedly higher in
Cohort 3 than in Cohort 4. Specifically, we find that the large and significant
positive difference in the number of accepted asks between the high and low
disposition traders from Cohort 3 has been nullified in Cohort 4. Moreover,
instead of the high disposition insiders accepting significantly less bids than
the low disposition insiders as was the case in Cohort 3, the Cohort 4 high
disposition insiders actually accept significantly more bids than their low
disposition counterparts from the same cohort. Furthermore, whereas in
Cohort 3 the high disposition insiders buy significantly more often and sell
significantly less often than the low disposition insiders, the Cohort 4 traders
both buy and sell less than the low disposition insiders from the same cohort.
Also, contrary to Cohort 3, Figure B.8 shows no real difference between high
and low disposition insiders in terms of post-signal portfolio changes.
Moving to the willingness to hold the asset in terms of Proxies 1P and
2P, we observe stark differences compared to Cohort 3. Specifically, we find
Proxy 1P to equal -38.10 for the high disposition insider period and -37.70
for the low disposition insider period. Furthermore, we find Proxy 2P to
equal -11.03 for the high disposition insider period and -26.43 for the low
disposition insider period. Thus whereas we observed lower values for both
Proxy 1P and Proxy 2P for the low disposition inisders from Cohort 3, we
only find the same results for Proxy 2P in Cohort 4. However, the differences
in values for Proxy 2P between the high and low disposition insider periods
of Cohort 4 are smaller than those found in Cohort 3.
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3The results from Table B.12 show that the absolute differences between
high and low disposition insiders in term of the prices of submitted and ac-
cepted bids and asks and the prices at which they buy and sell are generally
smaller than those for Cohort 3. Also, whereas for Cohort 3 all differences
were positive in line with theory, we observe negative differences for both
the price of submitted asks and the price at which the insiders sell their
assets.
Finally, Figure B.6 shows the Cohort 4 price paths relative to the bench-
mark that was calculated using an uncertainty premium equal to 50 in both
Period 2 and 3. In the period with high disposition insiders the price follow-
ing the negative price signal decreases significantly (p = 0.000) by 10.15%
while in the period with low disposition insiders we observe a roughly simi-
lar and significant (p = 0.000) decrease in transaction prices equal to 10.51%.
Table B.13 shows that both Cohort 4 periods display significant under-
reaction in the post-signal period as a whole with, in contrast to Cohort 3,
no significant difference in underreaction between the two periods. How-
ever, focusing on the thirty second post-signal trading blocks reveals that
although the differences in terms of underreaction between high and low
disposition insiders on average seem slightly more pronounced in Cohort 3,
the pattern of underreaction and subsequent price momentum in Cohort 4
seems roughly similar to that of Cohort 3 with a momentum of 7.55% for
the high disposition insider markets and a rather strong momentum equal
to 31.75% for the low disposition insider markets.
3.5 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we have studied the effect of disposition attitudes on insider
trading behavior and subsequent price patterns after administering a pri-
vate price signal concerning the ambiguous ending dividend. Our paper
is at the crossroads of two major research areas within the financial litera-
ture, namely the insider trading and the disposition bias literature, that have
hitherto not been combined. Furthermore, by making an explicit distinction
between disposition attitudes in the gain and loss domain we are able to
more precisely pinpoint the effects of this bias on market behavior following
either a positive or negative price signal.
In line with Hypothesis 1, our results demonstrate a clear difference in
the willingness to hold the asset following a price signal between high and
low disposition traders in both the gain as well as the loss domain when the
insider disposition attitudes are measured in the same domain as the ap-
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plied price signal. Specifically, following a positive signal in Cohort 1, high
disposition insiders exhibit a significantly lower willingness to hold on to
the asset than low disposition traders while the opposite occurs following a
negative price signal in Cohort 3. This result generally holds for the will-
ingness expressed in both the prices and quantities of submitted/accepted
bids and asks. As expected from Hypothesis 3, we find no such relation-
ship between disposition levels and market behavior for the Cohort 2 and
Cohort 4 insiders whose disposition attitudes where measured in a domain
not corresponding to the price signal. The remarkable differences between
Cohort 1 and 2 as well as between Cohort 3 and 4 are perhaps most apparent
by comparing Figure 3.2 (Cohort 1) to Figure B.7 (Cohort 2) and Figure 3.4
(Cohort 3) to Figure B.8 (Cohort 4); while we observe large differences in
post-signal portfolio changes between high and low disposition insiders for
Cohorts 1 and 3, no such difference is observed for Cohorts 2 and 4.
Although we find individual behavior to be in line with insider disposi-
tion attitudes, this only weakly translates to differences in terms of price un-
derreaction between high and low disposition insider periods from Cohorts
1 and 3 as formulated in Hypothesis 2. Specifically, for Cohort 1 we observe
no significant difference in underreaction following the positive price signal
between low and high disposition insider markets although the convergence
towards the new price seems slightly more pronounced in the low disposi-
tion insider markets. We do however observe a significantly lower under-
reaction in the Cohort 3 markets with low disposition insiders compared to
the Cohort 3 high disposition insider markets following the negative price
signal. The underreaction results for Cohorts 2 are actually opposite to those
of Cohort 1 and therefore, as expected, not in line with Hypothesis 2. The
price underreaction and subsequent momentum patterns in the two Cohort
4 periods are in line with the differences in the disposition attitudes in the
two different periods. However, when seen over the entire post-signal pe-
riod, the differences in underreaction between the high and low disposition
markets are less pronounced than those in Cohort 3.
A further important observation is obtained by comparing periods ex-
periencing a positive signal to those periods following a negative signal. In
terms of the quantity of submitted as well as accepted bids and asks (and
thus trades) the responses following both types of signals are relatively sim-
ilar, as can be seen in Table 3.5 or by comparing Figure 3.2 to Figure 3.4 and
Figure B.7 to Figure B.8. In terms of the prices of submitted and accepted
bids and asks (and trades), we generally observe a stronger response follow-
ing a negative than a positive signal as can be seen in Table 3.6. However,
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3this difference between the two types of price signals generally only mate-
rializes at the end of post-signal trading due to higher initial underreaction
but stronger subsequent momentum following a negative signal than a posi-
tive signal. Table 3.7 shows that this joint underreaction-momentum pattern
leads to a non-significant difference in underreaction following either type
of price signal when judged over the entire post-signal period.
Overall we thus observe both individual behavior, in terms of the differ-
ences in willingness to hold the asset, as well as aggregate market behavior,
in terms of price underreaction, to generally be in line with Hypotheses 1
and 2. The relatively weak evidence for Hypothesis 2 implies that the strong
effects of the disposition bias on individual behavior do not work through
as strongly in aggregate market prices and hence in price underreaction.
However, instead of being an individual decision, price formation is the re-
sult of many interactions that not only include insiders but also the outsider
traders who have to assess the direction of the price-signal from market be-
havior of fellow participants who may or may not have actual information
about this signal. It is therefore not surprising that we find stronger support
for Hypothesis 1 than for Hypothesis 2. Finally, the clear evidence in line
with Hypothesis 3 stresses the importance of discerning between individual
disposition behavior in the gain and loss domain.
Comparing our results related to underreaction to the findings of We-
ber and Welfens (2009) leads to both differences and similarities. Weber
and Welfens (2009) too find that high disposition markets exhibit stronger
underreaction after both a positive and a negative price signal. However,
where on average we find no significant difference between underreaction
following either a positive or negative price signal, Weber andWelfens (2009)
find a (much) stronger underreaction following a positive signal. Weber and
Welfens (2009) argue that the observed stronger underreaction following a
positive price signal in their data is due to selling decisions being more
strongly effected by disposition attitudes than buying decisions as the trader
shares a longer history with the asset when selling. However, the symmetry
between a positive and negative price signal both in terms of buy and sell
quantities and to a lesser extend in terms of transaction prices found in our
data is actually in line with the theoretical models of both Barberis et al.
(1998) and Grinblatt and Han (2005) that predict a similar pattern.
A possible limitation of the current study is related to the way we mea-
sure individual disposition scores. Although our results seem to indicate
our score is able to properly measure this behavior, our task makes use only
of the ’L’ and ’G’ lottery series even though one could argue that the behav-
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ior in some of the other series might be used as well. For instance, there is
no way to discern stopping after the second lottery in Series 2 in Table 3.1
from stopping after the second lottery in Series G. A further limitation of
this study is related to the order of the periods used in the market stage of
our experiment. As these periods were not randomized it is hard to fully
exclude any order or learning effects.
Besides the above limitations, further research could address the rather
weak translation of the strong individual insider disposition behavior to
market underreaction. A possible reason for this weak translation might
be related to the private price signal. Namely, in our study the private sig-
nal was comprised of deleting either the second highest or second lowest
dividend option. Deleting the highest and lowest dividend payouts instead
might result in stronger differences in price underreaction between the mar-
kets with high and low disposition insiders.
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Chapter 4
Risk aversion and overbidding in first
price sealed bid auctions: new experi-
mental evidence53
4.1 Introduction
Since the early eighties, laboratory experiments repeatedly provided evi-
dence that subjects tend to bid above the risk neutral Nash equilibrium
(RNNE) in first price sealed bid (FPSB) auctions (for an overview see Kagel
and Levin, 2002, 2011). This overbidding behavior has initially been rational-
ized with risk aversion (Cox et al., 1982a). Assuming constant relative risk
aversion in an expected utility framework, the bidding function depends
directly on a risk aversion parameter and thereby explicitly models the re-
lationship between risk aversion and overbidding (henceforth CRRAM for
constant relative risk aversion model). In an independent private value auc-
tion framework with N bidders and CRRA utility function ui(x) = xri , where
ri is the risk aversion parameter, each subject i maximizes expected utility
Ui(bi) by submitting the equilibrium bid b∗i , given uniformly distributed pri-
vate values v ∈ (0, v¯) and the subjective probability Fi(bi) that s/he can win
the auction by bidding bid bi (see e.g. Cox et al., 1982a):
Ui(bi) = Fi(bi)ui(vi − bi), b∗i (v) =
N − 1
N − 1+ ri v.
In general, subjects face the trade off that a higher bid increases the prob-
ability of winning the auction, i.e., dFi(bi)/dbi > 0, while at the same time
profit decreases in bids, i.e., dui(vi − bi)/dbi < 0. For a risk neutral agent
with ri = 1 the RNNE bid equals b∗i (v) = bRN(v) = (N − 1)v/N. For risk
averse subjects with 0 < ri < 1 the equilibrium bid bRA(v) exceeds bRN(v).
Hence, higher risk aversion (ri ↓) increases the equilibrium bid and thus
overbidding, i.e. bRA(v)− bRN(v) > 0.
To the best of our knowledge, experimental evidence in support of a pos-
itive relationship between risk aversion and overbidding is restricted to fit-
53This chapter is based on a joint paper with Sascha Füllbrunn and Utz Weitzel, Risk
Aversion and Overbidding in First Price Sealed Bid Auctions: New Experimental Evidence. Current
status: under review in the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
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4ting models like the CRRAM to auction data (Cox et al. 1982a; 1982b; 1983a;
1983b; 1984; 1985; 1988). Using experimentally observed auction prices and
bids, the authors estimated the implied value of ri and find that bidders
tend to be risk averse, which, assuming CRRAM, could explain overbid-
ding. However, these early results have been obtained ex post by implication
and not by administering a treatment effect from which the influence of risk
preferences on overbidding could have been tested directly and, importantly,
with causal inference. In fact, despite a rich literature and long debate about
the role of risk preferences in auction markets (see, e.g., Svorencˇík (2015)
chapter six for a discussion) no study has been able to show a direct causal
relationship between risk aversion and overbidding in FPSB auctions.
The missing experimental evidence is not because of a lack of trying.
Three studies analyze the risk-overbidding relationship in different settings.
Using a within-subjects design, Isaac and James (2000) and Berg et al. (2005)
elicit individual risk preferences with the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak proce-
dure (BDM, Becker and DeGroot, 1974) and with FPSB auctions. Assuming
CRRAM, the authors compare the inferred risk aversion parameter ri across
institutions at the individual level. Neither of the two studies finds signifi-
cant evidence for a positive relationship between the inferred risk aversion
parameters of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak method (BDM) and the FPSB.
In a third study, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2009) apply a treatment
effect by varying the risk that bidders face in auctions against computer
agents. The authors compare a condition, in which each bidding decision
effects a single auction, with a condition in which each bidding decision
affects ten independent auctions simultaneously. If CRRAM applies, risk
averse bidders should display less overbidding in the latter condition, be-
cause of a lower variance of a subject’s payoff (risk). Although the authors
find some risk effects, overall the difference between the two conditions
is not significant and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2009) conclude that
there is “virtually no support for the risk aversion model" (Engelbrecht-Wiggans
and Katok, 2009, p. 83). Possible reasons why these studies find no rela-
tionship between risk aversion and overbidding will be discussed in Section
4.4.
A number of studies offered alternative explanations, which effectively
claim that risk aversion plays no or only a minor role. Harrison (1989)
claimed that overbidding is rather due to the low cost of increasing the win-
ning probability than due to risk aversion (the so-called ‘flat maximum cri-
tique’). Kagel and Roth (1992) argued that risk aversion cannot be solely held
responsible for overbidding, as overbidding has also been observed in sec-
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ond price sealed bid auctions, in which risk preferences should have no ef-
fect on bids.54 Goeree et al. (2002) fitted a non-expected utility model to their
auction data and showed that a convex probability weighting function “fits
the data as well as the risk aversion model". Armantier and Treich (2009a) and
Armantier and Treich (2009b) fitted a non-expected utility model and con-
cluded that overbidding can be fully rationalized with non-linear probabil-
ity weighting functions. Ockenfels and Selten (2005) report that overbidding
can be due to dynamic bidding behavior in line with learning direction the-
ory (Selten and Buchta, 1994).55 Neugebauer and Selten (2006) reported that
learning direction theory fits their bidding data better than both CRRAM
and RNNE bid functions. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) introduce regret the-
ory as a reason for overbidding. ‘Winner regret’ occurs when the winner
realizes that her bid could have been lowered while still having won the
auction (money left on the table). ‘Loser regret’ occurs when a loser realizes
that her bid could have been increased above the winning bid without sur-
passing her private value. When both forms of regret are weighed equally,
the bidder’s utility maximizing bidding strategy is the RNNE bid, but when
loser regret is weighed more heavily, the optimal bid increases. Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Katok (2008) reported that loser regret is indeed stronger than
winner regret, which can explain overbidding in repeated FPSB auctions if
bidders receive the relevant feedback.56 The reported evidence against the
exclusive validity of the CRRAM clearly suggests that a number of factors
play a role in the bidding process. The same evidence, however, cannot
exclude the possibility of a fundamental relationship between risk aversion
and overbidding.
In this paper, we therefore aim for a treatment manipulation that directly
tests for this relationship by manipulating the level of risk aversion in mar-
54More recently, Georganas et al. (2017) consider overbidding behavior in second price
sealed bid auctions related to optimistic irrationality.
55Bidders decrease their bids after being outbid and increase their bids after having won
an auction. This behavior strongly depends on feedback about prices and bids. As learning
direction theory presumes a direct relationship between feedback and bids, it is inconsistent
with the CRRAM.
56Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) go one step further and experimentally test ‘anticipated
regret’. Here, bidders anticipate winner and loser regret and, ex ante, adjust their bids
accordingly. They conclude that bidding behavior in one shot auctions is consistent with both
forms of regret (although bidding in their winner regret treatment does not differ statistically
from bidding in a corresponding treatment without feedback). In a replication study with
additional robustness checks, Katušcák et al. (2015) find no evidence for anticipated regret.
This is in line with results from other studies, which do not report a treatment effect of
winner and or loser regret in the first round of repeated auctions with feedback (see, e.g.,
Isaac and Walker, 1985; Ockenfels and Selten, 2005; Neugebauer and Selten, 2006).
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4kets but keeping the above mentioned arguments that explain overbidding
constant. We use the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET), recently introduced
by Crosetto and Filippin (2013), to elicit the subjects’ level of risk aversion.
We then compose auction markets such that the subjects’ level of risk aver-
sion within a market is almost similar. However, markets differ in their av-
erage level of risk aversion. By comparing bidding behavior across markets,
we find a significant positive effect of the level of the subjects’ risk aversion,
measured by their BRET score, on overbidding. By design, the alternative
explanations mentioned cannot account for this result, as these explanations
all rely on factors that are theoretically not related to risk aversion, while in
our design the only difference between markets is the level of risk aversion.
We find that our result applies to all stages in a repeated auction setting and
are robust to the inclusion of feedback and hence to possible regret effects.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents our
experimental design and hypotheses. In Section 4.3 our results are presented
and discussed. Finally, Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Experimental design and hypotheses
4.2.1 Design
The idea behind our experimental manipulation is straightforward. If risk
aversion leads to overbidding in FPSB auctions, we expect to observe higher
bids—and thus higher auction prices—in a market composed of rather risk
averse subjects than in a market composed of rather risk seeking subjects.
More generally, we expect a positive relationship between the level of bid-
ders’ risk aversion in a market and bids/prices. To be able to test our con-
jecture, we first categorize subjects by their risk attitudes and then organize
auction markets with four subjects whose risk attitudes are almost similar
within markets but sufficiently heterogeneous between markets. In com-
parison to studies that elicit risk aversion for model-fitting or within-subject
comparisons, this design has the advantage that it experimentally manipu-
lates the variable of interest. The average level of risk aversion in a market
serves as the treatment variable while leaving the other arguments for over-
bidding constant. Hence, if we find that bids and prices are significantly
higher in markets with a higher level of risk aversion we can infer with high
internal validity that risk aversion indeed increases overbidding.57
57Subjects are unaware of the group composition process that assigns them to a market.
Hence, we do not change subjects’ beliefs about the risk attitudes of the other subjects in their
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For the experimental design it is crucial that we can clearly categorize
bidders in terms of risk aversion.58 Moreover, our sample needs to be suf-
ficiently heterogeneous in risk aversion levels, and the risk-elicitation task
should not be too complex in order to reduce the bias in measurement due
to subjects’ confusion (e.g. Dave et al., 2010). We therefore administered a
relatively new risk elicitation task, the dynamic BRET introduced by Crosetto
and Filippin (2013), due to its several advantages in measuring risk aversion;
it is based on an single choice, requires minimal numeracy skills, allows for
a virtually continuous distribution of risk aversion scores, and avoids trun-
cation of the data.59 Therefore, the BRET is easier to understand and to
implement than many other elicitation tasks and allows for sufficient het-
erogeneity of observed risk attitudes in the sample (Crosetto and Filippin,
2015). Moreover, because of the unique choice, the BRET avoids violations of
the Reduction Axiom. Finally, because the BRET does not provide endoge-
nous reference points, risk aversion measurements are less affected by loss
aversion.
The BRET works as follows.60 A subject collects a number of boxes,
0 ≤ k ≤ 100, from the 100 boxes available. For each collected box, the
subject earns 0.1 Euro. However, the computer has randomly assigned a
hidden bomb to one of the 100 boxes with equal probability. If at the end
of the task, after subjects have collected their desired number of boxes, the
bomb is among the collected boxes, it ‘explodes’ and the payoff for the task
is zero. Otherwise the payoff equals k× 0.1 Euro. In our experiment, sub-
jects only learned whether the bomb was collected—and thus their earnings
in the BRET—at the very end of the experiment. In the dynamic version
used in our experiment, 100 boxes are shown on the computer screen and
each second one box automatically disappears (is collected) until the subject
market. Earlier studies use similar techniques to manipulate the distribution of particular
subject characteristics in markets. For example, in recent double auction experiments subjects
have been separated by gender (Eckel and Füllbrunn, 2015) or the propensity to speculate
(Janssen et al., 2015). In an earlier study, Ang and Schwarz (1985) elicited risk aversion, and
assigned risk averse subjects to one asset market and risk seeking participants to another. In
auction experiments, Goertz (2012) assigned and compared experienced vs. inexperienced
markets in common value auctions.
58For example, multiple price list risk elicitation tasks (e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002) can lead
to inconsistent or dominated choices making it impossible to assign some of the observations
to a category.
59Even a recent neuro-scientific evidence corroborates the elicitation design by providing
evidence that the baseline cortical activity in the right prefrontal cortex predicts individual
risk-taking behavior in a task that is closely related to the BRET (Gianotti et al., 2009).
60Instructions and a screenshot can be found in Appendix C.1.
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4clicks on a stop button and confirms the number of collected boxes.61 Given
that the random position of the time bomb is uniformly distributed, collect-
ing exactly k = 50 boxes can be interpreted as risk neutral behavior, while
collecting less (more) boxes can be categorized as risk averse (risk seeking)
behavior.
We find it difficult, however, to interpret k as an absolute measure of risk
aversion. Rather we are interested in the relative level of risk aversion within
our student population, i.e. we focus on the ordinal ranking of subjects in
terms of risk aversion to analyze the relationship between degrees of risk
aversion—as measured by k—and overbidding. In order to do so, we cate-
gorize the auction markets and the individual subjects in these markets in
three distinct risk categories, which are based on the average k in a market:
‘LRA’ (low risk aversion), ‘MRA’ (moderate risk aversion), and ‘HRA’ (high
risk aversion). So, HRA markets contain HRA subjects with a relatively low
k who are willing to take less risk than the LRA subjects with a relatively
high k in LRA markets. Note that all three markets could be risk averse in
the absolute sense. By looking at the relative and not the absolute levels
of risk aversion within our student sample we refrain from imposing strict
assumptions on the utility function of our subjects.
The above mentioned categorization is executed as follows: In each ses-
sion with M subjects, we first elicited the BRET score (ki) for each subject
i. Then, we ranked the subjects according to their BRET score such that
k[1] < k[2] < ... < k[M]. After that we composed auction markets such
that the subjects with k[1], k[2], k[3], and k[4] are in auction market one, sub-
jects with k[5], k[6], k[7], and k[8] are in auction market two,..., and subjects
with k[M−3], k[M−2], k[M−1], and k[M] are in auction market M/4. We ran-
domly allocated ties. Having six sessions with M = 24 and two sessions
with M = 20 (due to no-shows), this procedure resulted in a total of 46
auction markets with average BRET scores K[1] ≤ K[2], ...,≤ K[46]. We sep-
arated those 46 groups in the three mentioned risk categories. We clas-
sify nine auction markets with K > 50 as LRA markets; the mean BRET
score is K¯LRA = 58.33 (sd = 4.37). On the other side of the distribution,
we classify the nine markets with the lowest BRET scores as HRA markets
(K¯HRA = 28.86, sd = 3.11). We classify the remaining 28 markets as MRA
markets (K¯MRA = 42.93, sd = 5.15). We then categorize subjects in HRA
61In comparison to the static BRET, the dynamic version is less demanding at a cognitive
level, better suited to facilitate subjects’ comprehension, and is characterized by a richer set
of parameters that can be manipulated. For these and other reasons, Crosetto and Filippin
(2013) conclude that "the visual version in continuous time [is] our preferred choice."
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(nHRA = 36), MRA (nMRA = 112), and LRA subjects (nLRA = 36) in line
with their market affiliation. Note that the three market categories differ
significantly in terms of BRET scores showing that our sample is sufficiently
heterogeneous in terms of risk attitudes.62 We admit that an ex-post catego-
rization is arbitrary. We are interested in having a sufficiently high difference
in risk aversion levels between categories to allow for a significant effect on
overbidding. Note, however, that the findings in this paper do not change
when we split the sessions into three equally-sized categories.
After the markets had been composed, subjects submitted sealed bids
in 50 subsequent FPSB auctions.63 Auction markets consisted of four sub-
jects submitting one bid in each period. The bidder with the highest bid
earns the difference between her private value and her bid, while the other
bidders’ payoff equals zero. The private values for each subject were pre-
drawn from a uniform distribution over the integer set [0, 10000], analogue
to earlier auction experiments (Füllbrunn and Neugebauer, 2013).64 In this
setting, a RNNE bidder would submit a bid that equals 3/4 of his private
value while bidders in line with the CRRAM submit higher bids when being
risk averse. Our treatment variable is the risk attitude—the average BRET
score K[j]—of the auction market. We kept parameters equal in each auction
market. Private values have been the same in each auction market. Addi-
tionally, we ranked the bidders in each market according to their BRET score
ki and assigned the same randomly drawn private value to the same rank.65
Hence, we made sure that we have the same condition in each market and
only vary the level of risk aversion measured via K.
In the first 25 auctions, feedback included only whether or not the subject
submitted the highest bid (‘No Regret’ phase). In the last 25 period, bidders
additionally learned the winning bid and the value of their ‘missed oppor-
tunity’ (‘Regret’ phase). The missed opportunity is the difference between
a subject’s value and the winning bid given the subject had a higher value
than the winning bid, and zero otherwise. Subjects received new instruc-
62We find distributions of K to be significantly different comparing the three categories
with each other using a Mann Whitney U test (p < 0.001). We can also reject the Null
hypothesis that KHRA ≥ KMRA ≥ KLRA in favor of the alternative that KHRA < KMRA <
KLRA using a Cuzick trend test (p < 0.001).
63Instructions can be found in Appendix C.2.
64We consider the independent private value environment in line with earlier experiments.
On first price auctions with common value elements see for example Aycinena et al. (2014).
65For example, in groups 21 and 26 the subjects’ elicited BRET scores have been 59, 60, 61,
and 70, and 25, 27, 30, and 31 respectively. In period 14, the computer assigned v = 6403 to
the subjects with scores 59 and 25, v = 2124 to the subjects with scores 60 and 27, v = 1210 to
the subjects with scores 61 and 30, and v = 7086 to the subjects with scores 70 and 31.
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4tions between the No Regret phase and the Regret phase. We implemented
the different feedback regimes as a robustness check. Our aim is to show
that even if feedback plays a role in bidding behavior (as a level effect), the
relationship between risk aversion and overbidding still holds.66 Finally, the
total earnings of all auction have been accumulated and divided by 1500 to
calculate the auction payoff in Euro.
A total of eight session were run with 24 subjects in six sessions and 20
subjects in two sessions with 184 subjects in total. Instructions were read
out aloud by the experimenter separately for each part of the experiment.
Comprehension questions have been administered and discussed. Subjects
earned about twelve euro including a 2.50 euro show-up fee. The experi-
ments lasted roughly one hour. Payments were made in cash and in private
at the end of the experiment. The experiment was computerized using z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
The sessions were conducted in the period from April to June of 2015 at the
NSM Decision Lab at the Radboud University (Nijmegen, The Netherlands).
4.2.2 Measurements and hypotheses
We formulate and test our hypotheses at two different levels: the market
level and the individual level. The former is relevant to show the effect
of the distribution of risk aversion on market performance, i.e. on pricing.
The individual level is relevant to show how risk aversion influences the
individual bid function.
At the market level, we consider ‘overpricing’ (OP) in market j and pe-
riod t as the relevant unit of observation; we define overpricing as the per-
centage deviation of the observed auction price—the winning bid—from
the RNNE price (OPjt = 100 × (pjt/pRNNE,t − 1)). Note that while the
RNNE price is determined by the highest private value, the bidder with
the highest private value not necessarily determines the observed auc-
tion price. When risk aversion has no effect on overbidding, overpricing
should not differ across auction markets. Hence, our Null hypothesis is
that overpricing is not significantly different across the three risk categories:
H1NULL : OPHRA = OPMRA = OPLRA. If risk aversion has an effect on over-
pricing, the alternative hypothesis predicts that overpricing is increasing in
the level of risk aversion: H1 : OPHRA > OPMRA > OPLRA.
66We are aware of the fact that experience itself might change bidding behavior over time.
The 100 private values in the No Regret Phase and in the Regret Phase do not significantly
differ using an ordinary t-test (p = 0.556).
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At the individual level, we consider ‘overbidding’ (OB) of subject i in mar-
ket j and period t as the relevant unit of observation and we define over-
bidding as the percentage deviation of the observed bid from the RNNE
bid (OBijt = 100× (bijt/bRNNE,it − 1)). The hypotheses for overbidding are
defined analogously to overpricing (H2NULL : OBLRA = OPMRA = OBHRA,
H2 : OBHRA > OBMRA > OBLRA).
If we reject the Null hypotheses H1NULL and H2NULL, we can infer with
a relatively high internal validity that a negative relationship between k (K),
measured with the BRET, and overbidding (overpricing) in FPSB auctions
exists. In all statistical tests, unless stated otherwise, we make use of the
Wilcoxon signed rank test (for paired replicates), the Mann-Whitney U test
for independent samples, and the Cuzick test to perform trend tests using a
significance level of 5%.67
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Overpricing
Figure 4.1 shows average overpricing for the HRA, MRA and LRA markets
divided into the No Regret phase (Period 1-25) and the Regret phase (Period
26-50). As a lower K is associated with higher risk aversion, the figure clearly
shows a positive relationship between risk aversion in a market and overpric-
ing. Average OP is about 710 basis points higher in the HRA markets than
in the LRA markets in the No Regret phase. In the Regret phase, average OP
is about 923 basis points higher in the HRA markets than in the LRA mar-
kets. We find a significant difference comparing HRA with LRA markets in
both phases (pNR = 0.009, pR = 0.001).68 Further, we find the trend to be
significant in both phases (pNR = 0.003, pR < 0.001). Hence, at this level
of aggregation we can clearly reject the H1NULL of equal overpricing levels
across all three risk categories in favor of the alternative hypothesis H1 that
overpricing increases with a higher average risk aversion in the market.
67Permutation tests instead of Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests or Mann-Whitney U tests yield
similar results.
68The p-values for comparing HRA to MRA are pNR = 0.018 and pR = 0.002, and the
p-values for comparing MRA to LRA are pNR = 0.103 and pR = 0.034.
83
4tions between the No Regret phase and the Regret phase. We implemented
the different feedback regimes as a robustness check. Our aim is to show
that even if feedback plays a role in bidding behavior (as a level effect), the
relationship between risk aversion and overbidding still holds.66 Finally, the
total earnings of all auction have been accumulated and divided by 1500 to
calculate the auction payoff in Euro.
A total of eight session were run with 24 subjects in six sessions and 20
subjects in two sessions with 184 subjects in total. Instructions were read
out aloud by the experimenter separately for each part of the experiment.
Comprehension questions have been administered and discussed. Subjects
earned about twelve euro including a 2.50 euro show-up fee. The experi-
ments lasted roughly one hour. Payments were made in cash and in private
at the end of the experiment. The experiment was computerized using z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
The sessions were conducted in the period from April to June of 2015 at the
NSM Decision Lab at the Radboud University (Nijmegen, The Netherlands).
4.2.2 Measurements and hypotheses
We formulate and test our hypotheses at two different levels: the market
level and the individual level. The former is relevant to show the effect
of the distribution of risk aversion on market performance, i.e. on pricing.
The individual level is relevant to show how risk aversion influences the
individual bid function.
At the market level, we consider ‘overpricing’ (OP) in market j and pe-
riod t as the relevant unit of observation; we define overpricing as the per-
centage deviation of the observed auction price—the winning bid—from
the RNNE price (OPjt = 100 × (pjt/pRNNE,t − 1)). Note that while the
RNNE price is determined by the highest private value, the bidder with
the highest private value not necessarily determines the observed auc-
tion price. When risk aversion has no effect on overbidding, overpricing
should not differ across auction markets. Hence, our Null hypothesis is
that overpricing is not significantly different across the three risk categories:
H1NULL : OPHRA = OPMRA = OPLRA. If risk aversion has an effect on over-
pricing, the alternative hypothesis predicts that overpricing is increasing in
the level of risk aversion: H1 : OPHRA > OPMRA > OPLRA.
66We are aware of the fact that experience itself might change bidding behavior over time.
The 100 private values in the No Regret Phase and in the Regret Phase do not significantly
differ using an ordinary t-test (p = 0.556).
82
At the individual level, we consider ‘overbidding’ (OB) of subject i in mar-
ket j and period t as the relevant unit of observation and we define over-
bidding as the percentage deviation of the observed bid from the RNNE
bid (OBijt = 100× (bijt/bRNNE,it − 1)). The hypotheses for overbidding are
defined analogously to overpricing (H2NULL : OBLRA = OPMRA = OBHRA,
H2 : OBHRA > OBMRA > OBLRA).
If we reject the Null hypotheses H1NULL and H2NULL, we can infer with
a relatively high internal validity that a negative relationship between k (K),
measured with the BRET, and overbidding (overpricing) in FPSB auctions
exists. In all statistical tests, unless stated otherwise, we make use of the
Wilcoxon signed rank test (for paired replicates), the Mann-Whitney U test
for independent samples, and the Cuzick test to perform trend tests using a
significance level of 5%.67
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Overpricing
Figure 4.1 shows average overpricing for the HRA, MRA and LRA markets
divided into the No Regret phase (Period 1-25) and the Regret phase (Period
26-50). As a lower K is associated with higher risk aversion, the figure clearly
shows a positive relationship between risk aversion in a market and overpric-
ing. Average OP is about 710 basis points higher in the HRA markets than
in the LRA markets in the No Regret phase. In the Regret phase, average OP
is about 923 basis points higher in the HRA markets than in the LRA mar-
kets. We find a significant difference comparing HRA with LRA markets in
both phases (pNR = 0.009, pR = 0.001).68 Further, we find the trend to be
significant in both phases (pNR = 0.003, pR < 0.001). Hence, at this level
of aggregation we can clearly reject the H1NULL of equal overpricing levels
across all three risk categories in favor of the alternative hypothesis H1 that
overpricing increases with a higher average risk aversion in the market.
67Permutation tests instead of Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests or Mann-Whitney U tests yield
similar results.
68The p-values for comparing HRA to MRA are pNR = 0.018 and pR = 0.002, and the
p-values for comparing MRA to LRA are pNR = 0.103 and pR = 0.034.
83
4Figure 4.1: Average Overpricing
Notes: Bars show mean overpricing for the categories HRA (n=9), MRA (n=28), and LRA
(n=9) in the No Regret phase (round 1-25) and in the Regret phase (round 26-50) to-
gether with error bars , e.g. for HRA in the No Regret phase OP = 19 ∑
9
j=1(
1
25 ∑
25
t=1 100×
(pjt/pRNNE,t − 1)). The average BRET score in each category is K.
To strengthen this result, we conducted random effects panel regressions
with OPjt, overpricing in market j in round t, as the dependent variable
which amounts to 46× 50 = 2300 observations at market level. With ran-
dom effects at market level, we additionally correct for possible intra-session
correlation by adjusting all standard errors with the Huber and White sand-
wich estimator of variance at session level (eight clusters). Table 4.1 reports
the results.
The main variable of interest on the RHS is the auction markets’ aver-
age BRET score K. Recall that a higher K stands for lower risk aversion.
Hence, a negative coefficient indicates that an increase in average risk aver-
sion (decrease in K) leads to an increase in overpricing. And indeed in all
specifications we find the coefficient to be significantly negative; clearly sup-
porting H1. The positive and significant coefficient of the regret dummy
(equal to one in the Regret phase) in Model (1) indicates that overbidding is
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Table 4.1: Random effects panel regressions at market level: overpricing
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
K -0.23∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.050)
Regret Dummy 2.50∗∗∗ 1.20∗ 2.51∗∗
(0.47) (0.50) (0.77)
Round 0.052∗
(0.026)
Round NR (1-25) 0.052 0.052
(0.038) (0.038)
Round R (1-25) 0.051 0.051
(0.028) (0.028)
Constant 27.1∗∗∗ 26.5∗∗∗ 26.5∗∗∗ 25.7∗∗∗ 29.7∗∗∗
(2.03) (1.98) (1.82) (1.89) (2.40)
No. observations 2300 2300 2300 1150 1150
No. Auction Groups 46 46 46 46 46
No. Clusters 8 8 8 8 8
Wald χ2 75.089 100.537 160.601 27.481 29.561
Prob < χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable is overpricing (OP) in each round for each group. The RHS
consists of K, the auction groups’ average BRET score, the Regret Dummy, equal to one in
the Regret phase (Period 26-50) and zero otherwise (No Regret: Period 1-25), Round, which
captures the number of auctions played and, finally, round NR and Round R, including the
number of auctions played in the No Regret or the Regret phase, respectively. We use random
effects at market level and correct for intra-session correlation by adjusting all standard errors
with the Huber and White sandwich estimator of variance at session level (eight clusters).
Models (1) and (2) include all 50 rounds, while model (3) and (4) include rounds 1-25 and
26-50 respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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4not driven by risk aversion alone. As shown in Model (2) the regret effect
also survives if we control for possible experience effects by including the
variable Round, which records the number of rounds played and is statis-
tically significant and positive, too. When analyzing the No Regret phase
and the Regret phase separately in Model (3), Model (4) and Model (5), the
experience effect turns out not to be very strong. This suggests that the co-
efficient of the count variable Round picks up some of the regret effect in
Model (2), rather than the other way around.
To consider economic effects of overpricing we look at the seller’s rev-
enues. Conditional on the private values drawn, the seller’s actual rev-
enue—assuming prices equal RNNE prices—is 193.90 Euro in each auction
market.69 The actual average gain in the experiment—the difference between
193.90 Euro and the observed revenue—is 43.64 Euro in HRA markets, 33.67
Euro in MRA markets, and 27.08 Euro in LRA markets. Hence, the seller’s
gain is about 61 per cent higher in the HRA markets than in the LRA mar-
kets. Statistically, we can reject the hypothesis of equal revenues in HRA and
LRA markets (p = 0.002).70
To sum up, we show that the distribution of risk aversion in an auction
market has a significant impact on overpricing in general and on the seller’s
revenue in particular. The higher the level of risk aversion in a market, the
higher overpricing and the higher the revenues for the seller.
4.3.2 Overbidding
The predicted bid-value ratio b/v is determined by the number of bidders
and by the level of risk aversion, assuming CRRAM. As the level of risk aver-
sion is assumed to be constant within subjects and as the number of partic-
ipants does not change, the bid-value ratio is supposed to be independent
of the private value. Prior studies suggest, however, that the bid-value ratio
is not constant across different private values (see e.g., Cox et al., 1985; Füll-
brunn and Neugebauer, 2013). As our measure of overbidding is related to
the bid-value ratio, we need to take this effect into account when analyzing
our data. Therefore, we analyze overbidding on one hand using the entire
value range and on the other hand using four separate value segments (quar-
tiles): {1, ..., 2500}, {2501, ..., 5000}, {5001, ..., 7500}, and {7501, ..., 10000}.
69As the RNNE price is pRNNE(v[1]) = (4− 1)× v[1]/4, we compute the revenue for the
seller by summing up the highest private value from each of the 50 rounds, multiplying it by
3/4 to get the RNNE price and by the exchange rate 1/1500 for Euro amounts.
70The p-value for comparing HRA to MRA is p = 0.008, and the p-value for comparing
MRA to LRA are p = 0.061. The Cuzick trend test yields p < 0.001
86
Figure 4.2 visualizes mean overbidding in blocks of five periods, for each
value segment and risk aversion category.71 We see that overbidding in
HRA exceeds LRA consistently from the first to the last block in each value
segment, with MRA mostly in between. A Cuzick trend test confirms this
ranking for each block; we find p-values at or far below 0.021 in every block
(across value segments) when neglecting outliers.72 Including outliers the
block with p = 0.021 is the only one where the trend is insignificant (with
p = 0.207). It is remarkable how stable the relationship between market
levels of risk aversion and overbidding is over time. In fact, visually there is
no indication for a regret effect, because there is no clear shift in the level of
overbidding after block five (red vertical line).
Figure 4.2: Mean overbidding over time
Notes: Mean overbidding for the categories HRA (n=9), MRA (n=28), and LRA (n=9) in
blocks of five periods separated by value segments.
71We take five period blocks to allow for sufficient observations in each value segment
plot.
72See further below in this section for the definition of outliers.
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4not driven by risk aversion alone. As shown in Model (2) the regret effect
also survives if we control for possible experience effects by including the
variable Round, which records the number of rounds played and is statis-
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4Table 4.2 shows average overbidding separated by risk category (HRA,
MRA, LRA), subdivided over four value segments for both the No Regret
and the Regret phase, along with p-values from Mann Whitney U tests,
testing the Null Hypothesis that overbidding in HRA and LRA are not sig-
nificantly different, and with p-values from a Cuzick trend test testing the
Null Hypothesis of no trend across HRA, MRA, and LRA. Pooling all val-
ues, we find overbidding to be significantly higher for the HRA than the
LRA subjects in both phases.73 Further, the Cuzick trend test rejects the Null
Hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis OBHRA > OBMRA > OBLRA.
Table 4.2: Average overbidding
Private value
(0-10000) (0-2500] (2500-5000] (5000-7500] (7500-10000]
No Regret
HRA (n=36) 18 (12) 14 (20) 21 (13) 20 (10) 19 (8)
MRA (n=112) 16 (8) 12 (17) 19 (10) 18 (7) 14 (9)
LRA (n=36) 13 (10) 9 (19) 18 (8) 17 (8) 10 (9)
p-value HRA=LRA 0.001 0.077 0.015 0.006 <0.001
p-value Cuzick 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Regret
HRA (n=36) 21 (11) 13 (24) 24 (10) 25 (6) 22 (6)
MRA (n=112) 16 (11) 10 (24 20 (8) 20 (7) 17 (7)
LRA (n=36) 12 (13) 3 (34) 17 (10) 17 (8) 12 (7)
p-value HRA=LRA 0.001 0.053 0.001 <0.001 <0.001
p-value Cuzick <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Notes: First we calculated the average overbidding of each subject in the respective category,
then we averaged over all subjects in that category. For example, 18 is the average of 36
subjects’ average overbidding for the first 25 periods independent of the redemption value.
The remaining rows show the p-values for the Mann Whitney U test comparing overbidding
between HRA and LRA, and the p-values for a Cuzick trend test.
To analyze the four value segments individually, we calculate the av-
erage overbidding for each subject in each value segment and then test
whether whether differences in average overbidding between value seg-
ments are zero (Wilcoxon Sign Rank test). Independent of whether we look
at all subjects (n = 184) or within risk categories (nHRA = nLRA = 36,
nMRA = 112), we find significant lower overbidding in value segment
{1, ..., 2500} than in value segment {2501, ..., 5000} (p < 0.001, pHRA =
0.004 pMRA < 0.001 pLRA = 0.003). In line with Cox et al. (1985), we be-
73The p-values for comparing HRA to MRA are pNR = 0.047 and pR = 0.007, and the p-
values for comparing MRA to LRA are pNR = 0.245 and pR = 0.251 with nHRA = nLRA = 28
and nMRA = 84.
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lieve that subjects in the low value segment do not submit serious bids: "This
‘throw away’ bid phenomenon [in the low value segment] can be interpreted as the
result of payoffs being so low that it is not worth the trouble of a ‘serious’ bid" (Cox
et al., 1985, p. 161). We can support this claim as almost 90 percent of the out-
lier bids—defined as bids that are either above valuation (OB > 33.33) or be-
low half of the valuation (OB < −33.33)—fall in the lowest value segment.74
Overbidding in the next two segments is not significantly different from each
other (p = 0.385, pHRA = 0.271, pMRA < 0.249, pLRA = 0.354), but over-
bidding is significantly lower in segment {7501, ..., 10000} than in segment
{5001, ..., 7500}(p < 0.001, pHRA = 0.004, pMRA < 0.001, pLRA < 0.003). In
the second and third value segment, subjects might believe that although
not having the highest value they still can win the auction with a sufficient
profit when they overbid. In the highest value segment, however, subjects
might believe that they have the highest value anyway and thus costs for
overbidding might be too high to justify an increase in the probability of
winning which makes overbidding less attractive. The focus of this paper
is not to explain why overbidding differs between value segments, but to
show that the positive relationship between risk aversion and overbidding
persists in each value segment. We find a significant difference in overbid-
ding comparing HRA and LRA individuals in all value segments (see Table
4.2, weakly significant in the lowest value segment though). The Cuzick test
shows a significant trend in all segments (p ≤ 0.001) and overall. Hence,
the relationship between risk aversion and overbidding holds for each value
segment under consideration.
To further strengthen our results, we apply a random effects regressions
with three levels of dependencies (in line with Chapter 4.7 in Moffatt, 2015)
with OBijt (overbidding of subject i in group j in round t) as the dependent
variable which amounts to 4× 46× 50 = 9, 200 observations. We correct for
intra-session correlation by estimating the variance at individual and auction
group level.75 In all models, we control for age, gender and economics major.
74In total, we identify 308 outlier bids (out of 9,200 bids) of which 268 bids are submitted
in the lowest value segment (2,668 bids were made in this segment).
75The specification of the regression model is OBijt = α+ β1 ki + β2 DRegret+ β3 DOutlier+
β4 t+ γ′DValue Segment + δ′zi + ui + vj + ijt with variances Var(ui) = σ2u , Var(vj) = σ2v , and
Var(i t) = σ2 . The three levels are t = 1, . . . 50 (Rounds), i = 1, . . . 148 (Subjects), and
j = 1, . . . 46 (Auction Groups). Independent variables are the level of risk aversion (ki) a
regret dummy (DRegret) which is one for periods 26-50, an outlier dummy (DOutlier) which
is one if the bid is higher than the private value or lower than 50% of the private value, a
dummy for the three upper value segments (D2501-5000,D5001-7500,D7501-10000), and controls
(zi) including a gender dummy, age, and a dummy equal to one for being an econ student.
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4We also added the number of rounds (Rounds) to control for experience and a
dummy for being an outlier as explained above (Outlier Dummy). The main
variable of interest on the RHS is the subjects’ BRET score k. A negative
coefficient indicates that an increase in risk aversion leads to an increase in
overbidding. Table 4.3 reports the results.
The first two models (1) and (2) consider all observations. Here we con-
trol for the regret phase using the Regret Dummy. The variable is not signif-
icant, which might be due to the fact that the Round variable interacts with
the Regret phase. Further, we added dummies for the value segments with
the lowest value segment as the reference. The coefficients reflect the discus-
sion above, i.e. overbidding is higher in the second and third value segment
but lower in the highest value segment. Model (3) considers only the No
Regret phase. In model (4), we drop the lowest value segment to account for
the fact that bidding is not serious in the lowest values segment (see discus-
sion above). The coefficient of interest related to the subjects BRET score k
is significantly negative in each of the four specifications. Hence, the higher
the BRET score—i.e. the lower the level of risk aversion—the lower is the
level of overbidding.
Overbidding can be measured in several ways (analogue for overpric-
ing) and we ran robustness checks with different measures. Füllbrunn and
Neugebauer (2013) use the difference between the bid-value ratio and the
RNNE bid-value ratio which is actually exactly 0.75 of our measure. Fur-
ther we can look at the log deviation, ln(b/bRNNE), to consider symmetric
deviations from the RNNE-bid. We also tested for absolute deviations from
the RNNE bid (b− 0.75v). The level of the private values introduces a lot of
noise, which is the reason why the former measures standardize the devia-
tion from the RNNE-bid. Robustness checks with these alternative measures
for overbidding yield qualitatively similar results.
To measure the economic effect of overbidding we analyze foregone prof-
its, i.e. profits that could have been earned when submitting a RNNE bid.
We compute the cumulative profits (in Euro) for each subject assuming that
this subject submitted a RNNE bid while the others submitted their actual
bid. Then we compare this profit to the actual profits earned in the exper-
iment. The average HRA-subject would earn about 3.24 Euro more when
submitting RNNE bids which is an increase in profits of about 65% (mean
profit observed = 4.98 Euro, mean profit from unilateral deviation to RNNE
= 8.22). The average LRA-subject would earn about 1.75 Euro more when
playing the RNNE bid which is an increase in profits of about 20% (mean
profit observed = 8.83 Euro, mean profit from unilateral deviation to RNNE
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Table 4.3: Three-level model regression: overbidding
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
k -0.12∗∗ -0.12∗∗ -0.12∗ -0.13∗∗
(0.047) (0.047) (0.045) (0.045)
Regret Dummy 0.34 -0.28
(0.57) (0.56)
2501-5000 2.40∗∗∗ 3.27∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.48)
5001-7500 1.39∗∗∗ 0.81 -1.00∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.49) (0.25)
7501-10000 -3.23∗∗∗ -3.48∗∗∗ -5.68∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.48) (0.26)
Round 0.035 0.054∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.0074)
Outlier Dummy -86.3∗∗∗ -86.1∗∗∗ -87.2∗∗∗ -85.4∗∗∗
(0.83) (0.84) (1.09) (1.39)
Constant 20.4∗∗∗ 19.8∗∗∗ 18.6∗∗∗ 23.1∗∗∗
(4.70) (4.69) (4.53) (4.07)
No. Observations 9200 9200 4600 6532
No. Auction Groups 46 46 46 46
No. Subjects 184 184 184 184
Wald χ2 10892 11330 6859 4295
Prob < χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
σv 0.000 0.000 0.001 1.847
σu 6.374 6.360 5.996 5.256
σ 13.614 13.466 11.262 8.377
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is overbidding (OB) in each round for each subject. The
RHS consists of k, the subject’s BRET score, the Regret Dummy, which equals one when
considering auction showing the missed opportunity feedback and zero otherwise, a dummy
for each value segment (2501-5000, 5001-7500, 7500-10000) with the lowest value segment
being the reference, Round, the number of auctions played, and an outlier dummy being one
if overbidding is higher than 33 or lower than -33. Controls not shown are Age, a dummy
for being an economics student, and a dummy for being male. We correct for intra-session
correlation by estimating the variance at individual and auction group level. Note that the
distribution of private values is the same in each auction group. Models (1) and (2) consider
all 50 rounds, model (3) only considers the No Regret phase, and model (4) we only consider
values above 2500. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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4= 10.38). If all subjects would play the RNNE strategy earnings would be
16.16 Euro. Using a Cuzick trend test and comparing the three categories, we
find that risk aversion significantly increases the foregone profits (p = 0.037).
To sum up, we show that risk aversion as measured by the BRET has a
significant impact on overbidding in general and on the bidders’ profit in
particular. The higher the risk aversion—measured by k—the higher over-
bidding and the lower the earnings for the bidder. This leads us to con-
clude that H2NULL : OBLRA = OBMRA = OBHRA is rejected in favor of
H2 : OBHRA > OBMRA > OBLRA.
A remaining question is how risk aversion affects overbidding in our
setting. On the one hand bidders might adjust their bidding function ac-
cording to risk aversion in the sense that they increase the probability to
win by sacrificing profits independent of the behavior in the market. On the
other hand bidders might best reply to potential or perceived overbidding
behavior. If the latter is true, we should observe a stronger increase in over-
bidding in the HRA than in the LRA markets. In order to test this, we run
a random effects regression (unreported) on OB with HRA and LRA data
in the No Regret Phase only with a HRA dummy variable, the number of
rounds, and an interaction between the two as independent variables (with
and without controls). While the HRA dummy and the number of rounds
are significant drivers of OB, the interaction coefficient is insignificant, also
in different specifications. Hence, adjustment of bidding over time is not
different between HRA and LRA markets. Eyeballing Figure 4.2, we also
find no indication for differences between HRA and LRA markets with re-
spect to changes in overbidding over time. All this indicates that it is indeed
our individual measurement of risk aversion, rather than learning about the
level of risk aversion in the market, which drives our results (in line with
Kirchkamp and Reiss, 2011).
4.4 Discussion and conclusion
In this study, we attempt to compose homogeneous markets in which sub-
jects have almost similar levels of risk aversion as measured by the BRET.
We hypothesized that overpricing—the deviation from the RNNE price—is
higher in markets with a high average level of risk aversion in comparison
to markets with a low average level of risk aversion. And indeed, our ex-
perimental results support this hypothesis. As the level of risk aversion is
the only difference across markets, our results strongly suggest that the ob-
served differences in overpricing are due to differences in risk aversion as
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measured by the BRET. The question remains, however, whether our results
can also be explained by other theories on overbidding.
Harrison (1989) started a debate on overbidding costs, i.e. the amount of
profits to sacrifice in order to increase the probability of winning the auction.
The argument is that subjects tend to overbid, because overbidding costs
are negligible and it is more important to increase the winning probability.
In our experiment, we keep the overbidding costs constant in all auction
groups. Although this argument might explain a level effect in all markets
it does not explain the differences across markets.76
Regret theory serves as a further explanation for overbidding
(Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1989). As risk aversion is not related to regret theory,
it cannot explain the treatment effect. But it might explain a shift in overbid-
ding when we report the missed opportunity in the Regret phase. Although
we find some indication for a regret effect—in particular in overpricing—it
does not significantly affect the risk-overbidding relationship across HRA,
MRA and LRA subjects.
Armantier and Treich (2009b) test in an experiment whether a star
shaped probability weighting function explains overbidding. By fitting a
model to the data they show—assuming a star shaped probability weight-
ing function—that probability weighting explains overbidding better than
risk aversion. However, as the probability weighting function is theoreti-
cally not assumed to be correlated with risk aversion we have no reason
to believe that probability weighting is different across treatments. Hence,
the probability weighting might have a similar effect on overbidding but is
unlikely to explain our treatment effect.
Further reasons for overbidding are related to the joy of winning (e.g.
Cox et al., 1983b; Goeree et al., 2002) or the ex-post relative standing of bid-
ders (Turocy and Watson, 2012). Aggressive bidding might be observed due
to the extra utility a bidder gains when winning the auction. To some extend
this is in line with ex-post relative standing of the bidders. The argument
here is that bidders try to outperform others in terms of profits, i.e. they
want to gain more relative to others. As in the standard FPSB auction only
the winner earns a profit and even a small profit is higher than the profit
for all others, overbidding is in line with ex-post relative standing. Turocy
and Watson (2012) compare the standard FPSB profit frame in which only the
76Hence, the discussion about using the payoff space or the message space as discussed
by several articles in the American Economic Review in the early 90s has no influence on the
comparison across treatments. See Svorencˇík (2015) for a survey of the debate on overbidding
in FPSB auctions.
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4winner earns a profit with a surplus frame with outside options. In the latter
the equilibrium prediction is perfectly in line with the standard FPSB auc-
tion. However, the winner earns the lowest profits among all bidders. The
authors report that subjects bid more aggressive in the profit frame than in
the surplus frame. They conclude that ex-post relative standing plays an im-
portant role. As long as joy of winning and relative standing are not related
to risk aversion these determinants might serve as a reason for a particular
level effect in all markets but not for our observed treatment effect. Further
interpersonal explanations for overbidding are collusion (Isaac and Walker,
1985) and spite (Morgan et al., 2003). They require post round interaction
and knowledge on the profit of the winner, respectively. Neither is provided
in our auction design. Hence, these potential causes of overbidding should
not confound our results.
Recent studies that focused directly on the risk-overbidding relationship
did not find supporting evidence for the CRRAM. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and
Katok (2009) look at bidding behavior in a FPSB auction against computer
agents. They compare a ‘k = 1’ condition in which each bidding decision
effects one single auction, and a ‘k = 10’ condition in which each bidding de-
cision effects ten independent auctions simultaneously and earnings equal
the average payments from all ten auctions. Hence, if CRRAM plays a role
and bidders are risk averse, then bids should be lower in the k = 10 condi-
tion than in the k = 1 condition, because the variance of payoffs is lower in
the k = 10 condition. The authors find a risk effect in the No Regret con-
dition, but not in the two Regret conditions when feedback allows for loser
regret and/or winner regret.77 The design of Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Ka-
tok (2009) is very different from ours, which makes it difficult to compare the
results. We can only speculate why the evidence in favor of the risk aversion
effect is not as strong as in our setting. First, it is possible that the regret
effect in Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2009) is stronger than risk aver-
sion, allowing for a effect of risk on overbidding in the No Regret condition
but not in the Regret conditions. Second, the relevant unit of observation
in the data analysis of Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2009) is the aver-
age bid. Non-serious bidding in some value segments might therefore have
reduced the probability of a rejection of the null hypothesis. Finally, sub-
jects played against computerized agents without knowing their predefined
77The authors consider three additional conditions: the loser regret condition in which
feedback includes the missed opportunity when not being the winner, the winner regret con-
dition in which feedback includes the money left on the table, and a condition with loser
regret and winner regret.
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strategy (see instructions in Appendix B in Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Ka-
tok, 2009). The overbidding effect might therefore be weaker than in our
setting, because bidding against computer agents has been found to reduce
overbidding (Teubner et al., 2015).
Two related studies derive the risk coefficient from bidding behavior in
FPSB auctions assuming CRRA and test whether these risk coefficients are in
line with risk coefficients derived from a BDM procedure.78 Isaac and James
(2000) use individual linear censored regressions to infer risk coefficients of
28 subjects from bidding behavior in a FPSB auction against the computer
(40 periods).79 They then relate these coefficients to risk aversion measures
from the last two bids of four repetitions of the BDM procedure and find a
negative relationship rather than a positive. As a robustness check for our
results, we apply their method to our data. That is, we use individual lin-
ear censored regressions to derive risk coefficients from our FPSB auction
data. When we compare these coefficients with the risk coefficient derived
from the BRET, we still find a significant positive relationship.80 In a related,
second study Berg et al. (2005) criticize Isaac and James (2000) for using a
restricted form of BDM and assuming a special utility function. Berg et al.
(2005) administered a modified design and found no significant relationship
between inferred risk coefficients from FPSB auctions (N=48, 20 periods) and
from the BDM procedure (20 periods). Both studies find no indications for
a positive relationship between overbidding and risk aversion. One possible
reason is that subjects bid against computerized bidders (in Isaac and James,
2000), which can reduce overbidding (Teubner et al., 2015). Another reason
could be that both studies use the BDM procedure which reliability has re-
cently been called into question (Cason and Plott, 2014). As the noise level
differs between risk elicitation tasks (Crosetto and Filippin, 2015), the indi-
vidual risk aversion parameters from the BDM procedure might be too noisy
to enable a significant relationship within a low number of observations. In
particular, Berg et al. (2005) find that only 45% percent of all subjects ex-
hibited risk-averse or risk-neutral behavior in BDM which is quite low in
comparison to all other risk elicitation methods (see Crosetto and Filippin,
78Note that the risk coefficient inferred from FPSB auctions is inversely related to over-
bidding: with OB = 100×
(
Nb
(N−1)v − 1
)
and b = N−1N−1+r v we get 1+OB/100 =
N
N−1+r .
79The authors excluded all bids in the high and low value segments, and excluded all
bidders for which the bidding regression bidi = αi + βivaluei + errori yields a significant α,
because the latter is not in line with theory.
80We also applied the analysis in this paper to the data from Isaac and James (2000) and
did not find a significant relationship. All estimations and test results are available upon
request. We sincerely thank Mark Isaac for providing the data.
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42013, table 4).81
Although the theoretical link between risk preferences and overbidding
has been questioned in recent studies, our treatment manipulation shows
that it is too early to completely discard risk aversion as an explanation for
overbidding in FPSB auctions. We do not claim that risk aversion is the only
explanation for overbidding nor do we defend the CRRAM. Rather, we con-
tend that it plays an important and possibly underestimated role alongside
other factors such as regret aversion or probability weighting functions.
81For recent comparisons of risk elicitation tasks see Charness et al. (2013) or Crosetto and
Filippin (2015).
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Chapter 5
Risk and reward: the effect of risk
preferences on asset valuation in call
markets82
5.1 Introduction
Financial decisions almost inherently involve risk concerning future out-
comes. Although the question of what determines individual risk prefer-
ences does not have a clear-cut answer83, this has not impacted the im-
portant role of risk in modeling financial decision making. For instance,
at the aggregate market level, risk aversion theoretically influences asset
prices as it serves as one of the pillars of both modern portfolio theory
(Markowitz, 1952) and the capital asset pricing model (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner,
1965; Mossin, 1966). Moreover, as shown in LeRoy and LaCivita (1981) and
Lansing and LeRoy (2014), risk aversion might theoretically account for part
of the volatility of these asset prices. At the individual level, risk attitudes
among others determine portfolio holdings through an investor’s place on
the capital asset market line as well as buying and selling decisions follow-
ing gains and losses through individual disposition attitudes that in turn are
driven by risk preferences in both the gain and loss domain of prospect the-
ory (see for instance Meng andWeng, 2017). Finally, individual risk attitudes
are paramount in domains such as financial advice, financial regulation, hir-
ing decisions and job training (Fellner and Maciejovsky, 2007; Anzoni and
Zeisberger, 2016).
Although the theoretical link between risk preferences and aggregate
market outcomes as well as individual market behavior is strong, empirically
testing for this relationship is problematic. Specifically, although market
average risk aversion coefficients can be extracted from archival data such as
portfolio choice (Blake, 1996) and labor supply data (Chetty, 2006), there is
no easy way to distill individual risk preferences without the use of either (1)
82This chapter is based on a joint paper with Sascha Füllbrunn, Risk and reward: the effect
of risk preferences on asset valuation in call markets. Current status: in preparation.
83Age, gender, cognitive ability and genetics all seem to play a role (Dohmen et al., 2010;
Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Guiso and Paiella, 2008; Borghans et al., 2009; Cesarini et al., 2010;
Dohmen et al., 2012). However, the brain regions that correspond to risk attitudes and risk
aversion in particular are quite well documented (see for instance Knoch et al., 2006).
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5large scale socio-economic panels or (2) the use of experimental methods. An
example of a study making use of the first option is Donkers and Van Soest
(1999) who, using a panel survey of Dutch households, find that higher
degrees of risk aversion result in lower holdings of risky asset classes. A
second example is provided by Pennings and Smidts (2000) who, with the
help of a large questionnaire, show that the market behavior of hog farmers
is related to their risk attitudes; risk averse farmers trade more often and
make more use of futures to secure their income.84
The second option, namely the use of experimental methods, offers some
large benefits over both an archival data analysis and the use of socio-
economic panels in studying the effect of risk preferences on trading be-
havior and market outcomes. Unlike the use of archival data, the use of
experiments allow one ”to isolate and manipulate one variable at a time, thereby
illustrating its causal effects without resorting to complex and imperfect economet-
ric techniques to filter out effects of other variables” (Bloomfield and Anderson,
2010, p. 1). In the specific case of risk attitudes, experiments allow for both
the measurement of individual risk attitudes and the subsequent use of these
attitudes as a treatment effect in an environment in which one can control
for competing explanations such as differences in beliefs or self-selection.
Finally, unlike socio-economic panels, experiments allow for the dynamic
interaction of multiple participants inherent to asset markets.
Although the use of experiments thus offers some clear advantages over
other methods in relating risk attitudes to individual market behavior and
aggregate market outcomes, there are relatively few experimental studies
on this topic. As discussed in more detail in Section 5.2, those experimental
studies that do exist generally find some evidence in favor of a relationship
between risk attitudes and both individual behavior as well as aggregate
market outcomes. Specifically, it is found that both transaction prices and
trading volume generally decrease with increasing risk aversion (Ang and
Schwarz, 1985; Fellner and Maciejovsky, 2007; Breaban and Noussair, 2014).
However, the robustness of this relationship can be questioned as is seems to
depend on among others the way individual risk preferences are measured
and the fundamental value trajectory of the asset being traded (Fellner and
84In Donkers and Van Soest (1999) risk aversion is measured by the answer to the question
’I think it is more important to have safe investments and guaranteed returns, than to take a
risk to have a chance to get the highest possible returns’ on a seven item Likert scale running
from ’disagree strongly ’ to ’agree strongly’. In Pennings and Smidts (2000) risk aversion is
measured by first determining certainty equivalents (CE) of a number of 50/50 lotteries for
various amounts of money and then using these values to determine the utility function and
extracting the risk aversion parameter.
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Maciejovsky, 2007; Breaban and Noussair, 2014).
Moreover, the existing studies almost exclusively make use of the double
auction framework without considering call markets despite clear evidence
of differences in terms of market activity and efficiency between the two
institutions. Friedman (1993) for instance finds that call markets exhibit
greater market depth and similar informational efficiency but a lower allo-
cational efficiency than double auction markets. Also, Theissen (2000) find
call markets to exhibit greater liquidity leading to lower transaction costs as
measured by the bid-ask spread. Baghestanian et al. (2014) find call markets
to exhibit a lower turnover, include less speculators and produce smaller
price bubbles than double auction markets. Finally, Füllbrunn et al. (2014)
find that ambiguity premiums exist in experimental call markets but not in
double auction markets. They argue that this difference is in part due to the
limited amount of market feedback in their call markets compared to the
double auction markets.
We believe that especially differences in information provision between
the two institutions might interact with risk preferences. Specifically, dou-
ble auctions provide the subjects with intra-period information on market
preferences by means of the information extracted from public order flow
while no such information is available to subjects in a call market. If the
intra-period information reduces the risk experienced by subjects, it might
well be that the lack of such information in call markets leads to bigger dif-
ferences in terms of trading behavior between risk seeking and risk averse
subjects in call markets than in double auction markets. However, one could
also argue that the call market is easier to understand thereby diminishing
the effect of risk aversion on market outcomes.
Given the low number of (experimental) studies and the hitherto exclu-
sive focus on the double auction framework, our paper hopes to add to
the existing literature relating risk preferences to market outcomes by ex-
perimentally studying the relationship between risk aversion and individual
market behavior as well as aggregate market outcomes in closed-book call
markets. We do so by using a two-staged experimental design in which we
first measure risk preferences using the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET)
by Crosetto and Filippin (2013) that are then used to compose call markets
with increasing average risk aversion. Namely, per session we compose a
low risk averse (LRA), moderate risk averse (MRA) and a high risk averse
(HRA) market with the placement of a subject in one of the three markets
being determined by his or her BRET score relative to that of the other sub-
jects.
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However, the robustness of this relationship can be questioned as is seems to
depend on among others the way individual risk preferences are measured
and the fundamental value trajectory of the asset being traded (Fellner and
84In Donkers and Van Soest (1999) risk aversion is measured by the answer to the question
’I think it is more important to have safe investments and guaranteed returns, than to take a
risk to have a chance to get the highest possible returns’ on a seven item Likert scale running
from ’disagree strongly ’ to ’agree strongly’. In Pennings and Smidts (2000) risk aversion is
measured by first determining certainty equivalents (CE) of a number of 50/50 lotteries for
various amounts of money and then using these values to determine the utility function and
extracting the risk aversion parameter.
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Maciejovsky, 2007; Breaban and Noussair, 2014).
Moreover, the existing studies almost exclusively make use of the double
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of differences in terms of market activity and efficiency between the two
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double auction markets. They argue that this difference is in part due to the
limited amount of market feedback in their call markets compared to the
double auction markets.
We believe that especially differences in information provision between
the two institutions might interact with risk preferences. Specifically, dou-
ble auctions provide the subjects with intra-period information on market
preferences by means of the information extracted from public order flow
while no such information is available to subjects in a call market. If the
intra-period information reduces the risk experienced by subjects, it might
well be that the lack of such information in call markets leads to bigger dif-
ferences in terms of trading behavior between risk seeking and risk averse
subjects in call markets than in double auction markets. However, one could
also argue that the call market is easier to understand thereby diminishing
the effect of risk aversion on market outcomes.
Given the low number of (experimental) studies and the hitherto exclu-
sive focus on the double auction framework, our paper hopes to add to
the existing literature relating risk preferences to market outcomes by ex-
perimentally studying the relationship between risk aversion and individual
market behavior as well as aggregate market outcomes in closed-book call
markets. We do so by using a two-staged experimental design in which we
first measure risk preferences using the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET)
by Crosetto and Filippin (2013) that are then used to compose call markets
with increasing average risk aversion. Namely, per session we compose a
low risk averse (LRA), moderate risk averse (MRA) and a high risk averse
(HRA) market with the placement of a subject in one of the three markets
being determined by his or her BRET score relative to that of the other sub-
jects.
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5All subjects in our markets have the same endowment (both money and
shares) as well as the same information regarding the dividend distribution.
Moreover, all endowments are reinstated after each period. This straightfor-
ward design allows us to minimize the influence of any factors other than
risk aversion that might interact with market pricing and trading behav-
ior. However, it also precludes us from studying differences in allocational
efficiency as well as price volatility between the three different markets as
for instance done in Ang and Schwarz (1985). Our main focus will there-
fore lie on studying the relationship between risk aversion and bid and ask
prices/quantities at the individual trader level as well as the relationship
between risk aversion and transaction price and transaction volume at the
market level.
From our results we observe little to no evidence for a strong relation-
ship between both individual as well as market average risk attitudes on the
one hand and individual market behavior and aggregate market outcomes
respectively on the other hand. Specifically, at the individual level, risk atti-
tudes do not predict the quantity nor the prices of submitted bids and asks.
At the market level we do not find a relationship between market average
risk aversion and neither transaction prices nor volumes. We do however
find some weak evidence for a negative relationship between market aver-
age risk aversion and market liquidity.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 5.2 provides a discussion of
the current literature and presents our hypotheses, Section 5.3 describes our
experimental design, results are presented in Section 5.4 and, finally, Section
5.5 concludes.
5.2 Literature review and hypotheses
5.2.1 Literature overview
Ang and Schwarz (1985) experimentally test the theoretical link between
risk aversion—measured using a questionnaire—and asset price volatility,
trading volume, transaction prices and overall market efficiency. They do
so by composing both high and low risks averse groups of market par-
ticipants trading in a double auction market under different information
regimes (either no, imperfect or perfect insider information). It is found
that, contrary to the theoretical prediction of Shiller (1980) and LeRoy and
Porter (1981), markets with risk averse individuals exhibit smaller within-
period price volatility than those with less risk averse individuals. Ang
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and Schwarz (1985) furthermore find trading volume in the low risk averse
markets to be slightly lower than in the high risk averse markets, though
not significantly so. However, as expected, the risk premium is on average
around 30% higher for the high risk averse markets than for the low risk
averse markets. Finally, market efficiency is found to be higher in the mar-
ket with the less risk averse participants in which prices are closer to the
(risk neutral) expected value and more assets end up with those traders that
value them the highest.
Fellner and Maciejovsky (2007) relate risk preferences measured in two
different ways to market behavior. The first measure for individual risk
preferences is obtained by eliciting subjects’ certainty equivalent in a lottery
with a 50% probability of either 100 experimental currency units (ECU) or
0 ECU. The second measure consists out of the number of times a subject
chose the expected value of a simple lottery over playing the lottery itself
in a total of seven such choices (with differing lotteries and thus expected
values in each of the seven choices). Fellner and Maciejovsky (2007) find
that the two measures of risk aversion do not significantly correlate. Also,
only the score obtained from the second measure relates to actual market
behavior in subsequent experimental double auction markets. Specifically, it
is found that the lower the individual risk aversion of a market participant,
the more bids, asks as well as trades he or she makes in the experimental
asset markets.
Making use of an experimental approach as well, Breaban and Noussair
(2014) find that there is a significant negative correlation between market
average risk aversion—based on the individual choices in a Holt and Laury
task (Holt and Laury, 2002)—and transaction prices in a continuous dou-
ble auction market with a bullish fundamental value trajectory. However,
they find no significant correlation between transaction prices and market
average risk aversion in the case of a bearish fundamental value trajectory.85
At the individual level they find a significant negative correlation between
risk aversion levels and end of market share holdings for individuals in the
bearish market but not for those in the bullish market. Furthermore, they
find some evidence for a positive correlation between risk aversion and fun-
damental value trading, i.e. buying (selling) when the price is below (above)
the fundamental value, and a negative correlation between risk aversion and
momentum trading, i.e. buying (selling) when prices have been increasing
85Both the bullish and bearish trajectory had a constant FV of 120 for the first eight periods
but in the bullish (bearish) market the FV increased (decreased) by 10 ECU per period by
means of a fixed inventory tax (subsidy) in the final seven periods.
101
5All subjects in our markets have the same endowment (both money and
shares) as well as the same information regarding the dividend distribution.
Moreover, all endowments are reinstated after each period. This straightfor-
ward design allows us to minimize the influence of any factors other than
risk aversion that might interact with market pricing and trading behav-
ior. However, it also precludes us from studying differences in allocational
efficiency as well as price volatility between the three different markets as
for instance done in Ang and Schwarz (1985). Our main focus will there-
fore lie on studying the relationship between risk aversion and bid and ask
prices/quantities at the individual trader level as well as the relationship
between risk aversion and transaction price and transaction volume at the
market level.
From our results we observe little to no evidence for a strong relation-
ship between both individual as well as market average risk attitudes on the
one hand and individual market behavior and aggregate market outcomes
respectively on the other hand. Specifically, at the individual level, risk atti-
tudes do not predict the quantity nor the prices of submitted bids and asks.
At the market level we do not find a relationship between market average
risk aversion and neither transaction prices nor volumes. We do however
find some weak evidence for a negative relationship between market aver-
age risk aversion and market liquidity.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 5.2 provides a discussion of
the current literature and presents our hypotheses, Section 5.3 describes our
experimental design, results are presented in Section 5.4 and, finally, Section
5.5 concludes.
5.2 Literature review and hypotheses
5.2.1 Literature overview
Ang and Schwarz (1985) experimentally test the theoretical link between
risk aversion—measured using a questionnaire—and asset price volatility,
trading volume, transaction prices and overall market efficiency. They do
so by composing both high and low risks averse groups of market par-
ticipants trading in a double auction market under different information
regimes (either no, imperfect or perfect insider information). It is found
that, contrary to the theoretical prediction of Shiller (1980) and LeRoy and
Porter (1981), markets with risk averse individuals exhibit smaller within-
period price volatility than those with less risk averse individuals. Ang
100
and Schwarz (1985) furthermore find trading volume in the low risk averse
markets to be slightly lower than in the high risk averse markets, though
not significantly so. However, as expected, the risk premium is on average
around 30% higher for the high risk averse markets than for the low risk
averse markets. Finally, market efficiency is found to be higher in the mar-
ket with the less risk averse participants in which prices are closer to the
(risk neutral) expected value and more assets end up with those traders that
value them the highest.
Fellner and Maciejovsky (2007) relate risk preferences measured in two
different ways to market behavior. The first measure for individual risk
preferences is obtained by eliciting subjects’ certainty equivalent in a lottery
with a 50% probability of either 100 experimental currency units (ECU) or
0 ECU. The second measure consists out of the number of times a subject
chose the expected value of a simple lottery over playing the lottery itself
in a total of seven such choices (with differing lotteries and thus expected
values in each of the seven choices). Fellner and Maciejovsky (2007) find
that the two measures of risk aversion do not significantly correlate. Also,
only the score obtained from the second measure relates to actual market
behavior in subsequent experimental double auction markets. Specifically, it
is found that the lower the individual risk aversion of a market participant,
the more bids, asks as well as trades he or she makes in the experimental
asset markets.
Making use of an experimental approach as well, Breaban and Noussair
(2014) find that there is a significant negative correlation between market
average risk aversion—based on the individual choices in a Holt and Laury
task (Holt and Laury, 2002)—and transaction prices in a continuous dou-
ble auction market with a bullish fundamental value trajectory. However,
they find no significant correlation between transaction prices and market
average risk aversion in the case of a bearish fundamental value trajectory.85
At the individual level they find a significant negative correlation between
risk aversion levels and end of market share holdings for individuals in the
bearish market but not for those in the bullish market. Furthermore, they
find some evidence for a positive correlation between risk aversion and fun-
damental value trading, i.e. buying (selling) when the price is below (above)
the fundamental value, and a negative correlation between risk aversion and
momentum trading, i.e. buying (selling) when prices have been increasing
85Both the bullish and bearish trajectory had a constant FV of 120 for the first eight periods
but in the bullish (bearish) market the FV increased (decreased) by 10 ECU per period by
means of a fixed inventory tax (subsidy) in the final seven periods.
101
5(decreasing) in previous periods.
Finally, in Eckel and Füllbrunn (2015) it is found that experimental
double auction markets filled with female participants show significantly
smaller bubbles than those filled with men. Although men are found to be
less risk averse, the level of risk aversion as measured in an incentivized
gamble-choice task does not correlate with bubble measures within treat-
ments (either all male, all female, or mixed markets). However, the authors
do find a significant correlation between market risk aversion and bubble
formation for all data combined. Namely, it is found that the higher the
average risk aversion in a market, the smaller the bubble is and the shorter
it lasts. The authors conclude that "risk aversion plays some role overall but it
is difficult to disentangle from the gender effect" (Eckel and Füllbrunn, 2015, p.
917).
5.2.2 Hypotheses
As explained in Section 5.1, the call market and double auction institutions
differ from each other in terms of among others market efficiency and activ-
ity. Although these differences might change the magnitude of any relation-
ship between risk preferences on the one hand and market outcomes and
individual market behavior on the other, there is however no reason for us
to expect that these differences affect the direction of this relationship. Some
of the below specified hypotheses are therefore based on previous findings
in double auction markets. As explained in section 5.1, our focus lies on
price and quantity data at both the aggregate market- and the individual
level.
Our first hypothesis related to transaction prices is derived from the the-
oretical influence of risk attitudes on certainty equivalents. Namely, higher
levels of risk aversion should—through the curvature of the utility func-
tion—lead to lower certainty equivalents and thus lower valuations of the
risky asset in our asset markets. Also, this hypothesis is in line with results
of Ang and Schwarz (1985) and Breaban and Noussair (2014) regarding the
relationship between transaction prices and market risk attitudes in double
auction markets.
Hypothesis 1: Transaction prices are negatively related to average
market risk aversion.
In line with Hypothesis 1 at the market level, we expect the prices of both
submitted bids and submitted asks to be decreasing in individual risk aver-
sion:
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Hypothesis 1a: Submitted bid prices are negatively related to individ-
ual risk aversion.
Hypothesis 1b: Submitted ask prices are negatively related to indi-
vidual risk aversion.
Also, as both Ang and Schwarz (1985) and Fellner and Maciejovsky (2007)
find evidence of a negative relationship between risk aversion and trans-
action volume, we expect the following to hold regarding the relationship
between transaction volume and market risk attitudes:
Hypothesis 2: Transaction volume is negatively related to average
market risk aversion.
Finally, the results from Fellner and Maciejovsky (2007) in terms of individ-
ual market behavior lead us to the following hypotheses at the individual
trader level:
Hypothesis 2a: The number of submitted bids is negatively related to
individual risk aversion.
Hypothesis 2b: The number of submitted asks is negatively related to
individual risk aversion.
5.3 Experimental design
We ran a total of 4 sessions consisting of three separate parts and lasting for
about ninety minutes. In the first part of the experiments we ran the BRET to
elicit individual risk preferences while in the second part we ran a call mar-
ket to elicit trading behavior. The first two parts of the experiment will be
further discussed below. In part three, right after the end of the call market,
a short questionnaire was administered that consisted out of questions re-
lating to demographics. In all sessions 24 subjects participated for a total of
96 participants who on average earned 15.91 euro including a 4 euro show-
up fee. Table D.1 in the Appendix provides the subject pool demographics.
The experiments were computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and
participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The sessions were
conducted from June till September of 2016 at the NSM Decision Lab at the
Radboud University (Nijmegen, The Netherlands).
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55.3.1 Measuring risk preferences
In part one of the experiment we used the dynamic Bomb Risk Elicitation
Task (BRET) by Crosetto and Filippin (2013) in order to elicit risk prefer-
ences. In the dynamic BRET subjects are presented with a field of 100 boxes
and in one of these boxes a bomb is hidden. All boxes have the same proba-
bility (1%) of containing the bomb. Every second one box disappears which
means it has been ’collected’ by the participant. The participants earn a fixed
amount of money per collected box and have to decide when to stop collect-
ing boxes by simply clicking a ’stop’ button. When a participant happens
to collect the box in which a bomb was hidden, he or she loses all money
earned. The implicit trade-off is thus between the money earned and the
risk taken by a subject.
Please note that during the BRET a participant does not know at any time
whether or not the bomb has been collected. Only at the very end of the
experiment we determine (by a random draw of the computer) in which of
the 100 boxes a bomb was hidden and thus whether or not a participant gets
to keep the money earned which, as mentioned above, equals the monetary
reward per box times the number of boxes collected. A subject’s BRET-score
equals the amount of boxes collected. A participant can be classified as
risk averse when collecting less then 50 boxes (BRET-score<50), risk neutral
when collecting exactly 50 boxes (BRET-score=50) and risk seeking when
collecting more than 50 boxes (BRET-score>50).
Our choice for the BRET-score is motivated by three main factors. Firstly,
the BRET is not biased by a participant’s degree of loss aversion since the of-
fered choice set does not contain an option that will yield a positive amount
of money for certain. Secondly, since the participants only have to make one
choice in the BRET they cannot violate the Reduction Axiom. And thirdly,
and perhaps most importantly, the BRET is extremely easy to understand
and requires little to no numeracy skills. This implies that the task will
likely not suffer from any issues related to misunderstanding.
We explained the BRET using the instructions found in appendix C.1.1.
These instructions were distributed to all participants and read out aloud by
the experimenter. Before we started the actual BRET we showed subjects the
screen used for the BRET and administered some test questions that can be
found in Appendix C.1.2. The experimenter then explained the correct an-
swers and started the BRET. Participants earned 10 euro cents per collected
box. The mean BRET-score of the subjects equals 45.15 with a standard de-
viation of 11.86, a median of 45, a minimum value of 20 and a maximum
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value of 99. Out of all subjects, 18.75% were risk neutral, 63.54% were risk
averse and 17.71% of subjects were risk seeking. In line with other studies
(Eckel and Grossman, 2002; Charness and Gneezy, 2012) we find females to
be more risk averse than males with average BRET-scores of 44.19 and 45.89
respectively, although this difference is not significant (MWU, p = 0.211).86
Figure D.2 in appendix D.3 shows the histogram of BRET-scores with the
accompanying percentages.
5.3.2 Call market design
In part two of the experiment we apply our main treatment effect by using
the individual BRET-scores elicited in part one of our experiment to create
three closed-book call markets per session with increasing average BRET-
scores. We did so by first ranking all 24 subject within a session based on
their BRET-score, ki; the lower their BRET-score, the higher their rank, ri,
with ties being broken randomly. We then created a high risk averse (HRA)
market filled with subjects with the eight highest BRET ranks (ri < 9), a low
risk averse (LRA) market filled with subjects with the eight lowest BRET
ranks (ri > 16) and, finally, a moderate risk averse (MRA) market filled with
the eight remaining subjects.
Table 5.1: BRET scores
BRET scores
H=L
Session HRA MRA LRA
S1 33.00 (3.18) 43.25 (2.45) 54.00 (7.27) <0.001
S2 31.88 (4.78) 41.00 (2.42) 51.50 (3.37) <0.001
S3 30.88 (4.62) 44.63 (3.96) 52.50 (5.03) <0.001
S4 40.38 (5.15) 50.75 (1.99) 68.00 (13.86) <0.001
ALL 34.03 (5.84) 44.91 (4.57) 56.50 (10.71) <0.001
Notes: BRET-scores per market and session (standard deviations in parentheses). The final
row ’ALL’ provides averages over all sessions while the final column ’H=L’ provides the
Mann Whitney U test p-values for BRETHRA = BRETLRA.
86Note that in the BRET there is no safe option that might serve as a reference point
against which subjects could evaluate the lottery outcomes in terms of gains and losses even
when actual losses are not possible in the lottery. Crosetto and Filippin (2013) and Filippin
and Crosetto (2013) argue that the higher loss aversion of women could explain differences
in risk aversion scores between males and females in frequently used risk measurement tasks
in the literature such as the Gneezy and Potters (1997) and Eckel and Grossman (2002) tasks
that do provide a safe option.
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5As show in Table 5.1, all HRA markets are on average risk averse
(BRET-score <50) while all LRA markets are risk seeking on average (BRET-
score>50). Finally, all markets (HRA, MRA and LRA) within each session
differ significantly in terms of BRET-scores (MWU, p < 0.05) with the dif-
ference between HRA and MRA markets being significant at the 1%-level in
each session. Moreover, using Cuzick’s trend test we reject the null of no
trend in BRET-scores from the HRA to the LRA markets within each session
(p < 0.01) as well as for all sessions combined (p < 0.01).
The closed-book call market ran for twelve periods during which subjects
could place a buy (sell) order by indicating how many shares they were
prepared to buy (sell) and the highest (lowest) price they were willing to bid
(ask). After every subject entered his or her order, the market was cleared
by determining the price at which the highest number of orders could be
executed (if possible). At the start of each period every subject received
7,000 gulden (experimental currency) and five shares.
Although in each period there were two possible dividend outcomes
with an expected value of 450, the two possible dividends were changed
after every four periods as a robustness check, creating three different div-
idend regimes. Dividends in Regime 1 equaled either 240 or 660 both with
a 50% probability, resulting in a standard deviation of 210 and a skew of 0.
In Regime 2 the dividend equaled either 140 or 760 with a 50% probability,
resulting in a standard deviation of 310 and a skew of 0. Finally, in Regime
3 the dividends equaled either 340 with a 75% probability or 780 with a 25%
probability, resulting in a standard deviation of 190.52 and a skew of 1.15.
Compared to Regime 1, only the standard deviation is increased in
Regime 2 (keeping the skew equal) while in Regime 3 the skew is increased
(keeping the standard deviation relatively similar). The choice to also in-
clude skewness as an additional robustness check is motivated by the find-
ing of Strážnická and Weber (2011) who find that a positively skewed asset is
perceived as being riskier than a zero skew asset with an equal standard de-
viation. Furthermore, in order to mitigate potential order effects, the order
of the dividend regimes was changed from 1, 2, 3 in the first two sessions to
3, 1, 2 in the final two sessions.
Before the start of the actual paid call market, subjects participated in an
unpaid trial market similar to the actual market to get them acquainted with
the trading interface. After the trial round, the first trading period started.
At the start of of each new dividend regime the two possible dividends and
accompanying probabilities were announced publicly and by an on-screen
message. Earnings in guldens flowing from trading in the call markets were
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calculated by randomly drawing one period out of each of the three blocks
of four periods and adding the earnings from these periods. The gulden
amount was converted to euros using an exchange rate of 1 euro per 666.67
guldens. Instructions for the call markets are found in Appendix D.1.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Market results
5.4.1.1 Transaction prices
Figure 5.1 shows the transaction prices in all three different markets in each
of the three dividend regimes with data averaged over all four sessions.87
Only for Regime 2 do we find the mean transaction price data to be in ac-
cordance with Hypothesis 1. While for Regime 1 and 3 the prices in the
LRA market are slightly higher than those in the HRA markets, there is no
clear increase in prices from the HRA through the MRA to the LRA markets.
Figure D.3 shows that at the session level the results differ strongly; only in
Session 1 and Session 2 do we generally observe higher transaction prices in
the LRA than in the HRA markets.
Figure 5.1: Mean transaction price over all sessions
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dend regime ( ’R1’, ’R2’ and ’R3’ indicate dividend Regimes 1, 2 and 3 respectively).
87Note that we exclude periods in which no transactions occurred
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5Table 5.2 provides the transaction price data aggregated over all session-
s/regimes as well per regime and per session. For the data over all ses-
sions combined (the ’ALL’ category) we find significantly higher prices in the
LRA than in the HRA markets when combining all three dividend regimes
(p = 0.023) as well as for the first and third dividend regime in isolation
(p = 0.068 for both regimes). For Regime 2 the transaction prices do not sig-
nificantly differ between the HRA and LRA markets (p = 0.465). However,
all the above results in line with Hypothesis 1 are solely driven by Sessions
1 and 2. A Cuzick’s trend test using data from all session combined shows a
mildly significant trend (increase) in prices from the HRA through the MRA
to the LRA markets when combining all dividend regimes (p = 0.076) while
the Null of no trend cannot be rejected for Regime 1 (p = 0.114), Regime 2
(p = 0.426) and Regime 3 (p = 0.750) individually.
Table 5.2: Price data
Regime Session HRA MRA LRA H=L
ALL
S1 390.58 435.50 443.92 0.058
S2 371.17 338.17 449.08 0.002
S3 449.67 452.25 404.33 0.002
S4 450.83 458.50 433.50 0.041
ALL 415.56 421.10 432.71 0.023
R1
S1 401.25 426.50 446.75 0.068
S2 357.75 322.50 446.75 0.068
S3 437.50 416.75 387.75 0.066
S4 440.00 443.00 411.00 0.068
ALL 409.13 402.19 423.06 0.068
R2
S1 352.50 423.75 460.00 0.317
S2 372.25 302.50 449.25 0.066
S3 461.25 490.00 385.25 0.068
S4 465.50 483.75 459.25 0.715
ALL 412.88 425.00 438.44 0.465
R3
S1 418.00 456.25 425.00 1.000
S2 383.50 389.50 451.25 0.068
S3 450.25 450.00 440.00 0.095
S4 447.00 448.75 430.25 0.144
ALL 424.69 436.13 436.63 0.068
Notes: Transaction price data for all three market types (’HRA’, ’MRA’ and ’LRA’) by divi-
dend regime (’ALL’ indicates all dividend regimes combined while ’R1’, ’R2’ and ’R3’ indi-
cate dividend Regimes 1, 2 and 3 respectively) and subdivided by sessions (Session 1, 2, 3
and 4 as well as ’ALL’ indicating the average over all 4 sessions). The final column ’H=L’
contains the Wilcoxon p-value for the test PriceHRA = PriceLRA.
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Finally, we run a random effects regressions as specified in model (1) and
(2) in table 5.3. The auction markets’ average BRET score, K, relates to our
Table 5.3: Market level regressions: Price & Volume
Price Volume
(1) (2) (3) (4)
K 0.56 0.92 -0.03 -0.02
(0.88) (1.39) (0.06) (0.08)
Experience 3.84∗∗ 0.32∗∗
(1.32) (0.10)
Low dividend 32.45∗ -0.40
(13.85) (1.07)
Male -51.51 -2.79
(133.54) (6.10)
Age 8.53 -0.80
(9.56) (0.81)
Div. Regime 2 12.65 -5.85 0.68 -0.35
(10.19) (9.62) (1.11) (0.97)
Div. Regime 3 21.02∗∗ 8.40 0.29 0.85
(6.87) (12.46) (0.86) (1.12)
Session 2 -34.33 -70.97 0.37 0.38
(29.79) (55.64) (1.92) (2.55)
Session 3 14.27 6.46 2.96∗ 2.34
(19.55) (33.53) (1.21) (1.70)
Session 4 20.68 25.31 1.72 0.83
(14.89) (28.62) (1.91) (1.46)
Constant 386.15∗∗∗ 371.91∗∗∗ 8.90∗∗∗ 8.81∗
(40.06) (72.58) (2.70) (3.50)
Observations 141.00 129.00 141.00 129.00
Numb. clusters 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00
WALD χ2 25.58 184.27 10.75 170.00
Prob<χ2 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00
Notes: Random effects regression with transaction price (specification 1 and 2) and volume
(specification 3 and 4) as the dependent variable. The RHS consists of ’K’ being the market
average BRET score, session dummies ’Session 2’, ’Session 3’ and ’Session 4’, dividend regime
dummies ’Regime 2’ and ’Regime 3’, ’Experience’ indicating the number of periods played
by each subject, ’Low dividend’ being a dummy indicating a low dividend in the previous
period, ’Male’ indicating the share of males in a market and, finally, ’Age’ indicating the
market average centered age. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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dend regime (’ALL’ indicates all dividend regimes combined while ’R1’, ’R2’ and ’R3’ indi-
cate dividend Regimes 1, 2 and 3 respectively) and subdivided by sessions (Session 1, 2, 3
and 4 as well as ’ALL’ indicating the average over all 4 sessions). The final column ’H=L’
contains the Wilcoxon p-value for the test PriceHRA = PriceLRA.
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5main treatment effect and is therefore our main interest in both models.
Although, in line with Hypothesis 1, the coefficient for K in model (1) is
positive, it is not significant when controlling for both the different sessions
and dividend regimes. This result does not change in model (2) in which we
additionally control for learning effects by means of the variable ’Experience’
that measures the amount of periods played, the belief in mean reversion,
i.e., the belief that after a low dividend the probability of a high dividend
increases, captured by means of the dummy variable ’Low dividend’ that
equals 1 when the low dividend was drawn in the previous period, the
fraction of males indicated by the variable ’Male’ and, finally, the average
market age indicated by the variable ’Age’. We do find that both experience
and the occurrence of a low dividend in the previous period significantly
increase transaction prices.
5.4.1.2 Transaction volume and market liquidity
With no clear increase in trading volume from the HRA, through the MRA
to the LRA markets for any of the three dividend regimes, Figure 5.2 shows
little evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2. Moreover, only in Regime 2 do we
see a higher volume in the LRA than in the HRA markets. Figure D.4 shows
that at the session level an erratic picture arises; in none of the session do
Figure 5.2: Mean trading volume over all sessions
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Notes: Transaction volume data for all three market types (’HRA’, ’MRA’ and ’LRA’) by
dividend regime ( ’R1’, ’R2’ and ’R3’ indicate dividend Regimes 1, 2 and 3 respectively).
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we see any evidence for Hypothesis 2 with a high variance in results both
within and between dividend regimes.
Table 5.4 confirms the results from Figures 5.2 and D.4; seen over all four
sessions, we do not find the transaction volume in the LRA to differ sig-
nificantly from that in the HRA markets for for all three regimes combined
(p = 0.844) nor for any of the dividend regimes separately (p = 0.715 for
Regime 1, p = 0.357 for Regime 2 and 3). At the session level, only the re-
sults from Session 2 confirm to what would be expected from Hypothesis 2.
Finally, performing a Cuzick’s trend test to test for a trend in transaction vol-
ume from the HRA, through the MRA to the LRA markets using data from
all sessions combined, we cannot reject the Null of no trend for Regime 1
(0.832), Regime 2 (0.684) and Regime 3 (0.384), nor for all regimes combined
(0.656).
Table 5.4: Volume data
Regime Session HRA MRA LRA H=L
ALL
S1 6.92 10.58 5.50 0.634
S2 6.33 7.33 11.33 0.013
S3 10.92 11.50 10.25 0.406
S4 12.42 8.33 7.25 0.005
ALL 9.15 9.44 8.58 0.844
R1
S1 9.25 13.00 6.75 0.465
S2 6.75 5.00 14.25 0.068
S3 8.75 10.25 9.00 0.854
S4 10.75 7.75 4.00 0.068
ALL 8.88 9.00 8.50 0.715
R2
S1 5.00 7.75 4.00 0.317
S2 7.50 7.25 10.25 0.465
S3 13.50 14.00 11.50 0.066
S4 12.00 8.50 10.25 0.197
ALL 9.50 9.38 9.00 0.357
R3
S1 6.50 11.00 5.75 0.854
S2 4.75 9.75 9.50 0.068
S3 10.50 10.25 10.25 0.854
S4 14.50 8.75 7.50 0.144
ALL 9.06 9.94 8.25 0.357
Notes: Transaction volume data for all three market types (’HRA’, ’MRA’ and ’LRA’) by
dividend regime (’ALL’ indicates all dividend regimes combined while ’R1’, ’R2’ and ’R3’
indicate dividend Regimes 1, 2 and 3 respectively) and subdivided by sessions (Session 1, 2,
3 and 4 as well as ’ALL’ indicating the average over all 4 sessions). The final column ’H=L’
contains the Wilcoxon p-value for the test VolumeHRA = VolumeLRA.
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Notes: Transaction volume data for all three market types (’HRA’, ’MRA’ and ’LRA’) by
dividend regime ( ’R1’, ’R2’ and ’R3’ indicate dividend Regimes 1, 2 and 3 respectively).
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we see any evidence for Hypothesis 2 with a high variance in results both
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sults from Session 2 confirm to what would be expected from Hypothesis 2.
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ume from the HRA, through the MRA to the LRA markets using data from
all sessions combined, we cannot reject the Null of no trend for Regime 1
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(0.656).
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5Specifications (3) and (4) in table 5.3 indicate that market risk attitudes, K,
have no significant influence on the transaction volume with small negative
coefficients that are non-significant in both specifications. Moreover, apart
from the dummy for Session 3 in specification (3) and the coefficient for
experience in specification (4) we find none of the controls to be significant.
Finally, related to the transaction volume, Table 5.5 provides the Relative
Inside Spread (RIS), defined as the difference between the best rejected bid
and ask when available (see Friedman, 1993), which can be seen as a measure
of market depth and thus market liquidity. Specifically, the RIS can be seen
as a measure for the price impact of an additional order, as this additional
order would have been filled at a price that would at worst be the best
rejected bid or ask (Theissen, 2000); the lower the RIS, the lower the price
impact and thus the higher the market liquidity. From the results of Ang and
Schwarz (1985) and Fellner and Maciejovsky (2007) that lead us to formulate
Hypothesis 2 we would expect a higher liquidity—and thus a higher RIS
value—in the LRA than the HRA markets.
The results from Table 5.5 show that, seen over all sessions and dividend
regimes, liquidity is indeed higher in the LRA markets than in the HRA
markets however not significantly so (p = 0.239). The same result holds for
Regime 3 (p = 0.715) whereas for Regime 1 the difference has the expected
sign but in addition is also significant (p = 0.068). In Regime 2 there is little
difference between the results for the LRA and HRA markets with liquidity
actually being slight higher in the LRA than the HRA market (p = 1.00).
At the sessions level, only Session 2 and 3 show a higher liquidity in the
LRA than the HRA markets for each dividend regime separately. However,
in the case of Session 2 this difference is only significant during Regime 2
whereas for Session 3 this result is only significant during Regime 1. Finally,
a Cuzick’s test for an increasing trend in liquidity from the HRA to the LRA
markets performed on the data from all four sessions shows that the Null of
no trend cannot be rejected for all regimes combined (p = 0.100) as well as
for Regime 2 (p = 0.403) and Regime 3 (p = 0.753) individually. For Regime
1, however, we do find a significant increasing trend in liquidity from the
HRA to the LRA markets (p = 0.052).
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Table 5.5: RIS values (market liquidity)
Regime Session HRA MRA LRA H=L
ALL
S1 29.58 17.67 17.33 0.767
S2 38.92 19.17 12.58 0.041
S3 65.42 38.72 28.50 0.059
S4 35.00 35.56 52.83 0.109
ALL 42.23 27.78 27.81 0.239
R1
S1 38.75 14.00 6.50 0.066
S2 22.50 21.25 17.00 0.465
S3 102.50 72.00 30.50 0.068
S4 6.75 20.00 23.25 0.144
ALL 42.63 31.81 19.31 0.068
R2
S1 33.75 18.75 11.00 0.317
S2 38.75 30.00 7.00 0.068
S3 61.50 22.50 30.00 0.655
S4 9.00 66.67 102.75 0.109
ALL 35.75 34.48 37.69 1.000
R3
S1 16.25 20.25 34.50 0.068
S2 55.50 6.25 13.75 0.353
S3 32.25 21.67 25.00 0.715
S4 89.25 20.00 32.50 1.000
ALL 48.31 17.04 26.44 0.715
Notes: Market liquidity data as measured by the Relative insider spread (RIS) for all three
market types (’HRA’, ’MRA’ and ’LRA’) by dividend regime (’ALL’ indicates all dividend
regimes combined while ’R1’, ’R2’ and ’R3’ indicate dividend Regimes 1, 2 and 3 respectively)
and subdivided by sessions (Session 1, 2, 3 and 4 as well as ’ALL’ indicating the average over
all 4 sessions). The final column ’H=L’ contains the Wilcoxon p-value for the test RISHRA =
RISLRA.
5.4.2 Individual behavior
5.4.2.1 Bid and ask prices
As expected from the findings from table 5.2, the left panel of Table 5.6
provides little evidence in favor of the negative relationship between bid
prices and individual risk aversion formulated in Hypothesis 1a. Focusing
on the bidding behavior aggregated over all sessions, we find no significant
difference between bid prices in the HRA and LRA markets for either all
regimes combined (p = 0.239), nor for Regime 1 (p = 0.715), Regime 2
(p = 0.144) and Regime 3 (p = 0.715) individually. However, the slight
differences between bids that do exist are of the expected sign. Using a
Cuzick’s trend test on the bid price data from all sessions combined, we
cannot reject the Null of no trend in bid prices from the HRA, through the
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Table 5.5: RIS values (market liquidity)
Regime Session HRA MRA LRA H=L
ALL
S1 29.58 17.67 17.33 0.767
S2 38.92 19.17 12.58 0.041
S3 65.42 38.72 28.50 0.059
S4 35.00 35.56 52.83 0.109
ALL 42.23 27.78 27.81 0.239
R1
S1 38.75 14.00 6.50 0.066
S2 22.50 21.25 17.00 0.465
S3 102.50 72.00 30.50 0.068
S4 6.75 20.00 23.25 0.144
ALL 42.63 31.81 19.31 0.068
R2
S1 33.75 18.75 11.00 0.317
S2 38.75 30.00 7.00 0.068
S3 61.50 22.50 30.00 0.655
S4 9.00 66.67 102.75 0.109
ALL 35.75 34.48 37.69 1.000
R3
S1 16.25 20.25 34.50 0.068
S2 55.50 6.25 13.75 0.353
S3 32.25 21.67 25.00 0.715
S4 89.25 20.00 32.50 1.000
ALL 48.31 17.04 26.44 0.715
Notes: Market liquidity data as measured by the Relative insider spread (RIS) for all three
market types (’HRA’, ’MRA’ and ’LRA’) by dividend regime (’ALL’ indicates all dividend
regimes combined while ’R1’, ’R2’ and ’R3’ indicate dividend Regimes 1, 2 and 3 respectively)
and subdivided by sessions (Session 1, 2, 3 and 4 as well as ’ALL’ indicating the average over
all 4 sessions). The final column ’H=L’ contains the Wilcoxon p-value for the test RISHRA =
RISLRA.
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5MRA to the LRA markets both for all regimes combined (p = 0.727) as well
as for Regime 1 (p = 0.777), Regime 2 (p = 0.525) and Regime 3 (p = 0.548)
in isolation. At the session levels we find the same sharp contrast between
Session 1 and 2 on the one hand and Session 3 and 4 on the other that
was also found for the transaction price data in section 5.4.1.1. Namely, we
again see results that are mostly in accordance with Hypothesis 1a for the
first two sessions—with HRA market bids being lower than LRA market
bids—whereas the opposite holds for the final two sessions (also see Figure
D.5).
Table 5.6: Bid and ask prices
Bid price Ask price
Regime Session HRA MRA LRA H=L HRA MRA LRA H=L
ALL
S1 360.45 384.37 383.05 0.099 396.04 443.96 507.98 0.002
S2 333.71 321.80 422.96 0.002 396.37 376.53 451.80 0.002
S3 384.14 410.68 354.24 0.008 459.89 434.65 421.11 0.007
S4 415.94 401.09 370.53 0.002 481.34 430.24 442.77 0.002
ALL 373.56 379.49 382.69 0.239 433.41 421.34 455.92 0.004
R1
S1 365.71 381.91 357.68 0.715 401.96 420.57 489.80 0.068
S2 316.50 296.67 419.86 0.068 365.00 338.50 446.69 0.068
S3 362.36 357.81 339.04 0.144 434.94 412.87 400.31 0.068
S4 392.70 360.86 338.69 0.068 462.04 441.88 433.21 0.068
ALL 359.32 349.31 363.82 0.715 415.99 403.46 442.50 0.068
R2
S1 318.75 353.07 381.83 0.068 354.62 451.13 537.52 0.068
S2 307.86 291.07 427.81 0.068 386.23 372.37 449.30 0.068
S3 377.09 445.33 324.14 0.068 468.00 453.85 401.39 0.068
S4 429.07 383.00 373.77 0.068 495.29 393.14 451.96 0.068
ALL 358.19 368.12 376.89 0.144 426.03 417.62 460.04 0.068
R3
S1 396.88 418.14 409.64 0.273 431.56 460.18 496.61 0.068
S2 376.79 377.67 421.21 0.068 437.87 418.71 459.41 0.144
S3 412.95 428.88 399.56 0.273 476.74 437.24 461.64 0.465
S4 426.04 459.41 399.11 0.068 486.68 455.71 443.14 0.068
ALL 403.16 421.02 407.38 0.715 458.21 442.96 465.20 0.273
Notes: Individual bid and ask data for all three market types (’HRA’, ’MRA’ and ’LRA’) by
dividend regime (’ALL’ indicates all dividend regimes combined while ’R1’, ’R2’ and ’R3’
indicate dividend Regimes 1, 2 and 3 respectively) and subdivided by sessions (Session 1, 2,
3 and 4 as well as ’ALL’ indicating the average over all 4 sessions). The final columns “H=L”
in the right and left panels contain the Wilcoxon p-values for the tests BIDHRA = BIDLRA
and ASKHRA = ASKLRA respectively.
The results from the right panel of Table 5.6 show a negative relationship
between risk aversion and ask prices in line with Hypothesis 1b. Specifically,
we find the difference between the LRA and HRA markets to be positive
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and significant for all regimes combined (p = 0.004) as well as for Regime
1 and Regime 2 (p = 0.068 for both regimes). For Regime 3 we do find
a slight positive though non-significant difference (p = 0.273). A Cuzick’s
trend test for an increasing trend in ask prices from the HRA, through the
MRA to the LRA markets yields a significant result for all dividend regimes
combined (p = 0.021) but fails to find a significant trend for and Regime 1
(p = 0.128), Regime 2 (p = 0.147) and Regime 3 (p = 0.437) in isolation.
Looking at individual sessions we again find that our results are only in
line with Hypothesis 1b for the first two sessions while in the final two
sessions the ask prices are higher in the HRA than in the LRA markets for
all dividend regimes (also see Figure D.7).
Specification (1) and (2) in table 5.7 provide the random effects regres-
sions with the bid price as dependent variable whereas in specification (3)
and (4) the prices of submitted asks are the dependent.88 In parallel with
the regression in Table 5.3, the subjects’ individual BRET score, k, relates to
our main treatment effect and is therefore again our main interest in all four
models. From both Hypotheses 1a and 1b we expect a positive coefficient for
k as a higher k indicates a lower individual level of risk aversion and hence
higher prices of both submitted bids and asks.
Specification (1) and (2) show that, contrary to Hypothesis 1a, there is
no effect of the individual BRET score ’k’ on the bid price with coefficients
even being negative in both specifications. We do however find a signifi-
cant and positive relationship between both our male dummy as well as the
experience of our subjects and bid prices in specification (2). Finally, the
results from specification (3) and (4) result in a rejection of Hypothesis 1b
with the coefficient for k being non-significant in both specifications. Con-
trary to specifications (1) and (2) however, the coefficients for k are positive
in both models. Finally, unlike specification (1) and (2) we do not observe
any relationship between the price of submitted asks and any of our control
variables added in specification (4).
88Multilevel specifications with a random intercept at the market level yield similar out-
comes for all 4 specifications. Specifically, a LR test of the random effects models versus the
multilevel model was not significant at the 5% level for all specifications (p = 1.00, p = 1.00,
p = 0.058 and p = 0.094 for specification 1-4 respectively).
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5Table 5.7: Individual level regressions: bids and asks
Bid price Ask price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
k -0.55 -0.65 0.76 0.91
(0.66) (0.65) (0.58) (0.62)
Experience 5.06∗∗∗ 0.68
(0.78) (0.91)
Low dividend 5.28 9.41
(5.43) (6.44)
Male 28.41∗ 1.18
(13.69) (14.24)
Age -0.91 1.26
(2.29) (2.03)
Div. Regime 2 -11.92 -26.24∗∗∗ 10.80 11.61
(6.88) (6.52) (8.45) (7.15)
Div. Regime 3 26.55∗∗∗ 29.19∗∗∗ 26.76∗∗∗ 24.45∗∗
(4.88) (5.08) (6.00) (8.14)
Session 2 -13.48 -2.39 -40.59∗∗ -47.91∗∗
(16.51) (18.20) (14.35) (15.90)
Session 3 17.30 15.49 -11.19 -13.88
(17.46) (17.86) (15.38) (16.10)
Session 4 33.85∗ 29.53 -10.74 -16.85
(16.76) (17.28) (21.24) (22.82)
Constant 395.29∗∗∗ 351.41∗∗∗ 408.03∗∗∗ 391.89∗∗∗
(29.50) (30.71) (22.50) (28.62)
Observations 750.00 688.00 810.00 734.00
Numb. clusters 95.00 95.00 94.00 94.00
WALD χ2 44.87 102.98 38.55 68.19
Prob<χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Random effects regression with individual bid price (specification 1 and 2) and ask
price (specification 3 and 4) as the dependent variable. The RHS consists of ’k’ being a
subject’s BRET score, session dummies ’Session 2’, ’Session 3’ and ’Session 4’, dividend
regime dummies ’Regime 2’ and ’Regime 3’, ’Experience’ indicating the number of periods
played by a subject, ’Low dividend’ being a dummy indicating a low dividend in the previous
period, a dummy for being male ’Male’, and finally, ’Age’ indicating the centered age of a
subject. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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5.4.2.2 Bid and ask quantities
The left panel of Table 5.8 shows that Hypothesis 2a is not supported by our
data. Specifically, when aggregating our data over all sessions and regimes
we find that the bid quantity is significantly lower in the LRA than in the
HRA markets (p = 0.050). The same result is found for the separate regimes
although this difference is only significant for Regime 3 (p = 0.068). A
Cuzick’s trend test using aggregate data for all four sessions cannot reject
the Null of no trend in bid quantities from the HRA to the LRA markets for
all regimes combined (p = 0.163) nor for Regime 1 (p = 0.986), Regime 2
(p = 0.832) and Regime 3 (p = 0.608) individually. At the session level we
Table 5.8: Bid and ask quantities
Bid quantity Ask quantity
Regime Session HRA MRA LRA H=L HRA MRA LRA H=L
ALL
S1 5.85 5.47 7.03 0.013 3.37 3.45 3.56 0.367
S2 4.29 3.46 5.00 0.239 3.58 3.93 3.56 1.000
S3 6.13 5.38 4.71 0.013 3.41 3.74 3.71 0.224
S4 8.13 4.11 6.18 0.012 4.31 3.40 2.91 0.002
ALL 6.10 4.61 5.73 0.050 3.67 3.63 3.43 0.034
R1
S1 6.50 5.18 7.20 0.095 3.30 3.75 3.80 0.144
S2 3.89 3.74 5.50 0.144 3.30 3.69 3.65 0.068
S3 6.41 4.93 4.54 0.095 3.11 3.61 3.54 0.144
S4 7.87 5.14 6.31 0.144 4.48 3.44 2.84 0.068
ALL 6.17 4.75 5.89 0.465 3.55 3.62 3.46 0.465
R2
S1 7.05 5.96 7.58 0.465 3.77 3.42 3.52 0.854
S2 3.62 3.37 5.08 0.144 3.82 3.80 3.74 0.715
S3 6.18 6.50 5.64 0.465 4.13 3.60 3.72 0.068
S4 8.36 3.95 6.45 0.144 4.14 2.95 2.70 0.068
ALL 6.30 4.95 6.19 0.465 3.96 3.44 3.42 0.068
R3
S1 4.00 5.28 6.32 0.068 3.04 3.18 3.35 0.465
S2 5.36 3.27 4.41 0.068 3.61 4.29 3.30 0.068
S3 5.81 4.72 3.96 0.068 3.00 4.00 3.86 0.068
S4 8.16 3.24 5.78 0.068 4.32 3.81 3.19 0.068
ALL 5.83 4.12 5.12 0.068 3.49 3.82 3.42 0.465
Notes: Individual bid and ask quantity data for all three market types (’HRA’, ’MRA’ and
’LRA’) by dividend regime (’ALL’ indicates all dividend regimes combined while ’R1’, ’R2’
and ’R3’ indicate dividend Regimes 1, 2 and 3 respectively) and subdivided by sessions
(Session 1, 2, 3 and 4 as well as ’ALL’ indicating the average over all 4 sessions). The fi-
nal columns “H=L” in the right and left panels contain the Wilcoxon p-values for the tests
Bid quantityHRA = Bid quantityLRA and Ask quantityHRA = Ask quantityLRA respectively.
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5find that the results are generally in line with Hypothesis 2a for the first two
sessions while the opposite holds true for the final two sessions (also see
Figure D.6).
The right panel of Table 5.8 mirrors the results found for the bid quantity
data when looking at data aggregated over all sessions; contrary to Hypothe-
sis 2b, the ask quantity is significantly higher in the HRA than the LRA mar-
kets for all regimes combined (p = 0.034) as well as for Regime 2 (p = 0.068)
in isolation. We observe the same though non-significant difference between
the HRA and LRA markets of Regime 1 and Regime 2 (p = 0.465 for both
regimes). Moreover, using a Cuzick’s trend test we cannot reject a trend
of increasing ask quantities from the LRA through the MRA to the HRA
markets when aggregating the data over all regimes (p = 0.010) nor when
looking at Regime 2 (p = 0.004) individually. However, the Null of no trend
cannot be rejected for Regime 1 (p = 0.416) and Regime 3 (p = 0.791). Fi-
nally, we again observe large difference between the four sessions with only
Session 4 showing a clear trend of decreasing ask quantities from the HRA
to the LRA markets that conflicts with Hypothesis 2b (also see Figure D.8).
In line with the results from Table 5.8, Table 5.9 shows that, contrary
to Hypothesis 2a, the coefficient for risk aversion k is negative and non-
significant in specification (1) implying that there is no relationship between
individual risk preferences and bid quantities in our data. Adding the con-
trols in specification (2) does not change this results but we do find find
males to make significantly more bids than women as well as a significant
negative effect of a subject’s age on the bid quantity.
Specification (3) again confirms the results from Table 5.8 with the co-
efficient for risk aversion k being negative and non-significant. The same
result holds for specification (4) in which we too observe a negative and
non-significant coefficient for risk aversion. We can thus conclude that both
specification (3) and specification (4) exhibit no evidence of any relationship
between risk preferences and ask quantities as would be expected from Hy-
pothesis 2b. Parallel to the results in specification (2), we do find males to be
more active in our markets than females as they submit significantly higher
ask quantities. This higher market activity by males in terms of both the
number of bids ans asks submitted is in line with the results of Fellner and
Maciejovsky (2007).
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Table 5.9: Individual level regressions: bid and ask quantity
Bid quantity Ask quantity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
k -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01
(0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Experience 0.08 0.01
(0.04) (0.01)
Low dividend 0.26 -0.04
(0.20) (0.08)
Male 3.36∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗
(0.73) (0.26)
Age -0.25∗ 0.01
(0.11) (0.05)
Div. Regime 2 0.60 0.30 0.01 -0.02
(0.31) (0.28) (0.09) (0.09)
Div. Regime 3 -0.19 -0.18 0.07 0.07
(0.26) (0.32) (0.09) (0.09)
Session 2 -1.55 -0.23 0.16 0.62
(1.30) (1.20) (0.41) (0.40)
Session 3 -0.42 -0.17 -0.00 0.30
(1.27) (1.17) (0.44) (0.37)
Session 4 0.61 0.21 0.29 0.38
(1.46) (1.34) (0.41) (0.34)
Constant 7.17∗∗∗ 4.70∗∗ 4.07∗∗∗ 3.15∗∗∗
(1.83) (1.66) (0.61) (0.52)
Observations 750.00 688.00 810.00 734.00
Numb. clusters 95.00 95.00 94.00 94.00
WALD χ2 17.65 46.31 2.56 30.33
Prob<χ2 0.01 0.00 0.86 0.00
Notes: Random effects regression with individual bid quantity (specification 1 and 2) and
ask quantity (specification 3 and 4) as the dependent variable. The RHS consists of ’k’ being
a subject’s BRET score, session dummies ’Session 2’, ’Session 3’ and ’Session 4’, dividend
regime dummies ’Regime 2’ and ’Regime 3’, ’Experience’ indicating the number of periods
played by a subject, ’Low dividend’ being a dummy indicating a low dividend in the previous
period, a dummy for being male ’Male’, and finally, ’Age’ indicating the centered age of a
subject. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
119
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55.5 Discussion and conclusion
Contrary to the hypotheses formulated in Section 5.2, we find little to no
relationship between risk attitudes and market behavior in any of the divi-
dend regimes in isolation nor for all regimes combined. We do however find
large differences between the four different sessions. Namely, while we find
some evidence in favor of Hypotheses 1, 1a and 1b in Sessions 1 and 2, no
such evidence is found in Sessions 3 and 4. Furthermore, we find little to no
evidence for Hypotheses 2, 2a and 2b in any of the four sessions. We how-
ever do not believe that the the order of dividend regimes—this being the
only difference between the first two and final two sessions—should affect
the relative standing of the LRA, MRA and HRA markets in terms of any of
the dependent variables we are interested in.
A first explanation for the lack of a relationship between risk attitudes
and market behavior and outcomes found in our study might be provided
by Anzoni and Zeisberger (2016). They argue that the traditional definition
of risk as the volatility of stock returns does not correspond to how sub-
jects in their experiments actually perceive risk. Specifically, using a battery
of different return distributions it is found that the subjects focus almost
exclusively on the potential losses’ profile rather than the volatility of re-
turns. Anzoni and Zeisberger (2016) find an almost perfect correlation of
0.99 between the perceived riskiness and the loss probability of a return
distribution while either no or only a relatively weak relationship is found
between perceived riskiness and volatility and skewness respectively. As we
do not introduce the option of losses in our experimental design in neither
the BRET nor the experimental markets it might well be that our experimen-
tal approach focuses on the wrong type of risk.
However, as Ang and Schwarz (1985), Fellner and Maciejovsky (2007)
and Breaban and Noussair (2014) study markets in which losses are not
possible either but still find an effect of risk attitudes, the operationalization
of risk aversion cannot be the only explanation for our results. A possible
second explanation might be related to the differences between call markets
and double auctions in terms of allocational efficiency, liquidity and bubble
formation found in Friedman (1993), Theissen (2000) and Baghestanian et al.
(2014) respectively. Namely, it might well be that some unique feature of the
call market institution explains our result. For instance, and as also posited
in section 5.1, the relatively simple structure of the call market might reduce
the effect of risk aversion on trading compared to the more dynamic and
informational intensive double auction market.
120
We should note that a limitation of our current study is the relatively low
number of observations which makes it difficult to state with full certainty
that risk preferences, with risk defined as the volatility of dividend pay-outs,
have no effect on market behavior in call markets. Especially with the large
differences between our four sessions we believe that expanding the number
of observations is therefore of critical importance to further research the
link between risk preferences and call market behavior. Given the above,
additional avenues for future research could consist of using different risk
measures or broadening our definition of risk by explicitly allowing for the
probability of a loss.
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Chapter 6
Discussion and conclusion
6.1 Summary
The central theme of this thesis has been the influence of individual char-
acteristics on both individual market behavior and, especially, aggregate
market outcomes. Instead of drawing conclusions regarding the influence
of individual characteristics on market outcomes based on non-aggregated
individual behavior as done in many previous experimental studies, the
two-staged experimental method used in this thesis allows for a more direct
test of such a relationship. Specifically, through the ex-ante composition of
experimental markets that differ only in terms of the degree to which a cer-
tain individual characteristic is present, we can directly study the linkages
between individual characteristics and market outcomes. Hence, this the-
sis adds to the current (experimental) literature by providing a clear test on
how individual traits aggregate and how this aggregated behavior influences
market performance and the efficient allocation of capital.
In our second chapter we have applied the two-staged experimental
method to study the influence of speculative tendencies on trading behavior
and, especially, bubble formation in SSW markets. Although theoretically
speculation is believed to have a large impact on bubble formation (see for
instance De Long et al., 1990a), we are the first to directly study this in-
fluence. With the use of our novel Speculation Elicitation Task (SET), we
are able to measure speculative tendencies at the individual level and hence
compose asset markets consisting of ever more speculative traders. We argue
that the rationale for speculation in the SET is the same as that in the SSW
asset markets. Namely, in both settings speculation can satisfy an individual
rationality constraint as long as one believes the probability of reselling to
a ’greater fool’ is high enough. Our results lend strong credibility to the
aforementioned theoretical models of speculation; we indeed observe sig-
nificantly stronger bubble formation in highly speculative markets than in
those markets containing subject with low SET-scores. Moreover, we find
that SET-scores are unrelated to bubble formation in markets in which re-
selling is not possible.
In Chapter 3 we have applied our composition methodology in order to
study the effect of disposition attitudes on both individual trading behavior
and price underreaction following the injection of private price informa-
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6tion into asset markets. We do so by creating markets with a number of
insiders who receive a signal on the ending dividend halfway through trad-
ing. Our treatment effect is the average disposition attitude of these insiders
which are measured using a novel experimental task. Although disposition
attitudes have been both theoretically and experimentally linked to price un-
derreaction following new price information, this has always been under the
assumption of public price information. We argue that both from a practical
as well as a theoretical standpoint it is interesting to instead study the effect
of disposition attitudes on price underreaction following private instead of
public information regarding the future dividend. Our results show that
although insider trading behavior in terms of both quantity as well as price
related variables are in line with disposition attitudes, price underreaction
seems only mildly stronger in the high disposition insider markets.
Chapter 4 studies the relationship between risk attitudes and overbid-
ding in first price sealed bid (FPSB) auctions. Theoretically, risk aversion
has been linked to overbidding by among others Cox et al. (1982a) but more
recent experimental tests of this relationship discard this explanation and
argue that for instance regret aversion might be a better explanation for the
observed overbidding. However, as these more recent studies have not yet
directly tested for the influence of risk aversion, we take up this task by com-
posing auction markets with average increasing risk aversion. Risk aversion
is measured in the first stage of our experiments by means of the Bomb Risk
Elicitation Task (BRET) developed in Crosetto and Filippin (2013). We find
that risk attitudes and overbidding are indeed related; subjects classified
as high risk averse bid significantly over the risk neutral Nash equilibrium
(RNNE) as well as significantly over the bids of the subjects classified as
being low risk averse. At the market levels this behavior results in signifi-
cantly higher overpricing in markets classified as being high risk averse than
those markets classified as being low risk averse. Finally, when introducing
the possibility of regret aversion by announcing the winning bid, we still
observe a strong and significant effect of risk aversion on bidding behavior.
While adding regret aversion increases overpricing it does not significantly
increase overbidding.
Finally, in Chapter 5 the relationship between risk attitudes and both
individual trading behavior as well as aggregate market outcomes in call
markets is studied. Theoretically there is a strong relationship between risk
attitudes and market behavior and outcomes in terms of especially price re-
lated variables. However, even though experiments lend themselves well to
study this relationship further, so far only a limited number of experimental
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studies exist on this topic. Moreover, all existing studies make use of the
double auction environment while the relationship has not been studied us-
ing call markets. We believe such a study to be long overdue as there exist
some strong differences between these two settings that might influence this
relationship. In order to measure individual risk attitudes we again make
use of the BRET that was implemented in the first stage of our experiment.
In the second stage of our experiment we used the BRET-scores in order
to compose call markets with increasing average degrees of risk aversion.
Contrary to our hypotheses, we find little to no relationship between risk at-
titudes and both individual behavior as well as aggregate market outcomes.
6.2 Policy relevance
The results from Chapter 2 point towards a strong influence of speculation
on bubble formation and subsequent crashes leading to the misallocation of
capital as well as the potential to have a destructive societal impact. As such
our results might strengthen the case for the implementation of regulations
aimed at reducing speculation. One such regulation that has received a lot of
(media) attention in recent years in the financial transaction tax (FTT) which
has been proposed by the European Commission in 2011. Besides argu-
ments related to the collection of extra taxes and harmonization of national
regulations, one of the main reasons for its implementation has been “cre-
ating appropriate disincentives for transactions that do not enhance the efficiency
of financial markets thereby complementing regulatory measures to avoid future
crises” (European Commission, 2013, p.2). Specifically, the FTT is designed
to curtail speculative high-frequency trades that aid little to overall market
liquidity. Whether or not the FTT will become a reality is still uncertain
at the time of writing, however its implementation is not aided by the low
degree of agreement on the effectiveness of such a tax both politically and
scientifically (see for instance Umlauf, 1993; Hanke et al., 2010; Anthony
et al., 2012).
Chapter 3 shows that disposition attitudes can have a strong influence
on both individual trading behavior and market efficiency. At the indi-
vidual level, having a high degree of disposition bias can seriously hurt
an investor’s performance through either holding losers too long or selling
winners too soon. For instance, Heisler (1994) finds that investment success
is negatively correlated with the amount of disposition bias present. More-
over, realizing only gains while not realizing losers also leads to paying too
much capital gain taxes as shown in Poterba (1987). Given the large influ-
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6ence of the disposition bias on investor performance, it is important to be
able to try and correct this bias at an individual level. Moreover, as shown
in Chapter 3, these individual biases also impact the efficiency of markets
at an aggregate level which is potentially an even bigger concern for policy
makers. A first step in such a process is identifying the bias. We believe that
our experimental task might help in doing so. Our measurement method
might be especially attractive as it is able to discern between the disposition
effect in the gain and loss domain, thereby allowing for more customized
advice to investors regarding their individual caveats.
With many transaction being executed with the use of auctions, the re-
sults from Chapter 4 are highly relevant. For instance, from the point of
view of a seller it is important to know how to set up an auction in such a
way as to maximize the selling price. Maskin and Riley (1984) find that the
best auction structure (in terms of maximizing revenue) from a seller’s per-
spective in the case of risk averse buyers is a first price sealed bid auction.
However, this result hinges on the positive relationship between risk aver-
sion and bid prices that has been strengthened by our experimental results.
Moreover, our results also lend further credibility to other theoretical re-
sults related to market uncertainty that flow from the relationship between
risk aversion and bidding behavior. For instance, McAfee and McMillan
(1987) find that not revealing the number of participants—and thus increas-
ing uncertainty—increases seller revenue. Conversely, providing an option
for buyers to reduce uncertainty will also increase seller revenues. For in-
stance, Reynolds and Wooders (2009) find that incorporating a ’buy now’
option increases seller revenue in internet auctions.
Finally, although the results in Chapter 5 do not point towards a strong
link between risk attitudes and individual market behavior and aggregate
market outcomes, this result might still prove important for future policy de-
cisions regarding market structures. Particularly, the fact that other earlier
studies do find evidence of such a relationship in double auction markets
might strengthen the findings of among others Friedman (1993) and Füll-
brunn et al. (2014) regarding the large difference between the double auc-
tion and call market designs in terms of both individual trading behavior
and aggregate market outcomes. Capital markets fulfill a hugely important
role in the efficient allocation of capital and as such it is very important to
know how heterogeneity in terms of individual characteristics aggregates in
these markets. I hope to have added to this understanding by means of the
results presented in Chapter 5.
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6.3 Limitations
As all four studies in this thesis make use of the ex-ante composition of
markets, the limitations of this method apply to all of them. One major
critique that could be levied relates to the fact that our experiments are
in fact quasi-experiments as the composition of our markets is non-random.
Because of the non-random composition it is hard to state with certainty that
the differences in the treatment variables that occur between markets can
indeed be held responsible for the observed variation in outcomes in these
markets. It might be that a third variable is correlated with the treatment
variable and as such could drive (part) of our results. In Chapter 2 we
explicitly tackle this threat to internal validity by running some additional
markets in which subjects were either buyers or sellers meaning reselling
opportunities did not exist. By implementing these markets we are able to
state with a higher degree of certainty that our Speculation Elicitation Task
indeed measures speculative tendencies. However, with limited means in
terms of both time and money we have not been able to implement similar
controls in the other studies (yet). In case of Chapters 4 and 5 we are dealing
with a well validated task (the BRET) alleviating some of the problems but in
Chapter 3 we make use of a novel measure. In the case of Chapter 3 however,
we do observe results that are strongly in line with subjects’ disposition
scores in our markets lending strong credibility to the task itself.
A further limitation related to Chapters 4 and 5 is that our way of mea-
suring risk aversion in is just one of the many different procedures that
can be used. It remains to be seen whether our results replicate when us-
ing different procedures as risk attitudes seem far from stable across com-
monly used tasks. Berg et al. (2005) for instance show that individual risk
preferences obtained from English clock auctions, first-price auctions and a
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure differ significantly. Also, Deck et al.
(2010) show that while risk attitudes elicited by the Holt and Laury task and
the Eckel and Grossman task are weakly though significantly correlated (a
result seconded in Reynaud and Couture, 2012), outcomes from both tasks
do not correlate with those obtained from the Balloon Analogue Risk Task
and a version of the ’Deal or No Deal’ TV show. A comparison of the BRET
with other tasks by Crosetto and Filippin (2015) shows that choices in the
BRET are generally more risk loving than those in the Holt and Laury and
Eckel and Grossman tasks but more risk averse than those in the Balloon
Task. Finally, Alexy et al. (2016) find no correlation between choices in the
Holt and Laury task and the BRET.
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6.3 Limitations
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6Although the benefits of using experiments can insure a high level of
internal validity, there are also a number of limitations related to our exper-
iments’ external validity. For instance, the subjects that participated in our
experiments have all been recruited from the same subject pool that includes
a relatively homogeneous part of the general population. Besides our subject
pool there are numerous other factors that cause our experimental set-up to
differ from the real-life environment it tries to study. For instance, our mar-
kets only have a small number of participants, a limited number of assets
and lack common real-life features such as short selling and margin trading.
There is however no way around this problem even when experiments are
programmed in such a way to resemble real markets and subjects are prop-
erly incentivized. However, although perhaps in some aspects far removed
from the environment they try to study, we believe that our experiments can
serve as a wind tunnel for testing economic theories (also see Croson and
Gächter, 2010). Specifically, we argue that instead of uncovering the exact
magnitude of the studied relationships, our experiments rather tell us some-
thing about the direction of these relationships. Moreover, many economic
phenomena, especially those related to competitive market outcomes, seem
rather robust to different market environments (Davis and Holt, 1993).
A final practical limitation of the studies in this thesis is related to the
amount of observations obtained from our experiments. As we are using
relatively expensive experiments to obtain our data we are sadly restricted in
the amount of experiments we can run. Compared to the use of for instance
archival data sets this implies that we are forced to draw our conclusions
from a relatively small sample.
6.4 Suggestions for future research
From the above mentioned limitations directly flow some suggestions for
future research. For instance, given the low correlation between the dif-
ferent risk measurement tasks discussed above, it would be interesting to
see whether the results obtained in Chapter 4 replicate. Moreover, it might
alleviate some of the issues related to running a quasi-experiment. Specifi-
cally, if our results would replicate this would dismiss any explanation for
our results that is based on confounding factors that are solely related to the
BRET. Similar arguments apply to Chapter 5; here too it would be interesting
to see whether using different risk measurement procedures might produce
different results.
One of the contributions of this thesis is the introduction of two new
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experimental tasks: the SET to measure speculative tendencies in Chapter
2 and a novel lottery task used to measure disposition attitudes in Chapter
3. These measures too could benefit from additional robustness checks. For
instance, we could replicate Chapter 2 using different fundamental value
paths in order to assess the robustness of the SET when it comes to measur-
ing speculative tendencies in environments other than SSW markets. Simi-
larly, one could assess the robustness of the lottery task from Chapter 3 to
different market environments by for instance using call markets instead of
double auctions or by using assets with an alternative dividend structure.
Furthermore, the novel tasks from Chapters 2 and 3 could both be used
as either an independent or dependent variable in new studies or be used
for more practical implications. For instance, using the SET one could create
markets with different numbers of highly speculative traders. This way, it
would be possible to study the influence of increasing degrees of specula-
tive tendencies present in a market on price dynamics. Similarly, our lottery
measure from Chapter 3 is able to discern between disposition attitudes in
the gain and loss domains. Explicitly making this distinction in future exper-
imental designs might provide more detailed results regarding phenomena
that have been related to disposition attitudes at both the individual trader
level as well as the aggregate market level. Also, both the SET as well as
the lottery task might be used as a screening/assessment tool used in the
hiring process of professionals in different industries or as a tool to be used
to advice individual investors based on their characteristics measured with
the use of these tasks.
Finally, given the relatively low sample size of studies in this thesis it
would be helpful to conduct further experiments in order to strengthen the
results found. This seems especially true given the finding by Camerer et al.
(2016) that sample sizes are strongly correlated with replicability. Also, re-
running our experiments with different subject groups, such as for instance
professional traders, would possibly aid the external validity of our results.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Instructions: SET & Belief elicitation
A.1.1 SET instructions
Instructions for part 1 of the experiment
Welcome to this market game. Please read carefully the following instruc-
tions. They are identical for all participants. Please do not communicate
with the other participants, stay quiet, and turn off your mobile phone dur-
ing the game. If you have questions, please raise your hand. An instructor
will come and answer. This first game will last approximately half an hour,
including the reading of the instructions.
1. The Exchange Process
To play this game, the computer creates groups of three traders. Each trader
is endowed with one euro which can be used to buy an asset. Your task
during the game is thus to choose whether you want to buy or not the asset.
This asset does not generate any dividend. If the asset price exceeds one
euro, you can still buy the asset. We indeed consider that a financial partner
(who is not part of the game) provides you with the additional capital and
shares profits with you according to the respective capital invested. The
market proceeds sequentially. The first trader is proposed to buy at a price
P1. If he buys, he proposes to sell the asset to the second trader at a price
which is ten times higher, P2 = 10*P1. If the second trader accepts to buy,
the first trader ends up the game with 10 euros. The second trader then
proposes to sell the asset to the third trader at a price P3 = 10*P2 = 100*P1. If
the third trader buys the asset, the second trader ends up the game with 10
euros. The third trader does not find anybody to whom he can sell the asset
as he is last. Since this asset does not generate any dividend, he ends up
the game with 0 euro. If you do not or cannot buy the asset – respectively
because you choose not to buy or because the person before you in line
does not offer you the asset – you end the game with 3 euros. This game is
summarized in the following figure:
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At the beginning of the game, traders do not know their position in the
market sequence. Positions are randomly determined with one chance out
of three for each trader to be first, second or third.
2. Proposed prices
The price P1 that is proposed to the first trader is random. This price is a
power of 10 and is determined as follows:
P1 Probability that this P1 is realized
1 15 %
10 20 %
100 30 %
1.000 20 %
10.000 15 %
traders decisions are made simultaneously and privately. For example, if
the first price P1 = 1 has been drawn, the prices that are simultaneously
proposed to the three traders are: P1= 1 for the first trader, P2= 10 for the
second trader, andP3 = 100 for the third trader. Identically, if the first price
P1 = 10.000 has been drawn, the prices that are simultaneously proposed
to the three traders are: P1= 10.000 for the first trader, P2= 100.000 for the
second trader, and P3= 1.000.000 for the third trader. The prices that are
being proposed to you can give you the following information regarding
your position in the market sequence:
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• If you are proposed to buy at a price of 1, you are sure to be first;
• If you are proposed to buy at a price of 10, you have a 6/10 chance of
being first, and a 4/10 chance of being second in the sequence;
• If you are proposed to buy at a price of 100, you have a 5/10 chance of
being first, a 3/10 chance of being second and a 2/10 chance of being
last in the sequence;
• If you are proposed to buy at a price of 1.000, you have a 3/10 chance
of being first, a 4/10 chance of being second and a 3/10 chance of
being last;
• If you are proposed to buy at a price of 10.000, you have a 2/10 chance
of being first, a 3/10 chance of being second and a 5/10 chance of
being last in the sequence;
• If you are proposed to buy at a price of 100.000, you have a 4/10 chance
of being second and a 6/10 chance of being last in the sequence;
• If you are proposed to buy at a price of 1.000.000, you are sure to be
last in the sequence.
Please note that all your decisions are completely anonymous as we do not
work with names but with numbers.
Are there any questions?
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A.1.2 SET test questions (shown on screen and discussed afterwards)
1) What is the probability of being third in line when you have not been
offered a price yet?
-Options (correct option underlined): 100%, 75%, 10%, 33.33%
2) What is the probability of the first price (P1) being 1.000?
-Options (correct option underlined): 0%, 15%, 20%, 30%
3) What is the probability of the first price (P1) being 100.000?
-Options (correct option underlined): 0%, 15%, 20%, 30%
4) If you are offered a price of 1.000, what is the probability of not being last
in line?
- Options (correct option underlined): 70%, 40%, 10%, 30%
5) What is your profit when you are first in line and buy but the person next
in line does not buy?
- Options (correct option underlined): 0 euro, 3 euro, 10 euro
6) What is your profit if you are second in line and the person before and
after you in line buy, but you do not buy?
- Options (correct option underlined): 0 euro, 3 euro, 10 euro
7) What is your profit when you are first in line, you decide to buy and the
trader next in line also buys?
- Options (correct option underlined): 0 euro, 3 euro, 10 euro
A.1.3 Further SET instructions (shown on screen)
In this experiment we will ask you for every possible price (1, 10, 100, 1.000,
10.000, 100.000, 1.000.000) whether you would want to buy or not the asset
if this price were offered to you in the game that was just explained. You
thus basically play the game not once, but for every possible price. After
you have made a decision (buy or not buy) for every possible price, there
are three further steps performed by the computer to determine your final
profit from this game:
• The computer will randomly pick one of the 7 possible prices, each
one is equally likely. Your choice (buy or not buy) at this price will be
used to determine your profit.
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• Then the computer will give you a place in line, either first, second or
third by using the probabilities of being first, second or third in line at
the chosen price from step 1. You can find these probabilities for all
possible prices in the instructions.
• The computer will couple you to two other traders to complete the
trading sequence. As was explained, your profit also depends on the
actions of these two other traders.
Please note: If you decide to buy for a price, we automatically assume you
would also want to buy for all lower prices as these are in fact less risky.
Because of this you will see a screen after you have decided to buy on which
we tell you that we assume you automatically also want to buy for all lower
prices. If this is indeed the case, simply click on "continue". However if
you want to change your previous decision you can always go back to that
decision by clicking on "change".
Figure A.1: Screenshot of the SET decision environment
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A.1.4 Belief elicitation task instructions (shown on screen)
You have just played a game where you had to decide for 7 different prices
whether or not you wanted to buy the asset. Could you indicate below for
which price you think the other participants STARTED to buy? Please do so
by assigning the number of participants who you think STARTED buying at
a particular price and then pressing the "assign" button.
For example: if you think 12 participants started buying at a price of 1.000 (which
of course means they also bought for all lower prices) you fill in 12 next the the
price of 1.000 and press assign. If you think some people never bought the asset, you
should assign them to the "never" category.
Make sure you assign ALL other participants to a category (you can check
this on the right side of your screen). You can always change your choices
by typing a different number and pressing on the "assign" button once more.
Once you have assigned all the other participants, please click the "continue"
button. You will earn 3 euros if you predict the prices at which the others
STARTED buying correctly for more than 90% of the participants, 2 euros if
you predict them correctly for between 75%-90% of the participants and 1
euro if you predict them correctly for between 50%-75% of the participants.
REMINDER: You yourself started buying at a price of : <price>
Figure A.2: Screenshot of the belief elicitation task after the SET
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A.2 Instructions: SSW & LNP asset markets
A.2.1 Sessions S1-S4 (SSW markets)
Instructions for part 2 of the experiment
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. If you
follow the instructions and make good decisions, you might earn a consid-
erable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the
experiment. The experiment will consist of a sequence of trading periods in
which you will have the opportunity to buy and sell shares. Money in this
experiment is expressed in francs (300 francs = 1 euro).
1. How to use the computerized market
The goods that can be bought and sold in the market are called ’shares’.
On the top panel of your computer screen you can see the money you have
available to buy shares and the number of shares you currently have.
If you would like to offer to sell a share, use the text area entitled “Enter Sell
price”. In that text area you can enter the price at which you are offering
to sell a share, and then select “Submit Sell Price”. Please do so now. You
will notice that around 30 numbers, one submitted by each participant, now
appear in the column entitled “Sell Price”. The lowest sell price will always
be on the top of that list and will be highlighted. If you press “BUY”, you
will buy one share for the lowest current sell price. You can also highlight
one of the other prices if you wish to buy at a price other than the lowest.
Please try to purchase a share now by highlighting a price and selecting
“BUY”. Since each of you had put a share for sale and attempted to buy
a share, if all were successful, you all have the same number of shares you
started out with. This is because you bought one share and you sold one
share.
If you would like to offer to buy a share, use the text area entitled “Enter
Buy price”. In that text area you can enter the price at which you are offer-
ing to buy a share, and then select “Submit Buy Price”. Please do so now.
You will notice that again around 30 numbers, one submitted by each par-
ticipant, now appear in the column entitled “Buy Price”. The highest price
will always be on the top of that list and will be highlighted. If you press
“SELL”, you will sell one share for the highest current buy price. You can
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also highlight one of the other prices if you wish to sell at a price other than
the highest. Please sell a share now by highlighting a price and selecting
“SELL”. Since each of you had put a share for purchase and attempted to
sell a share, if all were successful, you all have the same number of shares
you started out with. This is because you sold one share and you bought
one share.
There are 2 ways to sell a share: Choose a buy price and press “SELL” or
submit a Sell offer yourself.
There are 2 ways to buy a share: Choose a sell price and press “BUY” or
submit a buy offer yourself.
When you buy a share, your money decreases by the price of the purchase,
but your number of shares increase by one. When you sell a share, your
money increases by the price of the sale, but your number of shares decrease
by one. Purchase prices are displayed in the middle section of your screen
and are ranked by price. You will now have a practice period. Your actions in
the practice period do not count toward your earnings and do not influence
your position later in the experiment. The goal of the practice period is only
to master the use of the interface. Please be sure that you have successfully
submitted buy prices and sell prices. Also be sure that you have accepted
both buy and sell prices. You are free to ask questions, by raising your hand
during the practice period.
2. Specific instructions for this experiment
The experiment will consist of 15 trading periods, you will receive 2500
francs in money as well as two shares at the beginning of the experiment.
Each period lasts for 180 seconds, in which you may buy and sell shares.
Shares are assets with a life of 15 periods, and your inventory of shares
carries over from one trading period to the next. You may receive dividends
for each share in your inventory at the end of each of the 15 trading periods.
At the end of each trading period, including period 15 the computer ran-
domly draws a dividend for the period. Each period, each share you hold at
the end of the period:
• earns you a dividend of 0 francs with a probability of 25%
• earns you a dividend of 8 francs with a probability of 25%
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• earns you a dividend of 28 francs with a probability of 25%
• earns you a dividend of 60 francs with a probability of 25%
Each of the four numbers is equally likely. The average expected dividend in
each period is 24. The dividend is added to your cash balance automatically.
After the last dividend is paid at the end of period 15, there will be no
further earnings possible from shares.
3. Average Holding Value Table
You can use the following table to help you make decisions:
Ending Current Number of
×
Average Dividend
=
Average Value per
Period Period Holding Periods per Period Share in Inventory
15 1 15 × 24 = 360
15 2 14 × 24 = 336
15 3 13 × 24 = 312
15 4 12 × 24 = 288
15 5 11 × 24 = 264
15 6 10 × 24 = 240
15 7 9 × 24 = 216
15 8 8 × 24 = 192
15 9 7 × 24 = 168
15 10 6 × 24 = 144
15 11 5 × 24 = 120
15 12 4 × 24 = 96
15 13 3 × 24 = 72
15 14 2 × 24 = 48
15 15 1 × 24 = 24
There are 5 columns in the table. The first column, labeled ’Ending Period’,
indicates the last trading period of the experiment. The second column, la-
beled ’Current Period’, indicates the period during which the average hold-
ing value is being calculated. The third column gives the number of holding
periods from the period in the second column until the end of the experi-
ment. The fourth column, labeled ’Average Dividend per Period’, gives the
average amount that the dividend will be in each period for each unit held
in your inventory. The fifth column, labeled ’Average Holding Value Per
Unit of Inventory’, gives the average value for each unit held in your inven-
tory from now until the end of the experiment. That is, for each unit you
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hold in your inventory for the remainder of the experiment, you will earn
on average the amount listed in column 5.
Suppose for example that there are 7 periods remaining. Since the dividend
on a Share has a 25% chance of being 0, a 25% chance of being 8, a 25%
chance of being 28 and a 25% chance of being 60 in any period, the dividend
is on average 24 per period for each Share. If you hold a Share for 7 periods,
the total dividend for the Share over the 7 periods is on average 7*24 = 168.
Therefore, the total value of holding a Share over the 7 periods is on average
168.
4. Making predictions
In addition to the money you earn from dividends and trading, you can
make money by accurately forecasting the average trading price for the next
period. You will indicate your forecasts before each period begins on the
computer screen. The money you receive from your forecasts will be calcu-
lated in the following manner :
Accuracy Your Earnings
Within 10% of actual average price 50 francs
Within 25% of actual average price 20 francs
Within 50% of actual average price 10 francs
5. Your earnings
Your earnings for this part of the experiment will equal the amount of cash
that you have at the end of period 15, after the last dividend has been paid,
plus the money you made with your price predictions. The amount of cash
you will have is equal to:
Money you have at the beginning of the experiment (=2500 francs) + Divi-
dends you receive + Money received from sales of shares - Money spent on
purchases of shares + Earnings from all price predictions
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A.2.2 Sessions S5-S7 (LNP markets)
4. Specific Instructions for Trading
In the training period you were able to buy and sell. However, in the fol-
lowing 15 periods you are either a buyer OR a seller during the remainder
of the experiment (all 15 periods!). This means that you can only buy shares
(when you are a buyer) OR only sell shares (when you are a seller). Thus:
- If you are a buyer you are able to buy only, meaning you can make an offer
to buy a share or you can click the BUY button to buy for the lowest current
price. You thus can’ t sell your shares!
- If you are seller you are able to sell only, meaning you make an offer to sell
a share or you can click the SELL button to sell for the highest current price.
You thus can’t buy shares!
Half of all participants are a buyer and the other half are a seller. If you
are a buyer and you buy a share you have to hold it until the end of the
experiment and earn the dividends. If you are a seller and sell a share you
cannot buy it back and you thus receive no dividends from the sold share
for the rest of the experiment.
5. Your earnings
Your earnings for this part of the experiment will equal the amount of cash
that you have at the end of period 15, after the last dividend:
When you are a seller: Money you have at the beginning of the experiment
(=2500 francs) + Dividends you receive +Money received from sales of shares
When you are a buyer: Money you have at the beginning of the experiment
(=2500 francs) + Dividends you receive - Money spent on purchases of shares
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hold in your inventory for the remainder of the experiment, you will earn
on average the amount listed in column 5.
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purchases of shares + Earnings from all price predictions
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A.2.2 Sessions S5-S7 (LNP markets)
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A.3 Instructions: Risk attitudes & CRT
A.3.1 Risk attitude elicitation instructions (shown on screen)
On the left side of the screen you see 10 lines with two lotteries per line:
"Lottery A" and "Lottery B". Both lotteries have two potential outcomes. For
every one of the 10 lines, either choose lottery A or lottery B, depending on
which lottery you would rather participate in. Once you have filled in your
choice for all 10 lines, please click on the "Continue" button. 1 out of the
lines will be chosen at random and you will participate automatically in the
lottery you chose at that line (either A or B). You will receive the amount of
money that will follow from the outcome of your chosen lottery.
Figure A.3: Screenshot of the Holt & Laury task
160
A.3.2 CRT instructions (shown on screen)
Please answer the following three questions. You will receive 1.5 euro per
correct answer and you have 3 minutes to answer the questions.
• A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball.
How much (in whole cents) does the ball cost?
• If it takes five machines five minutes to make five bottles, how long (in
minutes) would it take 100 machines to make 100 bottles?
• In a lake, there is an oil stain. Every day, the stain doubles in size. If it
takes 48 days for the stain to cover the entire lake, how long (in days)
would it take for the stain to cover half the lake?
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A.4 Calculation of optimal buying prices
A.4.1 Calculation of optimal buying prices
We assume an expected utility framework with risk neutrality, which is a
conservative assumption in our setting (see further below), and compute
the individually optimal buying price as follows. For each subject we first
determine for each possible buying price i (with i = 1, denoting P = 1, i =
2, denoting P = 10, ....i = 7 denoting P = 1, 000, 000) the probability of some-
one buying both before and after a subject n, denoted by Pr(bi,n) and Pr(ai,n)
respectively, given that subject’s beliefs about the buying decisions of his
N − 1 fellow participants in a session (taking into account the probabilities
of being 1st, 2nd and 3rd at that particular price). For instance, to deter-
mine the probability of someone buying after subject n at a price of P = 100,
we first divide the amount of traders believed by subject n to buy at prices
higher than P = 100 by N and subsequently multiply this number with the
probability not to be last at this price (which equals 0.8 at P = 100).
We then calculate the expected earnings from buying at price i for subject
n, E(Ei,n), as: E(Ei,n) = 10 Pr(bi,n)Pr(ai,n) + 3(1− Pr(bi,n)). The earnings
at each possible buying price i are equal to E(Ei,n) when subject n buys
and equal to 3 when the subject does not buy. Finally, because buying at
some price i automatically implies buying at all prices< i, the total expected
earnings for subject n, denoted E(TEi,n), when starting to buy at some price i
are equal to: E(TEi,n) = ∑i1
1
7E(Ei,n) + (7− i) 37 . The price i at which E(TEi,n)
reaches its maximum defines the optimal buying price: E(TEi−optimal,n).
A.4.2 Optimal versus actual buying price
Table A.1 shows the percentage of subjects that bought at a particular num-
ber of steps too early/late in the SET task compared to their optimal SET-
score. For instance, when a subject has a SET-score of 4 (first bought at a
price of 1,000) while—given his/her beliefs about the SET-scores of the other
participants—his/her expected earnings (E(TEi,n)) would have been highest
at a SET-score of 3 (first buying at a price of 100), the ’SET-score differential’
is equal to (4-3=) 1. As shown in Table A.1, 81.86 percent (83.04 percent
for the first four sessions) of subjects buy at most one step away from their
optimal buying price.89
89Note that all calculations regarding the optimal buying price were made under the
assumption of risk neutrality and are thus relatively conservative compared to methods using
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Table A.1: Percentage of subjects per SET-score differential
Subjects (%)
SET-score diff. ALL S1-S4
-2 1.47 0.00
-1 4.90 5.08
0 24.02 22.03
1 52.94 55.93
2 11.76 11.02
3 4.41 5.93
4 0.49 0.00
Notes: SET-score differential is defined as the actual SET-score minus the optimal SET-score
given beliefs. N=204 for all sessions combined (’ALL’) and N=118 for the first four sessions
(’S1-S4’).
Table A.2 shows the SET-score differential per chosen SET-score, the the
average ’buy premium’ defined as the expected earnings at the actual
SET-score (E(TEi,n)) minus 3 euros (the earnings when not buying at
any price), the ’buy ratio’ defined as the the expected earnings at the
chosen SET-score divided by the earnings at the optimal switch point,
(E(TEi,n)/E(TEi−optimal,n)), and, finally, the ’marginal resale risk’ defined
as the expected probability of reselling the asset when buying at the max-
imum buy price belonging to the chosen SET-score given the beliefs about
the SET-scores of the other subjects.90
The SET-score differential shows an increasing trend in the chosen SET-
score indicating that subjects buying at higher prices in the SET seem to
be further away from their optimal buying price. However, the buy ratio
probability weighting such as cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
As probability weighting would increase especially low probabilities Pr(bi,n) and Pr(ai,n)
at which E(Ei,n) is not high enough to satisfy a trader’s individual rationality condition,
probability weighting would increase E(Ei,n) to the point where the individual rationality
condition is satisfied, increasing the percentage of optimal decisions for especially the higher
SET-score individuals.
90In order to provide an example on the calculation of the marginal resale risk assume
subject x has a SET-score of 4 at which the maximum buying price equals 1,000. Also assume
subject x beliefs 14 out of his 29 fellow participants bought at a price of 10,000 or higher. His
marginal resale risk would then be 14/29=0.48.
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Table A.2: Conditional SET outcomes by SET-score
SET-score diff. Buy ratio Buy Premium Marg. resale prob.
SET-score ALL S1-S4 ALL S1-S4 ALL S1-S4 ALL S1-S4
0 -0.64 -0.67 0.96 0.96 0.00 0.00 N/A N/A
1 -0.22 0.00 0.94 0.85 0.37 0.36 0.83 0.69
2 0.29 0.08 0.97 0.98 0.80 0.97 0.77 0.81
3 0.66 0.67 0.97 0.98 1.40 1.46 0.74 0.77
4 1.24 1.21 0.94 0.95 1.71 1.74 0.65 0.67
5 1.72 1.64 0.92 0.93 1.56 1.40 0.36 0.38
6 2.00 3.00 0.94 0.93 2.34 1.74 0.46 0.21
7 - - - - - - - -
Notes: All expected earnings (both at the optimal and at the actual buy price) are calculated
as explained in this appendix and are conditional on a subject’s own beliefs about the actions
of the other subjects. The ’SET-score differential’ is defined as the actual SET-score minus the
optimal SET-score given beliefs about the SET-scores of the other subjects. The ’buy ratio’ is
defined as the expected earnings at the chosen SET-score divided by the expected earnings at
the optimal SET-score. The ’buy premium’ is defined as the expected earnings at the actual
SET-score given beliefs about the SET-scores of the other participants minus 3 euros (the
earnings when not buying at any price). Finally, the ’marginal resale probability’ is defined
as the expected probability of reselling the asset when buying at the price belonging to the
chosen SET-score given the beliefs about the SET-scores of the other subjects. N=204 for all
sessions combined (’ALL’) and N=118 for the first four sessions (’S1-S4’).
for all SET-scores are relatively high and more importantly rather close to
each other indicating that people with higher SET-scores do not—given their
beliefs—make considerably worse choices with respect to expected earnings
than the lower SET individuals. Moreover, the buy premium is actually
mostly increasing in the chosen SET-score due to the fact that high SET
individuals expect others to buy at higher prices as well (see Table 2.3). As
the expected earnings (E(TEi,n)) are calculated over all 7 possible prices,
these more ’optimistic’ beliefs about the actions of others in the SET task
thus on average translate into a higher buy premium. Finally, although there
seems to be little difference in risk taking between between high and low
SET-score individuals when looking at the buy ratio, this picture radically
changes at the margin as shown by the marginal resale probability: higher
SET-score individuals do take a considerable higher risk at their maximum
buy price than low SET-score individuals.
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A.5 Additional tables
Table A.3: Subject pool descriptives
Mean Median Min Max Std. dev.
CRT-score 1.72 2 0 3 1.07
Risk attitude 5.69 6 0 10 1.71
General Risk 6.65 7 1 11 2.00
Age 20.77 20 17 29 2.19
Male 60.59% - - - -
Foreign 15.27% - - - -
Economics 46.30% - - - -
Notes: N=203. ’Economics’ stands for the percentage of economics students in our popula-
tion. ’Risk attitude’ represents the number of the row where a subject first switched from
lottery A to lottery B in the Holt and Laury task . ’General risk’ indicates the answer on
a Likert scale from 1 to 11 given to the question "In general, are you willing to take risks?"
from Dohmen et al. (2012); the higher the score the higher the willingness to take risks. Fi-
nally, ’CRT score’ indicates the number of questions correctly answered in the CRT test from
Frederick (2005).
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Table A.4: SET-scores
Session Market SET-Scores P-dif. Session Market SET-Scores P-dif.
S1
L vs. M 2.5 vs. 4.0 0.001
S5
L vs. M 2.4 vs. 3.7 0.002
M vs. H 4.0 vs. 4.7 0.010 M vs. H 3.7 vs. 4.4 0.017
H vs. L 4.7 vs. 2.5 0.000 H vs. L 4.4 vs. 2.4 0.000
S2
L vs. M 2.5 vs. 3.0 0.012
S6
L vs. M 1.6 vs. 3.0 0.000
M vs. H 3.0 vs. 4.2 0.000 M vs. H 3.0 vs. 4.3 0.000
H vs. L 4.2 vs. 2.5 0.000 H vs. L 4.3 vs. 1.6 0.000
S3
L vs. M 2.0 vs. 3.7 0.000
S7
L vs. M 0.4 vs. 2.6 0.000
M vs. H 3.7 vs. 4.2 0.028 M vs. H 2.6 vs. 4.0 0.000
H vs. L 4.2 vs. 2.0 0.000 H vs. L 4.0 vs. 0.4 0.000
S4
L vs. M 2.5 vs. 3.8 0.000
S5-S7
L vs. M 1.5 vs. 3.1 0.000
M vs. H 3.8 vs. 4.2 0.051 M vs. H 3.1 vs. 4.2 0.000
H vs. L 4.2 vs. 2.5 0.000 H vs. L 4.2 vs. 1.5 0.000
S1-S4
L vs. M 2.4 vs. 3.6 0.000
M vs. H 3.6 vs. 4.3 0.000
H vs. L 4.3 vs. 2.4 0.000
Notes: N=204. SET-scores per market. The ’P-dif.’ column provides the p-values obtained
by running a Mann Whitney U test on the SET-score differences between the respective
markets.
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Table A.4: SET-scores
Session Market SET-Scores P-dif. Session Market SET-Scores P-dif.
S1
L vs. M 2.5 vs. 4.0 0.001
S5
L vs. M 2.4 vs. 3.7 0.002
M vs. H 4.0 vs. 4.7 0.010 M vs. H 3.7 vs. 4.4 0.017
H vs. L 4.7 vs. 2.5 0.000 H vs. L 4.4 vs. 2.4 0.000
S2
L vs. M 2.5 vs. 3.0 0.012
S6
L vs. M 1.6 vs. 3.0 0.000
M vs. H 3.0 vs. 4.2 0.000 M vs. H 3.0 vs. 4.3 0.000
H vs. L 4.2 vs. 2.5 0.000 H vs. L 4.3 vs. 1.6 0.000
S3
L vs. M 2.0 vs. 3.7 0.000
S7
L vs. M 0.4 vs. 2.6 0.000
M vs. H 3.7 vs. 4.2 0.028 M vs. H 2.6 vs. 4.0 0.000
H vs. L 4.2 vs. 2.0 0.000 H vs. L 4.0 vs. 0.4 0.000
S4
L vs. M 2.5 vs. 3.8 0.000
S5-S7
L vs. M 1.5 vs. 3.1 0.000
M vs. H 3.8 vs. 4.2 0.051 M vs. H 3.1 vs. 4.2 0.000
H vs. L 4.2 vs. 2.5 0.000 H vs. L 4.2 vs. 1.5 0.000
S1-S4
L vs. M 2.4 vs. 3.6 0.000
M vs. H 3.6 vs. 4.3 0.000
H vs. L 4.3 vs. 2.4 0.000
Notes: N=204. SET-scores per market. The ’P-dif.’ column provides the p-values obtained
by running a Mann Whitney U test on the SET-score differences between the respective
markets.
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Table A.6: RD scores
Session Market RD scores P-dif.
S1
L vs. M 0.087 vs. 0.404 0.013
M vs. H 0.404 vs. 0.403 0.570
H vs. L 0.403 vs. 0.087 0.006
S2
L vs. M 0.207 vs. 0.099 0.650
M vs. H 0.099 vs. 0.686 0.001
H vs. L 0.686 vs. 0.207 0.013
S3
L vs. M 0.490 vs. 0.789 0.011
M vs. H 0.789 vs. 0.923 0.061
H vs. L 0.923 vs. 0.490 0.002
S4
L vs. M 0.168 vs. 0.906 0.001
M vs. H 0.906 vs. 1.068 0.023
H vs. L 1.068 vs. 0.168 0.001
S1-S4
L vs. M 0.238 vs. 0.550 0.002
M vs. H 0.550 vs. 0.770 0.001
H vs. L 0.770 vs. 0.238 0.001
Notes: N=118. RD scores per market. The ’P-dif.’ column provides the p-values obtained by
running a Wilcoxon signed rank test for RD differences (on a per period basis) between the
respective markets.
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Table A.7: Price prediction regressions
(a) (b)
Market Period trend (β ) R2 N Market FV (γ) R2 N
L
0.940***
(0.016)
0.930 482 L
1.073***
(0.035)
0.797 560
M
0.823***
(0.025)
0.845 441 M
0.882***
(0.050)
0.453 513
H
0.877***
(0.015)
0.877 464 H
0.787***
(0.047)
0.326 538
Notes: Regressions with the individual price predictions as the regressand and previous
price trends (a) and current fundamental value (b) as regressors. To test for the influence of
adaptive learning and thus the hypothesis that price predictions are a function of historical
price trends, we use an adapted form of the lag-adjustment formula used in Haruvy et al.
(2007). Specifically, we model the price prediction for period t made at the start of that same
period in market m by subject i, denoted by Bi,m,t, as follows: Bi,m,t = Ci + β periodtrend.
The variable ’periodtrend’ equals Pm,t−1 + Pm,t−1
Pm,t−1−Pm,t−2
Pm,t−2 where Pm,t stands for the median
transaction price in market m at time t. Note that we have removed the market trend
variable from the lag-adjustment formula used in Haruvy et al. (2007). This is done because
subjects in our experiment only participate in one market. Finally, to test the influence of
anchoring on the fundamental value we use the following formula: Bi,m,t = Ci + γ FVt with
FVt being the time t fundamental value. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01,**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table A.8: Market dynamics regression
Session Market aˆ bˆ N
S1-S4
L
-29.514***
(3.012)
0.205
(0.343)
52
M
-22.695**
(3.481)
1.615**
(0.389)
55
H
-20.218*
(8.491)
2.097***
(0.223)
56
ALL
-25.516***
(0.661)
1.691**
(0.344)
163
S5-S7 ALL
-23.638***
(5.295)
0.190
(0.240)
13
Notes: Regressions with the price change from period t − 1 to period t in market m as
regressand and a constant (aˆ ) as well as market pressure (bˆ ), defined as the number of bids
(Bm,t−1) minus the number of asks (Am,t−1) in period t − 1 in market m, as the regressor:
Pm,t − Pm,t−1 = aˆ + bˆ(Bm,t−1 − Am,t−1). Regression coefficients reported for market L, M
and H of S1-S4 were obtained from pooled OLS regressions (due to the low number of
observations) with reported standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for heteroskedasticity
and clustering at the session level. The coefficients reported in the ’ALL’ category of S1-S4
were obtained by running a fixed effects model on all markets from Sessions S1-S4 with
clustering at the market level and reported standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the session level. Regression coefficients reported in
the ’ALL’ category of S5-S7 were obtained from a pooled OLS regression (due to the low
number of observations) including (non-reported) session dummies with reported standard
errors (in parentheses) adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the market level.
***p < 0.01,**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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A.6 Additional figures
Figure A.4: Price prediction errors
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Notes: Prediction errors calculated as the median prediction at time t minus the median
actual price at time t for the L, M and H-markets averaged over Sessions S1-S4.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Experimental procedures
Figure B.1: Experimental procedureﬀ



Preparation stage
(welcome, reading and explaining the experimental instructions and
procedures)




Part 1: measuring individual disposition levels
(subjects face 6 sequential ambiguous lotteries, called ’series’, with four
rounds each in which subjects can either win or lose 400 ECU in each
round. Subjects decide before each round to either play or not play the
lottery)

ﬃ
ﬁ
ﬂ
Part 2: market stage
(8 trading periods, in each period subjects first trade 2 minutes, then
trading pauses and private signals are sent to insiders, trade then
continues for another 2 minutes)
ﬀ



Part 3: measuring ambiguity attitudes
(a multiple choice table with 11 rows is presented, subjects have to choose
between a risky and ambiguous lottery at each row)




Questionnaire
(some demographic questions)
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B.2 Instructions
B.2.1 Lottery task instructions
General instructions:
Thank you for participating in this experiment. By showing up on time
you receive a show-up fee of 4 euro. The purpose of this experiment is to
understand how people behave in certain situations. There are no right or
wrong answers. Please make the choice that you feel most comfortable with.
Your identity will never be revealed; others will not be able to identify you
with the choices you make.
In the experiment you will be able to make some money. The amount of
money you can make depends on your choices and some luck. The money
you earn will be immediately paid out to you in private after the experiment.
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand.
An experimenter will come to you and answer your questions individually.
Please put your cell phone on airplane mode and do not talk with other
participants in the experiment; otherwise, we may be forced to exclude you
from the experimental payment.
The experiment consists of three parts. Detailed instruction for each part
are provided below and also shown on the computer screen before that part
starts. In the experiment we talk about Experimental Currency Units (ECU)
instead of euro. The exchange rate between ECU and euro is 1000 ECU = 1
euro
174
Instructions for part 1 of the experiment:
You face six rounds in this part of the experiment. At the beginning of each
round, you receive 1600 ECU as an endowment. In each round you face a
lottery. There is a computerized bag with 10 balls, which are either black or
white but the exact composition is unknown. The contents of the bag
remain unchanged in each round. The lottery is such that you gain 400
ECU (+400 ECU) if the drawn ball is white and lose 400 ECU (- 400 ECU) if
the drawn ball is black. Here the ball is drawn with replacement. You need
to decide whether you want to play the lottery. If you decide not to play the
lottery, the round ends and the next round begins. If you decide to play the
lottery, the payment of the lottery will be immediately determined by the
computer and given to you. In each round you can play the lottery
sequentially up to four times.
At the end of the experiment, one of the six rounds will be randomly
chosen by the computer to determine your payment in part 1 of the
experiment. Your earning in this part thus equal: the payments from the
lottery of the randomly chosen round plus the 1600 ECU initial
endowment.
Figure B.2: Lottery task
175
B.2 Instructions
B.2.1 Lottery task instructions
General instructions:
Thank you for participating in this experiment. By showing up on time
you receive a show-up fee of 4 euro. The purpose of this experiment is to
understand how people behave in certain situations. There are no right or
wrong answers. Please make the choice that you feel most comfortable with.
Your identity will never be revealed; others will not be able to identify you
with the choices you make.
In the experiment you will be able to make some money. The amount of
money you can make depends on your choices and some luck. The money
you earn will be immediately paid out to you in private after the experiment.
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand.
An experimenter will come to you and answer your questions individually.
Please put your cell phone on airplane mode and do not talk with other
participants in the experiment; otherwise, we may be forced to exclude you
from the experimental payment.
The experiment consists of three parts. Detailed instruction for each part
are provided below and also shown on the computer screen before that part
starts. In the experiment we talk about Experimental Currency Units (ECU)
instead of euro. The exchange rate between ECU and euro is 1000 ECU = 1
euro
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B.2.2 Market stage instructions
Instructions for part 2 of the experiment:
In this part of the experiment, you are one of the nine traders in a stock
market. There are 8 trading rounds. Each trading round lasts for 5 minutes.
You trade a stock, and trading relates to units of the stock (“share”
hereafter). One share is one unit of the stock.
The value of each share is determined as follows. There is a box with 100
balls of four colors: black, white, yellow and purple, but you don’t know
the proportions of these colored balls. The proportions of the colored balls
are changed in each round. At the beginning of each trading round, a ball
will be drawn randomly from the box, and the color of the ball determines
the value of each share. The color of the ball will be revealed at the end of
the trading round. A black ball corresponds to 0 ECU for each share, a
white ball corresponds to 100 ECU for each share, a yellow ball
corresponds to 600 ECU for each share, and a purple ball corresponds to
700 ECU for each share. That is:
The Box
The color of the drawn Ball Black White Yellow Purple
Value of each share 0 ECU 100 ECU 600 ECU 700 ECU
At the beginning of each round, you receive an initial endowment of 4000
ECU and 15 shares. You then have 2 minutes to trade with other
participants in the stock market. After 2 minutes trading pauses, and three
of the nine traders receive a private signal. The private signal excludes one
potential color of the drawn ball. For example, the signal could state that
the drawn ball is NOT white. Then trading continues for another two
minutes.
Prior to the first trading round there will be ONE TRIAL ROUND in
which you can familiarize yourself with the trading screen and trading
rules. Your decisions in the trial round will NOT affect your payoff. At the
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end of part 2 one trading round will be randomly chosen. Your payment in
the chosen round will be your payoff in part 2. Your payment in a trading
round equals the money you have at the end of the round plus the number
of shares in your portfolio at end of the round times the value of each share.
Buying and selling shares in the stock market will be processed by the
computer. During each trading round, you will see the following trading
screen.
Figure B.3: Trading screen
How to buy a share: If you want to buy a share, you can do so in two ways:
1. When there are sell orders in the “Selling Orders” column that you
want to buy, you can directly click on the listed order price at which
you want to buy and press the “Buy” button, and the share will be
immediately bought.
2. You can enter a price that you are willing to pay in the field above the
red button of “submit BUY order”, and click the red button (“submit
BUY order”). Your buy order will then be displayed in the “Buying
Orders” column. Your order will be only executed when other traders
want to sell the share at your buying price.
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How to buy a share: If you want to buy a share, you can do so in two ways:
1. When there are sell orders in the “Selling Orders” column that you
want to buy, you can directly click on the listed order price at which
you want to buy and press the “Buy” button, and the share will be
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2. You can enter a price that you are willing to pay in the field above the
red button of “submit BUY order”, and click the red button (“submit
BUY order”). Your buy order will then be displayed in the “Buying
Orders” column. Your order will be only executed when other traders
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How to sell a share: If you want to sell a share, you also have two ways to
do this:
1. When there are buy orders in the “Buying Orders” column that you
want to sell, you can directly click on the listed order price at which
you want to sell and press the “Sell” button, and then the share will
be immediately sold.
2. You can enter a price that you are willing to sell in the field above the
red button of “submit SELL order”, and click the red button(“submit
SELL order”). Your sell order will then be displayed in the “Selling
Orders” column. Your order will be only executed when other traders
want to buy the share at your selling price.
B.2.3 Ambiguity task instructions (shown on screen)
(Screen 1)
In this part, we present you a decision table with 11 situations. Each situa-
tion offers you a choice between drawing a ball from two different urns, urn
1 or urn 2. Both urns contain 10 balls, either black or white:
Urn 1: The composition of urn 1 changes from one situation to the
next. While the number of balls in one color (e.g., white) increases from
0 to 10, the number of balls of the other color (e.g., black) decreases
accordingly.
Urn 2: The composition of urn 2 is identical in each situation. How-
ever, you don not know how many balls are white and how many balls
are black. Any combination is possible. There might be anywhere from
0 to 10 white balls, with the remaining balls being black.
One ball will be drawn from the urn you choose. The payment you can earn
depends on the color of the ball drawn. Only one color yields payment. You
can choose whether the color that yields payment is white or black. Please
choose the color of the ball that provides you payment:
Please choose the color of the ball that provides you payment:
[X] White
[X] Black
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(Screen 2)
Please take a look at the table below. In each of the 11 situations we would
like you to indicate which urn (urn 1 or urn 2) you prefer drawing a ball
from. At the end of this part, the computer will randomly select one out of
the 11 situations. Then, depending on whether you have chose urn 1 or urn
2 in that situation, the computer will randomly draw one ball from that urn.
Depending on the color of the ball, you earn the payment indicated in the
table. As explained before, both urns contain 10 balls, either black or white
Urn 1: The composition changes from one situation to the next
Urn 2: The composition of urn 2 is identical in each situation. How-
ever, you do not know how many balls are white and how many balls
are black. Any combination is possible.
Please note that the color of the ball you have chosen for payment is: [insert
color]
Now please choose in each situation from which urn you prefer to draw a
ball, urn 1 or urn 2 ?
Figure B.4: Ambiguity task
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How to sell a share: If you want to sell a share, you also have two ways to
do this:
1. When there are buy orders in the “Buying Orders” column that you
want to sell, you can directly click on the listed order price at which
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B.3 Additional tables
Table B.1: Subject descriptives
Mean/% S.D.
Age 21.33 2.35
Male (% ) 50.62 -
Econ/Business (% ) 41.98 -
Bachelor (% ) 65.43 -
Dutch (% ) 91.36 -
Notes: N=162. ’Male’ indicates the percentage of males in our subject population.
’Econ/Business’ stands for the percentage of economics/business students in our popula-
tion. ’Bachelor’ indicates the percentage of students in our subject population who are in the
bachelor phase of their studies. ’Dutch’ indicates the percentage of subjects in our subject
population who have the Dutch nationality.
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Table B.2: Number of bids and asks placed per second
Bids Asks
Before
signal
After
signal
Before
signal
After
signal
All Ins. Outs. All Ins. Outs.
P1
0-30 0.249 0.174 0.249 0.138 0.372 0.273 0.201 0.312
31-60 0.258 0.135 0.189 0.111 0.420 0.366 0.384 0.357
61-90 0.186 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.327 0.300 0.261 0.318
91-120 0.129 0.117 0.114 0.120 0.288 0.294 0.228 0.330
ALL 0.207 0.150 0.180 0.135 0.351 0.309 0.270 0.330
P2
0-30 0.345 0.135 0.123 0.141 0.414 0.555 0.906 0.378
31-60 0.231 0.168 0.111 0.198 0.417 0.570 0.816 0.444
61-90 0.219 0.123 0.144 0.114 0.366 0.480 0.657 0.393
91-120 0.177 0.138 0.156 0.129 0.387 0.435 0.667 0.318
ALL 0.243 0.141 0.135 0.147 0.396 0.510 0.762 0.384
P3
0-30 0.402 0.195 0.105 0.243 0.492 0.462 0.618 0.387
31-60 0.231 0.192 0.105 0.234 0.489 0.450 0.432 0.459
61-90 0.207 0.186 0.084 0.237 0.477 0.513 0.549 0.495
91-120 0.192 0.189 0.069 0.249 0.387 0.372 0.423 0.345
ALL 0.258 0.192 0.090 0.240 0.462 0.450 0.507 0.423
P4
0-30 0.408 0.339 0.618 0.201 0.591 0.393 0.210 0.483
31-60 0.270 0.288 0.507 0.180 0.381 0.414 0.171 0.534
61-90 0.264 0.249 0.462 0.141 0.390 0.417 0.207 0.522
91-120 0.210 0.213 0.396 0.120 0.318 0.291 0.108 0.384
ALL 0.288 0.273 0.495 0.162 0.420 0.378 0.174 0.480
P5
0-30 0.387 0.258 0.240 0.267 0.564 0.522 0.906 0.330
31-60 0.342 0.267 0.207 0.297 0.447 0.510 0.567 0.480
61-90 0.288 0.228 0.168 0.258 0.336 0.381 0.507 0.318
91-120 0.288 0.198 0.168 0.213 0.231 0.315 0.339 0.303
ALL 0.327 0.237 0.195 0.258 0.396 0.432 0.579 0.357
P6
0-30 0.411 0.435 0.678 0.315 0.531 0.342 0.216 0.405
31-60 0.258 0.360 0.594 0.243 0.384 0.297 0.168 0.360
61-90 0.303 0.381 0.606 0.270 0.351 0.234 0.138 0.282
91-120 0.186 0.306 0.366 0.279 0.288 0.189 0.099 0.231
ALL 0.291 0.372 0.561 0.276 0.390 0.267 0.156 0.321
P7
0-30 0.486 0.423 0.639 0.318 0.540 0.420 0.399 0.429
31-60 0.474 0.264 0.339 0.225 0.393 0.279 0.189 0.321
61-90 0.339 0.303 0.315 0.294 0.300 0.234 0.138 0.282
91-120 0.198 0.357 0.390 0.342 0.153 0.207 0.171 0.225
ALL 0.375 0.336 0.420 0.294 0.348 0.285 0.225 0.315
P8
0-30 0.447 0.339 0.183 0.417 0.531 0.561 0.723 0.480
31-60 0.381 0.381 0.243 0.450 0.369 0.483 0.621 0.414
61-90 0.321 0.216 0.150 0.249 0.294 0.414 0.579 0.333
91-120 0.270 0.216 0.225 0.216 0.264 0.330 0.417 0.285
ALL 0.354 0.288 0.201 0.333 0.366 0.447 0.585 0.378
Notes: Average number of submitted bids and submitted asks per second per period grouped
over all pre- and post-signal traders with the latter group subdivided into insider and out-
sider traders. For sake of comparability all figures have been normalized to a nine-person
market.
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Table B.3: Number of accepted bids and asks per second
Accepted bids Accepted asks Trades
Before
signal
After
signal
Before
signal
After
signal
Before
signal
After
signal
All Ins. Outs. All Ins. Outs.
P1
0-30 0.081 0.048 0.051 0.048 0.129 0.078 0.156 0.039 0.210 0.126
31-60 0.108 0.057 0.027 0.072 0.147 0.108 0.150 0.087 0.255 0.165
61-90 0.090 0.048 0.033 0.057 0.117 0.111 0.093 0.123 0.207 0.159
91-120 0.042 0.039 0.048 0.033 0.087 0.123 0.129 0.120 0.129 0.162
ALL 0.081 0.048 0.039 0.054 0.120 0.105 0.132 0.093 0.201 0.153
P2
0-30 0.072 0.033 0.039 0.03 0.123 0.123 0.039 0.168 0.195 0.156
31-60 0.072 0.063 0.084 0.054 0.129 0.141 0.078 0.171 0.201 0.204
61-90 0.063 0.045 0.039 0.051 0.162 0.138 0.132 0.141 0.225 0.183
91-120 0.069 0.042 0.042 0.045 0.114 0.105 0.099 0.108 0.183 0.147
ALL 0.069 0.045 0.051 0.045 0.132 0.126 0.087 0.147 0.201 0.174
P3
0-30 0.120 0.042 0.072 0.024 0.108 0.081 0.057 0.093 0.228 0.123
31-60 0.075 0.057 0.084 0.045 0.144 0.099 0.078 0.111 0.219 0.156
61-90 0.072 0.063 0.084 0.054 0.162 0.117 0.123 0.114 0.234 0.180
91-120 0.057 0.048 0.063 0.042 0.114 0.087 0.093 0.084 0.171 0.135
ALL 0.081 0.054 0.075 0.042 0.132 0.096 0.087 0.102 0.213 0.150
P4
0-30 0.078 0.057 0.015 0.078 0.126 0.069 0.129 0.039 0.204 0.126
31-60 0.099 0.099 0.018 0.138 0.129 0.114 0.201 0.069 0.228 0.213
61-90 0.093 0.090 0.012 0.129 0.117 0.135 0.183 0.111 0.210 0.225
91-120 0.081 0.084 0.051 0.099 0.111 0.105 0.168 0.072 0.192 0.189
ALL 0.087 0.084 0.024 0.111 0.120 0.105 0.171 0.072 0.210 0.189
P5
0-30 0.087 0.057 0.078 0.048 0.159 0.072 0.033 0.093 0.246 0.129
31-60 0.123 0.090 0.099 0.084 0.120 0.114 0.099 0.123 0.243 0.204
61-90 0.093 0.081 0.105 0.069 0.123 0.120 0.123 0.120 0.216 0.201
91-120 0.060 0.072 0.099 0.060 0.084 0.099 0.114 0.090 0.144 0.171
ALL 0.090 0.075 0.096 0.066 0.123 0.102 0.093 0.108 0.213 0.177
P6
0-30 0.066 0.075 0.066 0.081 0.135 0.093 0.111 0.084 0.201 0.168
31-60 0.087 0.084 0.093 0.081 0.096 0.105 0.177 0.066 0.183 0.189
61-90 0.078 0.084 0.078 0.090 0.102 0.093 0.132 0.072 0.180 0.177
91-120 0.060 0.069 0.072 0.066 0.096 0.081 0.120 0.063 0.156 0.150
ALL 0.072 0.078 0.078 0.081 0.108 0.093 0.135 0.072 0.180 0.171
P7
0-30 0.087 0.063 0.027 0.081 0.114 0.105 0.168 0.072 0.201 0.168
31-60 0.138 0.054 0.027 0.066 0.120 0.111 0.150 0.093 0.258 0.165
61-90 0.057 0.054 0.027 0.066 0.108 0.105 0.162 0.075 0.165 0.159
91-120 0.051 0.075 0.072 0.075 0.054 0.090 0.129 0.069 0.105 0.165
ALL 0.084 0.063 0.039 0.072 0.099 0.102 0.153 0.078 0.183 0.165
P8
0-30 0.093 0.051 0.105 0.024 0.105 0.108 0.012 0.156 0.198 0.159
31-60 0.117 0.084 0.177 0.039 0.099 0.135 0.060 0.171 0.216 0.219
61-90 0.114 0.072 0.117 0.051 0.099 0.114 0.057 0.144 0.213 0.186
91-120 0.087 0.075 0.129 0.048 0.090 0.108 0.063 0.132 0.177 0.183
ALL 0.102 0.072 0.132 0.042 0.099 0.117 0.048 0.150 0.201 0.186
Notes: Average number of accepted bids, accepted asks and transactions per second per
period grouped over all pre- and post-signal traders with the latter group subdivided into
insider and outsider traders. For sake of comparability all figures have been normalized to a
nine-person market.
182
Table B.4: Bid and ask prices
bid ask
Before
signal
After signal Before
signal
After signal
All Ins. Outs. All Ins. Outs.
P1
0-30 235.46 271.78 298.93 243.98 375.29 394.57 352.94 407.95
31-60 215.81 280.38 290.94 270.15 393.52 395.38 353.99 417.52
61-90 259.92 265.48 288.30 253.13 357.31 361.25 328.88 374.29
91-120 254.30 288.29 342.86 270.10 359.53 332.47 286.38 346.84
ALL 238.23 273.37 296.31 256.61 373.22 373.33 335.92 388.35
P2
0-30 227.61 234.24 190.33 247.74 374.29 335.00 336.36 333.35
31-60 250.60 252.40 241.00 254.40 353.04 328.20 315.76 339.63
61-90 277.61 207.50 171.18 221.86 339.83 294.02 293.16 294.80
91-120 276.65 191.21 168.75 199.76 342.33 259.28 255.98 262.74
ALL 252.05 226.34 190.51 236.86 353.16 309.29 306.12 312.49
P3
0-30 260.77 241.55 183.47 255.84 374.01 343.06 323.99 358.50
31-60 268.26 247.37 226.67 251.25 345.84 346.73 298.90 369.05
61-90 270.83 253.34 208.93 263.88 317.12 297.09 267.79 313.01
91-120 237.74 222.07 188.00 229.24 331.23 273.77 265.18 279.20
ALL 260.64 242.73 200.46 252.17 343.11 317.98 291.15 333.91
P4
0-30 249.92 278.17 300.79 242.21 354.90 398.33 402.63 397.37
31-60 262.67 281.68 297.70 256.84 365.55 339.91 350.32 338.22
61-90 252.74 296.41 311.77 273.91 339.04 328.10 357.39 322.54
91-120 246.82 268.00 266.43 270.04 334.32 310.89 345.00 306.11
ALL 253.28 283.11 298.88 259.46 349.79 346.79 367.83 342.93
P5
0-30 245.74 213.60 210.76 214.63 362.93 350.25 348.01 353.29
31-60 259.45 219.84 189.42 227.83 357.34 316.80 295.32 329.53
61-90 255.38 226.70 206.28 232.33 351.90 294.97 313.04 281.92
91-120 243.84 201.84 164.12 217.49 339.84 279.68 287.09 275.39
ALL 251.43 218.23 196.42 224.98 355.74 315.86 319.50 312.93
P6
0-30 249.55 240.93 255.51 226.49 351.27 368.65 387.89 363.64
31-60 263.61 277.45 283.08 270.81 329.92 384.05 374.60 386.23
61-90 255.89 288.70 291.14 286.88 332.83 351.30 325.97 356.97
91-120 253.10 298.28 304.87 293.97 333.65 357.49 333.33 363.84
ALL 254.83 273.30 279.43 267.89 338.74 366.61 360.68 368.04
P7
0-30 254.72 218.40 198.55 238.85 366.28 385.03 396.76 379.62
31-60 254.79 241.28 228.21 250.65 344.93 350.53 346.18 351.80
61-90 234.85 257.92 247.14 266.87 332.73 370.82 416.59 356.93
91-120 206.47 259.92 261.43 259.06 324.55 363.74 377.35 359.29
ALL 243.74 241.32 226.68 253.25 348.69 370.28 389.17 363.54
P8
0-30 261.90 211.25 176.67 222.29 379.14 348.73 336.47 357.94
31-60 252.89 227.94 179.27 242.72 355.97 316.12 297.94 329.79
61-90 262.83 221.62 215.88 223.50 339.88 286.20 283.36 288.68
91-120 227.85 207.02 208.00 206.70 326.20 298.89 263.13 322.24
ALL 253.22 219.67 192.12 228.39 356.07 315.13 301.17 325.93
Notes: Average prices of submitted bids and submitted asks per period grouped over all pre-
and post-signal traders with the latter group subdivided into insider and outsider traders.
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Table B.3: Number of accepted bids and asks per second
Accepted bids Accepted asks Trades
Before
signal
After
signal
Before
signal
After
signal
Before
signal
After
signal
All Ins. Outs. All Ins. Outs.
P1
0-30 0.081 0.048 0.051 0.048 0.129 0.078 0.156 0.039 0.210 0.126
31-60 0.108 0.057 0.027 0.072 0.147 0.108 0.150 0.087 0.255 0.165
61-90 0.090 0.048 0.033 0.057 0.117 0.111 0.093 0.123 0.207 0.159
91-120 0.042 0.039 0.048 0.033 0.087 0.123 0.129 0.120 0.129 0.162
ALL 0.081 0.048 0.039 0.054 0.120 0.105 0.132 0.093 0.201 0.153
P2
0-30 0.072 0.033 0.039 0.03 0.123 0.123 0.039 0.168 0.195 0.156
31-60 0.072 0.063 0.084 0.054 0.129 0.141 0.078 0.171 0.201 0.204
61-90 0.063 0.045 0.039 0.051 0.162 0.138 0.132 0.141 0.225 0.183
91-120 0.069 0.042 0.042 0.045 0.114 0.105 0.099 0.108 0.183 0.147
ALL 0.069 0.045 0.051 0.045 0.132 0.126 0.087 0.147 0.201 0.174
P3
0-30 0.120 0.042 0.072 0.024 0.108 0.081 0.057 0.093 0.228 0.123
31-60 0.075 0.057 0.084 0.045 0.144 0.099 0.078 0.111 0.219 0.156
61-90 0.072 0.063 0.084 0.054 0.162 0.117 0.123 0.114 0.234 0.180
91-120 0.057 0.048 0.063 0.042 0.114 0.087 0.093 0.084 0.171 0.135
ALL 0.081 0.054 0.075 0.042 0.132 0.096 0.087 0.102 0.213 0.150
P4
0-30 0.078 0.057 0.015 0.078 0.126 0.069 0.129 0.039 0.204 0.126
31-60 0.099 0.099 0.018 0.138 0.129 0.114 0.201 0.069 0.228 0.213
61-90 0.093 0.090 0.012 0.129 0.117 0.135 0.183 0.111 0.210 0.225
91-120 0.081 0.084 0.051 0.099 0.111 0.105 0.168 0.072 0.192 0.189
ALL 0.087 0.084 0.024 0.111 0.120 0.105 0.171 0.072 0.210 0.189
P5
0-30 0.087 0.057 0.078 0.048 0.159 0.072 0.033 0.093 0.246 0.129
31-60 0.123 0.090 0.099 0.084 0.120 0.114 0.099 0.123 0.243 0.204
61-90 0.093 0.081 0.105 0.069 0.123 0.120 0.123 0.120 0.216 0.201
91-120 0.060 0.072 0.099 0.060 0.084 0.099 0.114 0.090 0.144 0.171
ALL 0.090 0.075 0.096 0.066 0.123 0.102 0.093 0.108 0.213 0.177
P6
0-30 0.066 0.075 0.066 0.081 0.135 0.093 0.111 0.084 0.201 0.168
31-60 0.087 0.084 0.093 0.081 0.096 0.105 0.177 0.066 0.183 0.189
61-90 0.078 0.084 0.078 0.090 0.102 0.093 0.132 0.072 0.180 0.177
91-120 0.060 0.069 0.072 0.066 0.096 0.081 0.120 0.063 0.156 0.150
ALL 0.072 0.078 0.078 0.081 0.108 0.093 0.135 0.072 0.180 0.171
P7
0-30 0.087 0.063 0.027 0.081 0.114 0.105 0.168 0.072 0.201 0.168
31-60 0.138 0.054 0.027 0.066 0.120 0.111 0.150 0.093 0.258 0.165
61-90 0.057 0.054 0.027 0.066 0.108 0.105 0.162 0.075 0.165 0.159
91-120 0.051 0.075 0.072 0.075 0.054 0.090 0.129 0.069 0.105 0.165
ALL 0.084 0.063 0.039 0.072 0.099 0.102 0.153 0.078 0.183 0.165
P8
0-30 0.093 0.051 0.105 0.024 0.105 0.108 0.012 0.156 0.198 0.159
31-60 0.117 0.084 0.177 0.039 0.099 0.135 0.060 0.171 0.216 0.219
61-90 0.114 0.072 0.117 0.051 0.099 0.114 0.057 0.144 0.213 0.186
91-120 0.087 0.075 0.129 0.048 0.090 0.108 0.063 0.132 0.177 0.183
ALL 0.102 0.072 0.132 0.042 0.099 0.117 0.048 0.150 0.201 0.186
Notes: Average number of accepted bids, accepted asks and transactions per second per
period grouped over all pre- and post-signal traders with the latter group subdivided into
insider and outsider traders. For sake of comparability all figures have been normalized to a
nine-person market.
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Table B.4: Bid and ask prices
bid ask
Before
signal
After signal Before
signal
After signal
All Ins. Outs. All Ins. Outs.
P1
0-30 235.46 271.78 298.93 243.98 375.29 394.57 352.94 407.95
31-60 215.81 280.38 290.94 270.15 393.52 395.38 353.99 417.52
61-90 259.92 265.48 288.30 253.13 357.31 361.25 328.88 374.29
91-120 254.30 288.29 342.86 270.10 359.53 332.47 286.38 346.84
ALL 238.23 273.37 296.31 256.61 373.22 373.33 335.92 388.35
P2
0-30 227.61 234.24 190.33 247.74 374.29 335.00 336.36 333.35
31-60 250.60 252.40 241.00 254.40 353.04 328.20 315.76 339.63
61-90 277.61 207.50 171.18 221.86 339.83 294.02 293.16 294.80
91-120 276.65 191.21 168.75 199.76 342.33 259.28 255.98 262.74
ALL 252.05 226.34 190.51 236.86 353.16 309.29 306.12 312.49
P3
0-30 260.77 241.55 183.47 255.84 374.01 343.06 323.99 358.50
31-60 268.26 247.37 226.67 251.25 345.84 346.73 298.90 369.05
61-90 270.83 253.34 208.93 263.88 317.12 297.09 267.79 313.01
91-120 237.74 222.07 188.00 229.24 331.23 273.77 265.18 279.20
ALL 260.64 242.73 200.46 252.17 343.11 317.98 291.15 333.91
P4
0-30 249.92 278.17 300.79 242.21 354.90 398.33 402.63 397.37
31-60 262.67 281.68 297.70 256.84 365.55 339.91 350.32 338.22
61-90 252.74 296.41 311.77 273.91 339.04 328.10 357.39 322.54
91-120 246.82 268.00 266.43 270.04 334.32 310.89 345.00 306.11
ALL 253.28 283.11 298.88 259.46 349.79 346.79 367.83 342.93
P5
0-30 245.74 213.60 210.76 214.63 362.93 350.25 348.01 353.29
31-60 259.45 219.84 189.42 227.83 357.34 316.80 295.32 329.53
61-90 255.38 226.70 206.28 232.33 351.90 294.97 313.04 281.92
91-120 243.84 201.84 164.12 217.49 339.84 279.68 287.09 275.39
ALL 251.43 218.23 196.42 224.98 355.74 315.86 319.50 312.93
P6
0-30 249.55 240.93 255.51 226.49 351.27 368.65 387.89 363.64
31-60 263.61 277.45 283.08 270.81 329.92 384.05 374.60 386.23
61-90 255.89 288.70 291.14 286.88 332.83 351.30 325.97 356.97
91-120 253.10 298.28 304.87 293.97 333.65 357.49 333.33 363.84
ALL 254.83 273.30 279.43 267.89 338.74 366.61 360.68 368.04
P7
0-30 254.72 218.40 198.55 238.85 366.28 385.03 396.76 379.62
31-60 254.79 241.28 228.21 250.65 344.93 350.53 346.18 351.80
61-90 234.85 257.92 247.14 266.87 332.73 370.82 416.59 356.93
91-120 206.47 259.92 261.43 259.06 324.55 363.74 377.35 359.29
ALL 243.74 241.32 226.68 253.25 348.69 370.28 389.17 363.54
P8
0-30 261.90 211.25 176.67 222.29 379.14 348.73 336.47 357.94
31-60 252.89 227.94 179.27 242.72 355.97 316.12 297.94 329.79
61-90 262.83 221.62 215.88 223.50 339.88 286.20 283.36 288.68
91-120 227.85 207.02 208.00 206.70 326.20 298.89 263.13 322.24
ALL 253.22 219.67 192.12 228.39 356.07 315.13 301.17 325.93
Notes: Average prices of submitted bids and submitted asks per period grouped over all pre-
and post-signal traders with the latter group subdivided into insider and outsider traders.
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Table B.5: Transaction prices
Accepted bids Accepted asks Trades
Before
signal
After signal Before
signal
After signal Before
signal
After
signal
All Ins. Outs. All Ins. Outs.
P1
0-30 288.18 307.50 253.89 335.88 320.59 331.57 354.11 286.50 309.29 322.37
31-60 233.60 309.81 232.00 327.50 321.75 323.97 336.00 313.81 288.34 319.52
61-90 262.70 296.21 265.71 305.91 307.64 306.24 311.36 304.21 289.58 303.75
91-120 218.50 269.33 247.50 294.29 296.55 268.33 310.00 240.00 273.25 268.60
ALL 254.03 298.87 251.21 319.19 313.37 308.48 330.32 292.67 291.79 305.64
P2
0-30 236.61 281.80 279.57 283.75 317.77 293.26 245.71 298.90 288.94 291.14
31-60 265.65 285.84 271.07 308.00 304.39 280.58 237.50 290.31 292.38 281.88
61-90 277.61 236.61 261.50 222.78 301.86 242.42 197.77 260.02 295.90 241.07
91-120 256.39 221.67 207.00 232.14 310.07 222.58 239.15 213.96 291.98 222.36
ALL 257.40 258.23 261.43 255.47 308.08 262.65 221.60 274.26 292.37 261.64
P3
0-30 284.73 270.95 269.23 273.75 326.83 285.90 315.80 276.56 304.75 280.92
31-60 275.73 263.73 278.40 243.73 318.34 276.98 282.00 275.35 305.55 272.62
61-90 263.68 265.12 270.00 260.24 299.83 255.20 264.61 249.36 289.67 258.13
91-120 253.63 271.19 283.33 263.90 303.95 260.75 262.38 260.10 289.74 264.55
ALL 273.38 267.01 273.84 259.43 311.29 267.94 276.23 264.32 297.87 267.64
P4
0-30 266.05 309.60 425.00 293.86 295.32 293.11 303.76 277.14 284.75 299.98
31-60 277.64 285.70 350.00 281.21 302.23 303.05 290.43 321.46 292.27 295.45
61-90 268.61 276.72 258.75 279.60 291.46 296.04 288.26 302.88 281.82 288.57
91-120 253.41 290.91 305.00 287.95 278.78 314.89 328.89 300.89 269.10 305.85
ALL 267.20 286.99 311.94 283.64 292.41 300.63 298.20 303.33 282.50 295.12
P5
0-30 265.64 235.24 248.57 222.80 305.39 289.18 289.17 289.19 292.14 265.84
31-60 264.49 244.17 286.11 212.71 289.59 265.52 228.22 280.77 276.95 256.89
61-90 247.83 246.21 280.96 208.68 306.15 259.49 253.04 262.44 282.20 254.38
91-120 222.38 213.59 230.91 196.27 291.82 246.05 232.06 257.38 262.96 234.15
ALL 253.45 238.48 267.94 210.97 299.41 263.98 244.28 272.55 280.32 253.87
P6
0-30 242.73 270.34 246.92 280.03 309.28 309.73 280.26 328.40 287.29 291.79
31-60 271.76 261.18 218.53 288.04 294.62 326.61 330.09 321.96 284.01 297.82
61-90 260.10 281.37 238.76 298.21 296.93 325.32 317.65 333.00 281.36 304.72
91-120 251.00 262.76 234.11 284.25 309.54 315.83 319.62 312.75 287.67 293.54
ALL 257.50 270.94 233.53 289.48 303.15 320.53 314.72 326.01 285.08 298.16
P7
0-30 283.65 295.76 272.00 300.00 305.08 356.44 323.10 393.62 295.89 333.68
31-60 281.51 274.69 295.20 270.42 324.80 328.60 310.63 343.30 301.44 311.03
61-90 251.16 272.17 277.73 270.13 318.11 344.27 342.42 345.90 294.52 319.22
91-120 236.68 299.48 309.38 295.71 315.82 351.60 351.28 352.08 276.25 325.98
ALL 270.01 284.62 288.48 283.53 315.90 344.04 330.97 356.88 294.75 321.88
P8
0-30 272.00 243.70 228.61 273.89 332.14 288.34 280.00 288.64 304.30 274.16
31-60 282.37 250.67 254.03 243.00 327.44 285.04 292.36 283.74 303.35 271.76
61-90 273.97 228.20 227.07 229.52 301.30 283.55 254.64 287.97 286.80 261.74
91-120 276.11 203.78 193.50 218.73 295.77 251.32 228.80 258.58 286.04 232.44
ALL 276.35 233.35 230.79 237.47 315.01 279.89 260.74 282.83 295.41 262.36
Notes: Average accepted bid prices, accepted ask prices and transaction prices per period
grouped over all pre- and post-signal traders with the latter group subdivided into insider
and outsider traders.
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Table B.6: Percentage difference between insiders and indicated groups in
terms of the number of submitted/accepted bids and asks
Insiders
vs. pre-
insiders
Insiders
vs.
pre-all
Insiders
vs.
outsiders
P1
Bids 27.11** -12.52 32.66**
Asks -11.24 -23.97** -18.84**
Acc. bids -71.52*** -50.69*** -23.68**
Acc. asks -0.028 9.73 42.65**
P2
Bids -56.02 -44.98*** -7.55
Asks 105.76*** 91.92*** 98.93***
Acc. bids 41.14 -27.57*** 13.85
Acc. asks -27.87 -33.64*** -40.18***
P3
Bids -54.86*** -65.06*** -62.50***
Asks 24.48** 9.25 20.00**
Acc. bids -25.28** -8.58 83.33
Acc. asks -40.12*** -33.42*** -12.33*
P4
Bids 27.87*** 70.77*** 208.85***
Asks -50.60*** -58.74*** -63.77***
Acc. bids -54.22** -72.11*** -77.78***
Acc. asks 49.98** 40.28** 131.76***
P5
Bids -40.32*** -40.65*** -25.07***
Asks 30.48*** 45.32*** 60.99***
Acc. bids -2.21 5.19 47.37**
Acc. asks -29.75** -23.07** -12.25
P6
Bids 133.90*** 91.18*** 101.98***
Asks -47.90*** -60.00*** -51.18***
Acc. bids -5.78 8.02 -0.80
Acc. asks 66.42*** 25.35** 90.38***
P7
Bids 85.14*** 12.17 42.59***
Asks -44.67*** -35.79*** -28.23***
Acc. bids -48.64** -52.85*** -45.28***
Acc. asks 17.11 52.20*** 98.21***
P8
Bids -36.61*** -43.56*** -39.38***
Asks 102.16*** 58.84*** 54.35***
Acc. bids 33.62* 29.42** 228.13***
Acc. asks -3.57 -51.34*** -68.33***
Notes: Percentage difference between insiders on the one hand and pre-signal insiders, all
pre-signal traders and post-signal outsiders on the other hand in terms of the average number
of submitted/accepted bids and asks per second per trader. Wilcoxon test for significance:
***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1.
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Table B.5: Transaction prices
Accepted bids Accepted asks Trades
Before
signal
After signal Before
signal
After signal Before
signal
After
signal
All Ins. Outs. All Ins. Outs.
P1
0-30 288.18 307.50 253.89 335.88 320.59 331.57 354.11 286.50 309.29 322.37
31-60 233.60 309.81 232.00 327.50 321.75 323.97 336.00 313.81 288.34 319.52
61-90 262.70 296.21 265.71 305.91 307.64 306.24 311.36 304.21 289.58 303.75
91-120 218.50 269.33 247.50 294.29 296.55 268.33 310.00 240.00 273.25 268.60
ALL 254.03 298.87 251.21 319.19 313.37 308.48 330.32 292.67 291.79 305.64
P2
0-30 236.61 281.80 279.57 283.75 317.77 293.26 245.71 298.90 288.94 291.14
31-60 265.65 285.84 271.07 308.00 304.39 280.58 237.50 290.31 292.38 281.88
61-90 277.61 236.61 261.50 222.78 301.86 242.42 197.77 260.02 295.90 241.07
91-120 256.39 221.67 207.00 232.14 310.07 222.58 239.15 213.96 291.98 222.36
ALL 257.40 258.23 261.43 255.47 308.08 262.65 221.60 274.26 292.37 261.64
P3
0-30 284.73 270.95 269.23 273.75 326.83 285.90 315.80 276.56 304.75 280.92
31-60 275.73 263.73 278.40 243.73 318.34 276.98 282.00 275.35 305.55 272.62
61-90 263.68 265.12 270.00 260.24 299.83 255.20 264.61 249.36 289.67 258.13
91-120 253.63 271.19 283.33 263.90 303.95 260.75 262.38 260.10 289.74 264.55
ALL 273.38 267.01 273.84 259.43 311.29 267.94 276.23 264.32 297.87 267.64
P4
0-30 266.05 309.60 425.00 293.86 295.32 293.11 303.76 277.14 284.75 299.98
31-60 277.64 285.70 350.00 281.21 302.23 303.05 290.43 321.46 292.27 295.45
61-90 268.61 276.72 258.75 279.60 291.46 296.04 288.26 302.88 281.82 288.57
91-120 253.41 290.91 305.00 287.95 278.78 314.89 328.89 300.89 269.10 305.85
ALL 267.20 286.99 311.94 283.64 292.41 300.63 298.20 303.33 282.50 295.12
P5
0-30 265.64 235.24 248.57 222.80 305.39 289.18 289.17 289.19 292.14 265.84
31-60 264.49 244.17 286.11 212.71 289.59 265.52 228.22 280.77 276.95 256.89
61-90 247.83 246.21 280.96 208.68 306.15 259.49 253.04 262.44 282.20 254.38
91-120 222.38 213.59 230.91 196.27 291.82 246.05 232.06 257.38 262.96 234.15
ALL 253.45 238.48 267.94 210.97 299.41 263.98 244.28 272.55 280.32 253.87
P6
0-30 242.73 270.34 246.92 280.03 309.28 309.73 280.26 328.40 287.29 291.79
31-60 271.76 261.18 218.53 288.04 294.62 326.61 330.09 321.96 284.01 297.82
61-90 260.10 281.37 238.76 298.21 296.93 325.32 317.65 333.00 281.36 304.72
91-120 251.00 262.76 234.11 284.25 309.54 315.83 319.62 312.75 287.67 293.54
ALL 257.50 270.94 233.53 289.48 303.15 320.53 314.72 326.01 285.08 298.16
P7
0-30 283.65 295.76 272.00 300.00 305.08 356.44 323.10 393.62 295.89 333.68
31-60 281.51 274.69 295.20 270.42 324.80 328.60 310.63 343.30 301.44 311.03
61-90 251.16 272.17 277.73 270.13 318.11 344.27 342.42 345.90 294.52 319.22
91-120 236.68 299.48 309.38 295.71 315.82 351.60 351.28 352.08 276.25 325.98
ALL 270.01 284.62 288.48 283.53 315.90 344.04 330.97 356.88 294.75 321.88
P8
0-30 272.00 243.70 228.61 273.89 332.14 288.34 280.00 288.64 304.30 274.16
31-60 282.37 250.67 254.03 243.00 327.44 285.04 292.36 283.74 303.35 271.76
61-90 273.97 228.20 227.07 229.52 301.30 283.55 254.64 287.97 286.80 261.74
91-120 276.11 203.78 193.50 218.73 295.77 251.32 228.80 258.58 286.04 232.44
ALL 276.35 233.35 230.79 237.47 315.01 279.89 260.74 282.83 295.41 262.36
Notes: Average accepted bid prices, accepted ask prices and transaction prices per period
grouped over all pre- and post-signal traders with the latter group subdivided into insider
and outsider traders.
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Table B.6: Percentage difference between insiders and indicated groups in
terms of the number of submitted/accepted bids and asks
Insiders
vs. pre-
insiders
Insiders
vs.
pre-all
Insiders
vs.
outsiders
P1
Bids 27.11** -12.52 32.66**
Asks -11.24 -23.97** -18.84**
Acc. bids -71.52*** -50.69*** -23.68**
Acc. asks -0.028 9.73 42.65**
P2
Bids -56.02 -44.98*** -7.55
Asks 105.76*** 91.92*** 98.93***
Acc. bids 41.14 -27.57*** 13.85
Acc. asks -27.87 -33.64*** -40.18***
P3
Bids -54.86*** -65.06*** -62.50***
Asks 24.48** 9.25 20.00**
Acc. bids -25.28** -8.58 83.33
Acc. asks -40.12*** -33.42*** -12.33*
P4
Bids 27.87*** 70.77*** 208.85***
Asks -50.60*** -58.74*** -63.77***
Acc. bids -54.22** -72.11*** -77.78***
Acc. asks 49.98** 40.28** 131.76***
P5
Bids -40.32*** -40.65*** -25.07***
Asks 30.48*** 45.32*** 60.99***
Acc. bids -2.21 5.19 47.37**
Acc. asks -29.75** -23.07** -12.25
P6
Bids 133.90*** 91.18*** 101.98***
Asks -47.90*** -60.00*** -51.18***
Acc. bids -5.78 8.02 -0.80
Acc. asks 66.42*** 25.35** 90.38***
P7
Bids 85.14*** 12.17 42.59***
Asks -44.67*** -35.79*** -28.23***
Acc. bids -48.64** -52.85*** -45.28***
Acc. asks 17.11 52.20*** 98.21***
P8
Bids -36.61*** -43.56*** -39.38***
Asks 102.16*** 58.84*** 54.35***
Acc. bids 33.62* 29.42** 228.13***
Acc. asks -3.57 -51.34*** -68.33***
Notes: Percentage difference between insiders on the one hand and pre-signal insiders, all
pre-signal traders and post-signal outsiders on the other hand in terms of the average number
of submitted/accepted bids and asks per second per trader. Wilcoxon test for significance:
***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1.
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Table B.7: Percentage difference between insiders and indicated groups in
terms of the prices of submitted/accepted bids and asks
Insiders
vs. pre-
insiders
Insiders
vs.
pre-all
Insiders
vs.
outsiders
P1
Bids 28.40*** 24.38*** 15.47***
Asks -7.43*** 39.41 -13.50***
Acc. bids 2.06*** -1.11*** -21.30
Acc. asks -2.67 5.41*** 12.86
P2
Bids -23.06*** -24.42*** -19.57***
Asks -13.58*** -13.32*** -2.04
Acc. bids -10.83** 1.57*** 2.34
Acc. asks -19.01*** -28.07*** -19.20*
P3
Bids -17.24*** -23.09** -20.51***
Asks -6.31*** -15.14*** -12.81***
Acc. bids -3.30 0.17** 5.56
Acc. asks -14.50*** -11.26 4.50**
P4
Bids 12.61*** 18.00*** 15.19***
Asks 9.27** 5.16*** 7.26***
Acc. bids 5.61* 16.74*** 9.98**
Acc. asks 9.76* 1.97 -1.69
P5
Bids -17.23*** -21.88*** -12.69*
Asks -16.52*** -10.19*** 2.10
Acc. bids -3.67 5.71*** 27.00***
Acc. asks -12.96*** -18.41*** -10.37**
P6
Bids 12.76*** 9.65*** 4.31
Asks 9.84*** 6.48 -1.99***
Acc. bids 5.38 -9.31** -19.33***
Acc. asks 2.07 3.82*** -3.46
P7
Bids -13.48*** -7.00*** -10.49**
Asks 7.43 11.61 7.05***
Acc. bids -6.26* 6.84*** 1.75
Acc. asks 8.22*** 4.77 -7.26***
P8
Bids 0.43*** -24.13*** -15.88***
Asks -16.49*** -15.42*** -7.60**
Acc. bids -7.86 -16.49 -2.82
Acc. asks -18.83*** -17.23** -7.81
Notes: Percentage difference between insiders on the one hand and pre-signal insiders, all
pre-signal traders and post-signal outsiders on the other hand in terms of the average prices
of submitted/accepted bids and asks. Wilcoxon test for significance: ***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p
<0.1.
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Table B.8: Volume - Cohort 2
Cohort 2 # Bids # Asks # Acc. bids # Acc. asks # Bought # Sold
0-30 -5.73 84.62 -58.33 50.00 9.80 -22.22
31-60 -42.99 13.33 -70.59 -15.63 -27.58 -48.38
61-90 -47.70 0.00 -64.29 20.83 -22.00 -28.00
91-120 7.14 65.00 0.00 8.70 8.11 -4.55
ALL -24.51*** 43.86** -49.12*** 12.12 -9.69 -27.62**
Notes: Percentage difference between Cohort 2 high and low disposition insiders in terms of
volume. Wilcoxon test for significance (final row only): ***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1.
Table B.9: Prices - Cohort 2
Cohort 2 Bid price Ask price Acc. bid price Acc. ask price Buy price Sell price
0-30 -18.81 1.91 8.28 12.82 8.03 5.83
31-60 -16.62 -6.81 28.37 -5.25 -2.11 14.10
61-90 -13.04 23.96 13.32 6.60 8.71 9.63
91-120 -12.38 11.35 26.32 8.43 9.27 19.96
ALL -16.16*** 6.82 19.21** 4.32 5.83** 12.17*
Notes: Percentage difference between Cohort 2 high and low disposition insiders in terms of
prices. Wilcoxon test for significance (final row only): ***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1.
Table B.10: Underreaction - Cohort 2
Post-signal trading block (30s. each)
1 2 3 4 ALL
(a) High disp. (Period 7) 13.06*** 18.97*** 16.83*** 15.07*** 16.14***
(b) Low disp. (Period 6) 23.88*** 22.31*** 20.51*** 23.42*** 22.22***
Diff. (a) and (b) -10.82** -3.34 -3.68 -8.35** -6.08***
Notes: Transaction price underreaction in percentage terms relative to the benchmark price
following a positive price signal in Cohort 2. Mann Whitney U test (first two rows) and
Wilcoxon test (final row) for significance: ***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1.
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Table B.9: Prices - Cohort 2
Cohort 2 Bid price Ask price Acc. bid price Acc. ask price Buy price Sell price
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Wilcoxon test (final row) for significance: ***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1.
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Table B.11: Volume - Cohort 4
Cohort 4 # Bids # Asks # Acc. bids # Acc. asks # Bought # Sold
0-30 -13.63 -31.90 85.71 42.86 41.67 -16.00
31-60 -5.00 -46.94 0.00 0.00 -22.72 -37.50
61-90 -42.31 -16.10 114.28 -8.33 -21.88 2.22
91-120 -56.67 -36.72 50.00 -5.26 9.52 31.82
ALL -32.65** -33.63*** 48.64** 0.00 -5.75 -10.91
Notes: Percentage difference between Cohort 4 high and low disposition insiders in terms of
volume. Wilcoxon test for significance (final row only): ***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1.
Table B.12: Prices - Cohort 4
Cohort 4 Bid price Ask price Acc. bid price Acc. ask price Buy price Sell price
0-30 -2.86 -3.20 -3.14 23.70 6.40 -2.72
31-60 -4.92 -4.61 2.28 15.48 3.16 -5.94
61-90 17.07 -7.39 2.73 26.98 24.58 -3.19
91-120 8.80 3.01 29.70 8.03 9.15 22.79
ALL 4.14 -4.20 3.99 20.11*** 13.19** -2.04
Notes: Percentage difference between Cohort 4 high and low disposition insiders in terms of
prices. Wilcoxon test for significance (final row only): ***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1.
Table B.13: Underreaction - Cohort 4
Post-signal trading block (30s. each)
1 2 3 4 ALL
(a) High disp. (Period 3) 29.65*** 25.82*** 19.14*** 22.10*** 23.52***
(b) Low disp. (Period 2) 34.37*** 30.09*** 11.25*** 2.62 20.76***
Diff. (a) and (b) -4.72 -4.27** 7.89 19.48** 2.76
Notes: Transaction price underreaction in percentage terms relative to the benchmark price
following a negative price signal in Cohort 4. Mann Whitney U test (first two rows) and
Wilcoxon test (final row) for significance: ***p <0.01,**p <0.05, *p <0.1.
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B.4 Additional figures
Figure B.5: Price paths - Cohort 2
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Notes: Box plots and means of transaction prices per trading block of 30 seconds for both
Cohort 2 periods.
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Figure B.6: Price paths - Cohort 4
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Notes: Box plots and means of transaction prices per trading block of 30 seconds for both
Cohort 4 periods.
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Figure B.7: Change in post-signal shareholdings for Cohort 2 insiders
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Notes: Average post-signal share build-up for the high and low disposition insiders from
Cohort 2 following the positive price signal.
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Figure B.8: Change in post-signal shareholdings for Cohort 4 insiders
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Notes: Average post-signal share build-up for the high and low disposition insiders from
Cohort 4 following the negative price signal.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 BRET task
C.1.1 Instructions
General instructions
You are about to participate in an economic experiment. Please read
carefully the following instructions. They are identical for all participants.
Please do not communicate with the other participants, stay quiet, and turn
off your mobile phone during the experiment. If you have questions, please
raise your hand. An instructor will come and answer. If you follow the
instructions and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable
amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the
experiment. The experiment will consist of two parts and in addition to
your earnings in both parts, you will be paid a 2.5 euro show-up fee.
Instructions (Part 1)
On your screen you find a field composed of 100 boxes. You can see that
every second one of those boxes is deleted, starting from the top-left corner.
We say that every time a box is removed you “collect” a box. By clicking
stop at some point in time, you collect the number of boxes that have been
removed up to that point in time. Thus the later you click stop, the more
boxes you will have collected. You can now try to press the stop button to
collect the indicated number of boxes. You earn 10 eurocents for every box
that is collected. Once collected, the box disappears from the screen and
your earnings are updated accordingly. At any moment you can see the
amount earned in euros (denoted with “virtual earnings”) up to that point.
However, such earnings are only potential (hence called “virtual”) because
in one of the boxes a bomb is hidden. When you collect this bomb-box all
your earnings collected so far will be destroyed. When collecting boxes,
you do not know which box contains the bomb. You only know that the
bomb can be in any of the 100 boxes with equal probability. Which box
contains the bomb will be randomly determined by the computer AFTER
you have collected your desired number of boxes. The computer will do so
by randomly picking one of the 100 boxes (all are equally likely). The
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chosen box will then be the one that contains the bomb. The more boxes
you collect, the higher the probability of also collecting the bomb.
THUS: Your task is to choose how many boxes you want to collect. If you
happen to have collected the box that contains the bomb you will earn zero.
If the bomb is located in a box that you did not collect you will earn 10
euro cents for each collected box.
Are there any questions? We will now continue with some test questions
that you will find on your screen
Figure C.1: Screenshot of the BRET task
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C.1.2 Comprehension questions (shown on screen and discussed
afterwards)
1. Suppose that the bomb is located in the 25th box.
(a) If you collect the first 21 boxes, how much will you earn in euros? (2.1)
(b) If you collect the first 38 boxes, how much will you earn in euros? (0)
(c) If you collect the first 62 boxes, how much will you earn in euros? (0)
(d) If you collect the first 79 boxes, how much will you earn in euros? (0)
2. Suppose that the bomb is located in the 75th box.
(a) If you collect the first 21 boxes, how much will you earn in euros? (2.1)
(b) If you collect the first 38 boxes, how much will you earn in euros? (3.8)
(c) If you collect the first 62 boxes, how much will you earn in euros? (6.2)
(d) If you collect the first 79 boxes, how much will you earn in euros? (0)
3. Do you agree with the following: The location of the bomb depends on
how many boxes you decide to collect. (No)
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C.2 Auction markets
C.2.1 Instructions
Instructions (part 2)
This part of the experiment will consist of a sequence of 50 auctions.
Money in this experiment is expressed in tokens (Examples are not
representative for the values in the experiment).
General procedure - In each auction one fictive object is auctioned off. You
and three other participants submit integer bids to buy the object. This
object has a private value to each bidder called the “private value”. The
private value of the object is the number of tokens the experimenter pays
you in case you buy it. The bidder with the highest bid buys the object (ties
are broken randomly) and pays her/his own bid. Hence, your payoff is
equal to your personal private value minus your bid when you buy, or zero,
otherwise.Example: Suppose your private value is 8000 and your bid is
7000. If 7000 is the highest bid among all four bidders you earn 8000 – 7000
= 1000 tokens, otherwise you earn zero.
Private value - Before each auction, a new individual private value between
zero and 10,000 is randomly picked by the computer for each bidder. Each
number within this interval is equally probable. Private values thus differ
for all participants and across all auction rounds!
Auction payoff – Your payoff equals “private value-bid” when you have
submitted the highest bid, and zero, otherwise. (Note: bids above your
private value lead to negative earnings!) Your total payoff in euros is the
sum of all earnings from the 50 auctions expressed in tokens divided by
1500 (thus the exchange rate is 1500 tokens = 1 euro).
Other bidders - The three other bidders are selected from the bidders in
this room. Neither you nor they know the identity of the other bidders.
Feedback – Information about the result of the auction will be provided
after each auction. Besides knowing your own bid and your own private
value, you will learn whether you won the auction (and thus whether you
buy the object or not) as well as your earnings in this round and your total
earnings over all rounds.
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C.2.2 Comprehension questions (shown on screen and discussed
afterwards)
Stage 1: Generate an example:
Please enter five different numbers (between 0 and 10,000) in decreasing
order! We use them to provide an example.
-Enter the highest number: (recorded as private value of winner)
-Enter the second highest number: (recorded a bid 2=winning bid)
-Enter the third highest number: (recorded as bid 3)
-Enter the fourth highest number: (recorded as bid 4)
-Enter the lowest number: (recorded as bid 5)
Stage 2: Entered numbers under step 1 are used in the following
questions (correct answers in parentheses):
Four bidders submit the following bids:
Bidder 1: (bid 3)
Bidder 2: (bid 2)
Bidder 3: (bid 5)
Bidder 4: (bid 4)
Who buys the object? (Bidder 2)
What is the price (in tokens) s/he has to pay? (bid 2)
Suppose the private value of the highest bidder equals (bid 2). What is the
buyer’s payoff in tokens? (private value of winner - bid 2)
What is the payoff of all other bidders in tokens? (0)
Stage 3: Subject is shown the correct answers on screen. The instructor
explains the correct answers and asks if there are any further questions.
197
C.2 Auction markets
C.2.1 Instructions
Instructions (part 2)
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private value lead to negative earnings!) Your total payoff in euros is the
sum of all earnings from the 50 auctions expressed in tokens divided by
1500 (thus the exchange rate is 1500 tokens = 1 euro).
Other bidders - The three other bidders are selected from the bidders in
this room. Neither you nor they know the identity of the other bidders.
Feedback – Information about the result of the auction will be provided
after each auction. Besides knowing your own bid and your own private
value, you will learn whether you won the auction (and thus whether you
buy the object or not) as well as your earnings in this round and your total
earnings over all rounds.
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C.2.2 Comprehension questions (shown on screen and discussed
afterwards)
Stage 1: Generate an example:
Please enter five different numbers (between 0 and 10,000) in decreasing
order! We use them to provide an example.
-Enter the highest number: (recorded as private value of winner)
-Enter the second highest number: (recorded a bid 2=winning bid)
-Enter the third highest number: (recorded as bid 3)
-Enter the fourth highest number: (recorded as bid 4)
-Enter the lowest number: (recorded as bid 5)
Stage 2: Entered numbers under step 1 are used in the following
questions (correct answers in parentheses):
Four bidders submit the following bids:
Bidder 1: (bid 3)
Bidder 2: (bid 2)
Bidder 3: (bid 5)
Bidder 4: (bid 4)
Who buys the object? (Bidder 2)
What is the price (in tokens) s/he has to pay? (bid 2)
Suppose the private value of the highest bidder equals (bid 2). What is the
buyer’s payoff in tokens? (private value of winner - bid 2)
What is the payoff of all other bidders in tokens? (0)
Stage 3: Subject is shown the correct answers on screen. The instructor
explains the correct answers and asks if there are any further questions.
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C.2.3 Additional information loser regret treatment after period 25
(shown on screen and read out)
In the remaining auctions, the winning bid (= highest bid) will be made
public to all bidders. Moreover, you will also learn your "missed
opportunity" value. This value is always 0 when you DO win the auction or
when your private value is below the winning bid amount, and otherwise it
is your private value minus the winning bid amount. The "missed
opportunity" value tells you the maximum amount of tokens you could
have made by bidding higher than you did. This of course only makes
sense when your private value is higher than the winning bid, meaning
that you could have actually won the auction without bidding higher than
your private value! For example: when your private value is 2000 and your
bid is 1500 but the winning bid is 1750, your missed opportunity is equal
to: 2000-1750=250. This is what you could have earned by bidding slightly
over the winning bid of 1750. Again, when your private value is lower than
the winning bid or you won the auction, there would have been no room
for improvement and your missed opportunity value thus equals 0.
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Appendix D
Appendix to Chapter 5
D.1 Call market instructions91
Instructions for part 2 of the experiment
The second part of the experiment consists of a sequence of trading periods
in which you will have the opportunity to buy and sell shares from a hy-
pothetical company that pay a certain dividend at the end of each period.
Money in this part is expressed in ’gulden’. First, we will show you how
to trade in the market platform. After that we will describe the dividend
payment procedure.
1. How to trade
Find a screenshot of the trading platform below and on your screen. You
will see this platform in each of 12 independent periods.
Figure D.1: Call market screen
91These specific instructions apply to the first two sessions only as the dividends and
probabilities of the first four periods were changed (to those of Regime 3) in the final two
sessions. Apart from this difference, the instructions were similar for all four sessions.
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At the beginning of each period, every participant (trader) is provided with
an endowment of gulden and shares. All market participants receive an
endowment of 7,000 gulden and five shares. This endowment will be shown
on your trading screen. Note that 5,000 guldens of your total of 7000 guldens
represents a loan which you will be required to return at the end of each
trading period. All participants will be divided over three markets of equal
size. You thus only trade with participants of the same market.
How to buy shares
If you want to buy shares, you can do so by following these steps:
1. Enter the number of shares you are willing to buy in the field “Number
of shares you would like to buy”.
2. Enter the highest price for which you are willing to buy each share in the
field “Highest price for which you would like to buy“.
How to sell shares
If you want to sell shares, you can do so by following these steps.
1. Enter the number of shares you are willing to sell in the field “Number of
shares you would like to sell”.
2. Enter the lowest price for which you are willing to sell each share in the
field “Lowest price for which you would like to sell“.
Once you have entered your buy and sell orders you click the ’confirm entry’
button.
Restrictions (will be enforced by the computer):
Budget constraints:
• The price you are willing to buy for must be lower than the price you are
willing to sell for.
• You cannot offer to sell more shares than your share endowment, i.e. Num-
ber of shares you would like to sell must be 5 or less.
• The total amount you would have to pay when buying cannot exceed your
Gulden endowment, i.e. the number of shares you would like to buy times
the highest price for which you would like to buy has to be smaller than
7,000 Gulden.
200
Submission constraints:
• If you don’t want to buy or sell shares, just type zero in the “Number of
shares you would like to buy” field or in the “Number of shares you would
like to sell” field respectively.
• Due to programming reasons price quotes need to be positive (> 1). But
when the quantity is zero the price quotes are not recorded.
As soon as you click the “Confirm Entry” button, your sell offers and buy
offers will be submitted.
Execution of trades:
The computer uses the offers to buy and the to offers sell of all market par-
ticipants to determine the market price. All transactions in this period will
be processed at this unique price. This price will be such that the number
of shares with offers to sell below or equal to this price is the same as the
number of shares with offers to buy higher or equal to this price.
•The market participants who submitted offers to buy above this market
price, will buy at this price. Their Gulden endowment will be reduced by
the total amount paid, i.e. market price ×number of shares purchased. Their
share endowment will be increased by the number of shares purchased.
•The market participants who submitted offers to sell below this market
price will sell at this price. Their Gulden endowment will be increased by
the total amount received, i.e., market price × number of shares sold. Their
share endowment will be decreased by the number of shares sold.
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2. Value of Shares
Shares in the hypothetical company pay a dividend at the end of each period.
For the first four periods the dividend payment is as follows: one of you
throws a twelve-sided dice. When the dice shows 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6, the
dividend equals 240 Gulden, and when the dice shows 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, or
12 the dividend equals 660 Gulden. You will receive information about the
possible dividend payments and their probabilities in the rest of the periods
after period four has ended.
3. Payoff
After each period you learn your period payoff. The payoff depends on the
market price, the shares sold/purchased, the dividend realized and your
endowment as shown in the below table:.
Payoff if you have sold shares
(5 shares - shares sold) x dividend
+ 7000 + (shares purchased x market price) -5000
Payoff if you have purchased shares
(5 shares + shares purchased) x dividend
+ 7000 - (shares purchased x market price) -5000
After the experiment, an experimenter will come to you and let you throw
a dice to randomly pick one period out of the first four, second four and
final four periods for your payment in cash. This means that every trade in
each of the periods might be essential for your actual payment! Your gulden
earnings from the drawn periods will be added and paid out in euros at
a rate of 666.67 gulden=1 euro. Thus, your final payment from the market
experiment is:
(Payoff drawn from the first four periods + Payoff drawn from the second four
periods+Payoff drawn from the final four periods) / 666.67
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4. Some hints for trading
What if you do not want to buy or sell:
• If you don’t want to buy, enter 0 into the field “Number of shares you
would like to buy“, and an arbitrary price.
• If you don’t want to sell, enter 0 into the field “Number of shares you
would like to sell“, and an arbitrary price.
What if you want to buy or sell for any price:
• If you want to buy at any price, enter the number of shares you want to
buy into the field “Number of shares you would like to buy“, and a very
high number in the field “Highest price for which you would like to buy“
(e.g. 1000). However, your amount to pay needs to be lower than your
Gulden endowment.
• If you want to sell at any price, enter the number of shares you want to
sell into the field “Number of shares you would like to sell“, and a very low
price in the field “Lowest price for which you would like to sell“ (e.g. 1).
When do you make a sure loss:
• For all periods it is true that buying for a price above the highest dividend
leads to a sure loss.
•You also make a sure loss when selling for a price below the lowest divi-
dend.
A final note:
• There might be situations in which the number of shares to buy exceeds
the number of shares to sell at a certain price. In this case your orders might
be only filled in part. E.g. at a price of X we have 12 offers to buy and 8
offers to sell. In this case, 8 offers randomly chosen from 12 offers to buy
will be matched with the 8 offers to sell. The same procedure applies vice
versa if the number of shares to sell exceeds the number of shares to buy
at a certain price. The Gulden account and share accounts will be updated
accordingly.
Are there any questions?
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D.2 Additional tables
Table D.1: Subject pool demographics
Variable Mean Median Min Max Std. dev.
Age 22.15 22.00 19.00 37.00 2.99
Male 56.25% - - - -
Economics 37.50% - - - -
Business 19.79% - - - -
Notes: N=96. Subjects’ demographics. ’Male’ stands for the precentage of males in our sub-
ject population, ’Economics’ and ’Business’ stand for the percentage of participants studying
economics and business respectively.
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D.3 Additional figures
Figure D.2: BRET-score distribution
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Figure D.3: Mean transaction prices
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Notes: Mean transaction prices per session subdivided by market (HRA, MRA, LRA) and
dividend regime (’R1’, ’R2’ and ’R3’ indicate dividend regimes 1, 2 and 3 respectively).
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Figure D.4: Mean transaction volumes
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Notes: Mean transaction volumes per session subdivided by market (HRA, MRA, LRA) and
dividend regime (’R1’, ’R2’ and ’R3’ indicate dividend regimes 1, 2 and 3 respectively).
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Notes: Mean transaction volumes per session subdivided by market (HRA, MRA, LRA) and
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Figure D.5: Bid prices
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Notes: Mean bid prices per session subdivided by market (HRA, MRA, LRA) and dividend
regime (’R1’, ’R2’ and ’R3’ indicate dividend regimes 1, 2 and 3 respectively).
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Figure D.6: Bid quantities
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Notes: Bid quantities (avg. per trader) per session subdivided by market (HRA, MRA, LRA)
and dividend regime (’R1’, ’R2’ and ’R3’ indicate dividend regimes 1, 2 and 3 respectively).
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Notes: Mean bid prices per session subdivided by market (HRA, MRA, LRA) and dividend
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Notes: Bid quantities (avg. per trader) per session subdivided by market (HRA, MRA, LRA)
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Figure D.7: Ask prices
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Notes: Mean ask prices per session subdivided by market (HRA, MRA, LRA) and dividend
regime (’R1’, ’R2’ and ’R3’ indicate dividend regimes 1, 2 and 3 respectively).
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Figure D.8: Ask quantities
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Notes: Ask quantities (avg. per trader) per session subdivided by market (HRA, MRA, LRA)
and dividend regime (’R1’, ’R2’ and ’R3’ indicate dividend regimes 1, 2 and 3 respectively).
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Figure D.7: Ask prices
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Nederlandse samenvatting
(Dutch summary)
In dit proefschrift heb ik onderzoek gedaan naar de invloed van verschil-
lende karaktereigenschappen op zowel individueel handelsgedrag als markt
gerelateerde uitkomsten in zowel aandelenmarkten als veilingen. Hiervoor
is gebruik gemaakt van experimenteel economische methoden die ons in
staat hebben gesteld om de invloed van deze karaktereigenschappen te on-
derzoeken en tegelijkertijd alle mogelijk correlerende andere variabelen con-
stant te houden. De methode bestaat uit een tweedelig experiment waarin
allereerst de relevante karaktereigenschap wordt gemeten met behulp van
een individuele experimentele taak en vervolgens deze scores worden ge-
bruikt om markten samen te stellen met een toenemende gemiddelde score,
waarbij de verschillen in scores dienen als het treatment effect.
In hoofdstuk 2 is bovenstaande methode gebruikt om de invloed van
speculatie op het ontstaan van prijsbubbels in aandelenmarkten te onder-
zoeken. Theoretisch is dit verband meerdere malen verondersteld maar het
is lastig om dit verband zonder het gebruik van experimentele methodes in
de praktijk vast te stellen. Om de neiging naar speculatie op individueel
niveau te meten hebben we een nieuwe experimentele taak ontwikkeld, de
’Speculation Elicitation Task’ (SET), die qua opzet veel gemeen heeft met de
aandelenmarkt die we in deel twee van het experiment gebruiken om het
ontstaan van prijsbubbels te bestuderen. Specifiek, in zowel de SET als in de
experimentele aandelen markten is het onstaan van een bubbel irrationeel op
marktniveau maar kan het op individueel niveau rationeel zijn om toch te
speculeren als de veronderstelde kans op het kunnen doorverkopen van het
aandeel hoog genoeg is. Onze resultaten laten zien dat de neiging tot specu-
latie—gemeten door middel van de SET-score—significant samenhangt met
de grootte van bubbels die ontstaan in de verschillende markten.
In hoofdstuk 3 hebben we het tweedelig experimentele ontwerp aange-
wend om de relatie tussen het disposition effect en prijsonderreactie vol-
gend op het toedienen van informatie aangaande het dividend aan insiders
te bestuderen. De verwachting is dat in een market met daarin relatief veel
handelaren met een hoge disposition bias de onderreactie volgende op deze
nieuwe informatie sterker zal zijn dan in een market met relatief veel han-
delaren met een lagere disposition bias. Deze relatie is al aangetoond in het
geval van nieuwe publieke informatie aangaande het toekomstig dividend,
maar nog niet in het geval van informatie die alleen bekend is bij een groep
insiders. Onze resultaten laten relatief zwak bewijs zien voor deze stelling,
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al is het individuele gedrag van de insiders wel sterk in lijn met hun dispo-
sition bias. Namelijk, we zien dat insiders met een hoge disposition bias een
relatief sterke neiging hebben om een aandeel aan te houden (verkopen) na
het ontvangen van negatief (positief) nieuws.
De relatie tussen risico aversie en de (theoretisch gezien) te hoge biedin-
gen in First Price Sealed Bid (FPSB) veilingen staat centraal in hoofdstuk 4.
Deze relatie kan intuïtief verklaard worden door te stellen dat personen met
een hoge mate van risico aversie bang zijn om een veiling te verliezen en
dit compenseren door hoger te bieden. We meten de mate van risico aversie
door middel van de relatief eenvoudig toe te dienen en te begrijpen Bomb
Risk Elicitation Task (BRET). In het tweede deel van ons experiment stellen
we veilingmarkten samen met toenemende gemiddelde risico aversie. In to-
taal bieden de deelnemers in deze markten 50 maal op een goed waarvoor
ze een privé waardering hebben gekregen. Als ze de bieding winnen, krij-
gen ze het verschil tussen hun winnende bod en deze privé waarde. In de
eerste 25 biedingen wordt het winnende bod niet bekend gemaakt maar in
de laatste 25 biedingen wel. Hiermee kunnen we naast risico aversie ook
het additionele effect van de aversie aangaande spijt meten, hetgeen recen-
telijk is aangedragen als een alternatieve verklaring voor het waargenomen
biedingsgedrag. Onze resultaten laten zien dat biedingsgedrag inderdaad
positief samenhangt met de mate van risico aversie en dat deze relatie ro-
buust is tegen de introductie van spijt aversie in de laatste 25 ronden.
Tot slot onderzoeken we de relatie tussen risico aversie en zowel indivi-
dueel handelsgedrag als geaggregeerde markt uitkomsten in call markets in
hoofdstuk 5. Hoewel de relatie tussen risico aversie in de waardering van
risicovolle instrumenten als aandelen theoretisch sterk is onderbouwd, is er
relatief gezien nog maar weinig bewijs dat deze relatie ook daadwerkelijk
in de praktijk standhoudt. Bovendien zijn de papers die dit (experimenteel)
onderzoeken vaak gericht op andersoortige markten (voornamelijk double
auction markets) waarin potentieel andere dynamische effecten een rol spe-
len. Net als in hoofdstuk 4 maken we ook in hoofdstuk 5 gebruik van de
BRET om risico aversie op individueel niveau te meten in het eerste deel
van het experiment. In het tweede deel van het experiment worden deze
BRET scores gebruikt om call markets samen te stellen met een toenemende
gemiddelde mate van risico aversie. Onze resultaten laten weinig tot geen
verband zien tussen risico aversie en handelsgedrag op individueel niveau
alsmede transactie prijzen en volumes op het markt niveau. We beargumen-
teren dat dit mede zou kunnen komen door de eigenschappen van de door
ons gebruikte call markets.
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